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One of the main goals of a cryptographic system is to provide authentication, which 
simply means providing assurance about the content and origin of communicated mes­
sage.
Historically, cryptography began with secret writing and this remained the main 
area of development until very recently. With the rapid progress in data communi­
cation, the need for providing message integrity and authenticity has escalated to the 
extent that currently authentication is seen as the more urgent goal of cryptographic 
systems.
Traditionally, it was assumed that a secrecy system provides authentication by the 
virtue of the secret key being only known by the intended communicants; this would 
prevent an enemy from constructing a fraudulent message. It is a fairly recent real­
ization that secrecy and authenticity are quite distinct goals. In classical or private 
cryptography these two concepts were closely intertwined. While secrecy depended 
on the message being unintelligible to any receiver who did not know the secret key, 
authenticity depended on the inability of anyone without knowledge of the secret key 
to produce a ciphertext that would decipher to an intelligible message. Simmons ar­
gued that the two goals of cryptography are independent. He shows that a system 
that provides perfect secrecy might not provide any protection against authentication 
threats. Similarly, a system can provide perfect authentication without concealing the 
message.
This thesis will deal with authentication theory.
Chapter 1 reviews the basic concepts of authentication theory, some fundamental 
results and constructions of authentication schemes.
In Chapter 2, we study the application of algebraic curves over finite fields to the 
constructions of universal hash functions and unconditionally secure authentication 
codes.
The theory of algebraic curves over finite fields has many applications in coding
v
theory and it has been observed by several authors that coding theory, universal hash 
families and authentication codes are closely related. This has led researchers to nat­
urally consider the algebraic-geometric codes based on some specified algebraic curves 
to construct universal hash families and authentication codes. We pursue this direction 
of research. However, unlike the earlier approach, which composes a family of efficient 
geometric codes to obtain a strongly universal hash family, known as “composition 
method” , we instead provide a direct construction of strongly universal hash families 
from the algebraic curves over finite fields without using the composition method. We 
show that our constructions result in new classes of strongly universal hash families 
and authentication codes which have the best performance known so far.
In Chapter 3, we study multireceiver authentication codes (MRA-codes). MRA- 
codes were introduced by Desmedt, Frankel and Yung in 1992 as an extension of Sim­
mons’ model of unconditionally secure authentication. In an MRA-code, a sender 
wants to authenticate a message for a group of receivers such that each receiver can 
individually verify authenticity of the received message. The receivers are not trusted 
and may try to construct fraudulent messages on behalf of the sender. If the fraudu­
lent message is acceptable by even one receiver the attackers have succeeded. This is 
a useful extension of traditional authentication codes and has numerous applications.
In this chapter we start by giving a formal definition of an MRA-code and use it to 
derive information theoretic bounds on the probability of success in impersonation and 
substitution attack against a single receiver for a general MRA-code. These bounds 
are used to obtain lower bounds on the the number of keys of the sender and receivers, 
and also lower bound on the length of the transmitted codeword in terms of deception 
probability of the system. This is followed by a review of the known constructions of 
MRA-codes, pointing out their shortcomings and giving constructions that alleviate 
these shortcomings.
In Chapter 4, we introduce and investigate multireceiver authentication codes with 
dynamic senders (DMRA-code). MRA-codes can be seen as the first attempt in provid­
ing authentication in group communication. However in this model the sender is fixed. 
We remove this limitation by introducing the new model of DMRA-codes to allow the 
sender to be dynamic. The extended model of DMRA-codes captures the essential as­
pect of authentication problem in group communication with many applications such 
as dynamic conference key distributions.
In this chapter we introduce the model and give the formal definition of DMRA- 
codes. We prove the lower bounds on size of the key and codeword, and give an
vi
optimal construction that meets the bounds. We also describe efficient constructions 
from key distribution patterns and perfect hash families. We consider systems with 
multiple senders and present two constructions. As one application, we propose a 
secure dynamic conference authenticated system based on our new model. Finally, 
computationally secure group authentication systems are also discussed.
Chapter 5 deals with shared generation of authenticator systems (SGA-systems). 
SGA-systems are a generalisation of Simmons’ traditional model o f authentication 
where authenticating a message (also called a source state) requires collaboration of a 
group of senders. In a (i, n) threshold SGA-system  any group of t senders is an autho­
rised group and no coalition of t — 1 (or less) senders can produce a valid authenticator 
for a source state (impersonation attack) or, after seeing a valid codeword can produce 
a valid authenticator for a different source state (substitution attack). This means that 
in a (t, n) threshold SGA-systems receiving an authenticated codeword implies autho­
risation o f at least t senders. SGA-systems are an important cryptographic primitive 
in distributed systems where a number of parties located at distant geographic location 
are to collaboratively authorise an action, sign a document or share responsibility.
Threshold SGA-systems are part of a general approach to cryptography, known as 
threshold cryptography which has received considerable attention in recent years. While 
computationally secure threshold authentication, e.g. threshold RSA and DSS signa­
ture have been studied extensively, the information-theoretic secure model, i.e. thresh­
old SGA-systems has received much less attention. Unconditionally secure threshold 
SGA-systems were first introduced by Desmedt, Frankel and Yung in 1992. The ba­
sic idea behind their schemes is to combine a traditional A-code and a secret sharing 
scheme to construct a threshold SGA-system. We note that a naive application of 
a secret sharing scheme to share the secret authentication key among the senders is 
not acceptable simply because it requires full trust on the combiner and in fact allows 
him to authenticate any message of his choice and without requiring any collaboration „ 
from senders, after receiving partial authenticators from an authorised group. The key 
assumption in an SGA-system is that the combiner is not trusted and the combining 
operation does not require any secret information.
In this chapter we formally define the model of threshold SGA-systems and their 
important parameters, and then we derive information-theoretic and combinatorial 
lower bounds on (£, n) SGA-systems. We present two efficient (i, n) SGA-systems and 
show how to build new threshold SGA-systems for large groups from old ones (small 
groups) by using perfect hash families. We also discuss the robustness in SGA-systems
Vll
and propose two constructions.
Chapter 6 studies multiplicative secret sharing schemes. Secret sharing schemes, 
introduced independently by Shamir and Blakely in 1979, are one of the main building 
blocks of secure distributed computation. A secret sharing scheme gives a method 
of breaking a secret into shares that are distributed among members o f a group V, 
called participants, such that only authorised subgroups of 'P can recover the secret. 
To generate the shares of a secret, a dealer uses a random input to select a distribution 
rule that determines the share given to each participant. In a perfect secret sharing 
scheme unauthorised subgroups do not learn anything about the secret. In a (t , n) 
threshold scheme, any group of at least t out of n users can recover the secret.
Multiplicative secret sharing schemes play an important role in the constructions 
of SGA systems and MRA-codes. In this chapter, We introduce a new approach to 
constructing new threshold schemes from old ones. The basic idea is to start with the 
set of shares generated for an instance of the original scheme and then form the shares 
of the new scheme as subsets of the shares of the old one. To form the subsets, we 
introduce a new combinatorial structure, called a strong cover free family. Cover-free 
families are extensively studied by various authors and have found numerous applica­
tions in cryptography. Strong cover-free families are a special case of cover-free families 
that can be constructed in a number of ways and in particular using universal classes of 
hash functions and error correcting codes. Distributing shares to the new participants 
according to the blocks of a strong cover-free family results in a threshold scheme which 
inherits security and structural properties of the original scheme, that is perfectness, 
homomorphic and multiplicative property, with the same randomness o f the original 
scheme.




C ry p tog ra p h y  is the science and study of secret writing. A ciph er is a secret method 
of writing, whereby a p la in text (or c leartext) is transformed into a c iph ertext. The 
process of transforming the plaintext into the ciphertext is called en cryp tion ; the 
reverse process of transforming the ciphertext into the plaintext is called d ecryp tion . 
Both encryption and decryption are controlled by a cryptographic key or a number of 
cryptographic keys.
The traditional goal of a communications engineer is to ensure that the message 
delivered to the destination is the same as that sent by the sender. The enemy is noise. 
Cryptography by contrast has two goals: secrecy and/or authenticity. A cryptographer 
may seek to ensure that the message is intelligible only to the intended receiver -  the 
enemy is the “eavesdropper” who overhears the transmitted signals. The cryptographer 
may seek instead (or also) to ensure that the identity of the sender and the integrity of 
the message can be unmistakely verified by the receiver -  the enemy is the “spoofer” 
who can originate, or tamper with, transmitted signals.
It is a fairly recent realization that secrecy and authenticity are quite distinct goals.
In classical or private cryptography these two concepts were closely intertwined. While 
secrecy depended on the message being unintelligible to any receiver who did not know 
the secret key, authenticity depended on the inability of anyone without knowledge of 
the secret key to produce a ciphertext that would decipher to an intelligible message. . 
It was only with the introduction of public-key cryptography by Diffie and Heilman
[43] in 1976 that it became clear that secrecy and authenticity did not always go hand- 
in-hand.
In 1949, Shannon [98] provided a theoretical foundation for cryptography based 
on his fundamental work on information theory [97]. He measured the protection of 
a cipher by the uncertainty about the plaintext given the received ciphertext. If, no 
matter how much ciphertext is intercepted, nothing can be learned about the plaintext, 
the cipher achieves perfect secrecy.
IX
We shall follow Shannon’s lead in distinguishing between the two types of cryp­
tographic security: theoretical security and practical security. “Theoretical security 
means that security is unconditional, that is, the cryptographic system provides against 
an enemy who has unlimited computational resources available to him. “Practical secu­
rity” means, the system is computationally secure, it provides against an enemy with 
finite computational resources. A system is theoretically secure, or unconditionally 
secure, if it is impossible to break regardless of how much effort the enemy cryptana­
lyst expends. A system is practically secure, or computationally secure if its breaking 
requires a computational effort beyond the enemy’s means.
The theory of unconditionally secure authentication is still very young. The initial 
study appears to be Gilbert, MacWilliams and Sloane’s landmark paper “Codes which 
detect deception” [56] in 1974. In the beginning of 80’s Simmons placed this subject in 
a more general setting and developed a more systematic theory. Because o f its young 
age, many researchers feel that the theory of unconditionally secure authentication is 
not so well developed and established.
A completely different solution to the same problem appeared in 1976 when Diffie 
and Heilman introduced the concept of a digital signature. Here the solution depends 
on the assumption that certain difficult problems cannot be solved efficiently [43]. For 
example, it is hard to factor large numbers.
In this thesis, we will be mainly concerned with the theoretical security of crypto­
graphic systems. We will study unconditionally secure authentication schemes. The 
unconditionally secure authentication theory draws heavily from mathematics and com­
puter science, it has been studied from many different areas, for example in design the­
ory, finite geometry, finite field, coding theory and information theory. In this thesis, 
we will focus on authentication systems in distributed environments. We have been 
interested in both theoretical and practical aspects.
Here is a brief summary of the chapters:
• Chapter 1. Introduction, introduces the basic concepts of authentication codes, 
briefly reviews some fundamental results in authentication theory.
• Chapter 2. Authentication Codes and Universal Hashing from Algebraic Curves, 
studies the application of algebraic curves over finite fields to the constructions 
of universal hash functions and unconditionally secure authentication codes. We 
show that the construction from Garcia-Stichtenoth curves yields new classes of 
authentication code and universal hash families which are substantially better 
than those previously known.
x
• Chapter 3. Multireceiver Authentication Codes (MRA-codes), studies authen­
tication in multireceiver environments. We extend the mathematical model of 
multireceiver authentication codes and derive the information-theoretic and com­
binatorial bounds for such systems. We also give some new optimal MRA-codes 
from coding theory.
• Chapter 4- Multireceiver Authentication Codes with Dynamic Senders (DMRA- 
codes), continues the study of MRA-codes. We introduce the model of MRA- 
codes with dynamic senders, called DMRA-codes, we derive the combinatorial 
bounds and present several methods for constructions of DMRA-codes. We also 
address the application of DMRA-codes in secure group communications.
• Chapter 5. Shared Generation of Authenticator systems (SGA-systems), deals 
with threshold authentication systems. We derive the information-theoretic and 
combinatorial bounds for (t , n) threshold authentication codes and present new 
constructions. We also introduce the model of robust threshold authentication 
and give two efficient constructions.
• Chapter 6. Multiplicative Secret Sharing and Threshold Authentication Codes, 
explores the connection between threshold authentication codes and secret shar­
ing schemes. We show how a threshold authentication code can be constructed 
by a multiplicative secret sharing scheme and a linear authentication. We then 
study the efficient construction for multiplicative secret sharing schemes.
Part of this thesis appear in the following papers.
• New Results on Multireceiver Authentication Codes, In Advances in Cryptology 
- EUROCRYPT ’98, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 1403 (1998), 527-541.
• Bounds and Constructions for Multireceiver Authentication Codes, In ‘Ad- * 
vances in Cryptology - ASIACRYPT ’98’ Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 
1514(1998), 242-256.
• Multireceiver Authentication Codes: Model, Bounds, Constructions and Exten­
sions, Information and Computation, Vol. 151, No. 1/2, 1999, 148-172.
• Constructions o f authentication codes from algebraic curves over finite fields, 
IEEE Trans. IT, Vol.46, 2000, 886-892 (also presented in the Rump session 
at Crypto’99).
xi
• Broadcast authentication in group communication, Theoretical Computer Sci­
ence, to appear in 2001. (also appeared in ‘Advances in Cryptology - ASI- 
ACRYPT ’98’ , Lecture Notes in Computer Science No, 1716, 1999, 399-41.
• Bounds and Constructions for  Threshold Shared Generation o f Authenticators, 
International Journal of Computer Mathematics, to appear (also apperaed in Pro­
ceedings of the Eleventh Australasian Workshop on Combinatorial Algorithms, 
AWOCA 2000, 93-110).
• Optimal Multireceiver Authentication Codes from Error-Correcting Codes, sub­
mitted, 1999.
• Multiplicative secret sharing schemes and strong cover-free families, to be sub­
mitted.
During my PhD studies, I also wrote and published the following papers which I 
have not included in this thesis.
• On Syntactic Nuclei of Rational Languages Information Processing Letters, 
Vol67, No.5,1998, 221-226.
• On Rational Languages and Rational Series Theoretical Computer Science. Vol. 
205, No. 1-2, 329-336, 1998.
• (with Ghodosi H., Pieprzyk J., Safavi-Naini R ) On Construction o f Cumulative 
Secret Sharing Schemes, In Proceedings of ACISP’98 (Australian Conference on 
Information Security and Privacy), Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 1438, 
378-390, 1998.
• (with Martin K M, Pieprzyk J, Safavi-Naini R) Secret Sharing with a Variable 
Threshold, Australian Computer Journal, Vol. 31, No.2, 1999, 34-43. (also ap­
pears in Proceedings of Information Security and Privacy Conference, Lecture 
Notes in Computer Science, No. 1578, Spring-Verlag, 177-191, 1999).
• (with Martin K M, Safavi-Naini R) Bounds and Techniques for  Efficient Redistri­
bution of Secret Shares to New Access Structures, The Computer Journal, Vol.42, 
No. 8, 638-649, 1999.
• (with Desmedt Y, Safavi-Naini R, Charnes C and Pieprzyk J) Broadcast Anti­
jamming Systems, ICON’99, Proceedings of the IEEE International Conference 
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Introduction to Authentication Theory
One of the main goals of a cryptographic system is to provide authentication, which 
simply means providing assurance about the content and origin of communicated mes­
sage.
Historically, cryptography began with secret writing and this remained the main 
area of development until very recently. With the rapid progress in data communi­
cation, the need for providing message integrity and authenticity has escalated to the 
extent that currently authentication is seen as the more urgent goal of cryptographic 
systems.
Traditionally, it was assumed that a secrecy system provides authentication by the 
virtue of the secret key being only known by the intended communicants; this would 
prevent an enemy from constructing a fraudulent message. Simmons [99] argued that 
the two goals of cryptography are independent. He shows that a system that pro­
vides perfect secrecy might not provide any protection against authentication threats. 
Similarly, a system can provide perfect authentication without concealing the message.
In this thesis, we use the term communication system to encompass message trans­
mission as well as storage. The system consists of one or more transmitters (or senders) 
who want to send a message, one or more receivers who are the intended recipients of 
the message, and an enemy (or opponent) who attempts to construct a fraudulent 
message with the aim of getting it accepted by the receiver unwittingly. The commu­
nication is assumed to be over a public channel, and hence the communicated message 
can be seen by all the principals. An authentication threat is an attempt by an enemy 
in the system to modify a communicated message or inject a fraudulent message into 
the channel. In a secrecy system the attacker is passive, while in an authentication sys­
tem the enemy is active and not only observes the communicated message and gathers 
information such as plaintext and ciphertext, but also actively interacts with the sys­
tem to achieve its goal. This view of the system clearly explains Simmons’ motivation 
for basing authentication systems on game theory.
1
1.1. Authentication Model 2
The most important criteria that can be used to classify authentication systems
are:
• the relation between authenticity and secrecy;
• the framework for the security analysis.
The first criterion divides authentication systems into those that provide authen­
tication with and without secrecy. The second criterion divides systems into systems 
with unconditional security and systems with computational security. Unconditional 
security implies that the enemy has unlimited resources while in systems with compu­
tational security, the security relies on the required computation exceeding the enemy’s 
computational power.
These two classifications are orthogonal and produce four subclass. Below we review 
the basic concepts of authentication theory, some known bounds and constructions in 
unconditional security. We then also briefly review computationally secure authenti­
cation systems, also called message authentication codes (or MACs).
1.1 Authentication Model
In Simmons’ model of unconditionally secure authentication, there are three partici­
pants: a transmitter (sender), a receiver and an opponent. The transmission from the 
sender to receiver takes place over an insecure channel. The opponent has access to the 
channel and can insert a message into the channel, or observe a transmitted message 
and replace it with another message.
The information that the sender wants to send is called a source state, denoted by 
s and taken from the finite set S  of possible source states. The source state is mapped 
into a (channel) message, denoted by m and taken from the set of possible messages.
Exactly how this mapping is performed is determined by the secret key, called “the 
encoding rule” , which is denoted by e and taken from the set £  of possible encoding 
rules. The encoding rule is secretly shared between the sender and receiver.
D efin ition  1.1 An authentication code (A-code) is a 4-tuple ( S , £ , M , f ) ,  where f  is 
a mapping from S  x £ to M.
f  : S x £  — > M
such that f ( s , e) =  m and / ( s ',  e) =  m implies s =  s'.
1.1. Authentication Model 3
In the above definition, an important property is that /  satisfies the condition 
/ ( s ,  e) =  m and / ( s 7, e) =  m implies s =  s'. It follows for each e E f ,  / ( . , e )  induces an 
injective mapping from S  to A4. In other words, two different source states cannot be 
mapped into the same message for a given encoding rule. In general, the mapping /  
can be a probabilistic mapping, i.e., / ( s ,e )  may take on one of several possible values 
determined by some probabilistic law. In authentication theory this is called splitting. 
In this thesis, we will only deal with non-splitting A-code.
Given an A-code (<S, £ ,.A d ,/) , in order to authenticate a source state, the sender 
and receiver follow the following protocol. First, they agree on a key e € S which is 
randomly selected, which can be through a trusted way. At a later time, if the sender 
wants to communicate a source state s G S  to the receiver over an insure channel, he 
computes m — / ( s ,e )  and sends m to the receiver. When the receiver receives the 
message m, he checks whether a source s such that f ( s , e) — m  exists. If such an s 
exists, the message m  is accepted as authentic (m is called valid). Otherwise, m  is not 
authentic and thus rejected.
We will study two different types of attacks that the opponent might carry out. 
These attacks are described as follows:
• Im personation : the opponent introduces a message m  into the channel, hoping 
to have it accepted as authentic by the receiver.
• Substitution : the opponent observes a message m in the channel, and then 
changes it to ra7, hoping for m’ to be valid. We demand that message m  and m! 
correspond to different source states.
Associated with each of these attacks is a deception probability, which represents 
the probability that the opponent will successfully deceive the receiver. We assume 
that the opponent chooses the message that maximises his chance of success. These 
probability are denoted by P / for impersonation attack and Ps for substitution attack. 
They are formally defined as follows
Pi =  max P (m  is valid )
Ps =f max P (m 7 is valid | m is valid ).
ra,m ' G/A
m̂ m!
In order to complete P, and Ps , we need to specify a probability distribution on 
S  and £. This will induce a probability distribution on M .  We shall adopt the
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Kerckhoff’s principle that everything in the system except the actual key is public. 
That is, we assume that the authentication code and the probability distributions on 
S  and £  are known to the opponent. The only information that the sender and receiver 
posses that is unknown to the opponent is the value of the key e.
We define £(m)  as the set of keys for which the message m  is valid, i.e.,
£(m) =  { e  G £ : 3s E <S, f ( s ,  e) =  m}.
Then Pj can be expressed as
Pj =  max P (£ (m )).TO
Furthermore, if we assume that the probability distribution on S  and £  are uniform, 
the deception probability can be expressed as
Pi =  maxTO
[ ¿ M l
\ e \
Ps = max
m ,m ' EA4
|£(m)  fl £(m')\
£ ( m )
m̂ m!
Since the opponent can choose between the two attacks, we define the overall deception 
probability of an A-code, defined by Pd , as
PD =  m ax{P /,P 5}.
In an A-code without secrecy, the key is used to compute an authentication tag and 
concatenate to the source state as a message to be transmitted to the receiver. We will 
use the notation (<S, £ , T , f )  to denote A-code without secrecy.
D efin ition  1.2 An A-code ( S , £ , M , f )  for  which the mapping f  : S  x £  — > M  can 
be written as
f  : S  x  £  — > <S x T , / ( ( * ,e ) )  =  (M ),
where s £ S ,t  G T , is called a systematic Cartesian A-code (or A-code without secrecy). 
The second part t in the message is called the tag (or authenticator^.
In an A-code without secrecy, the key is used to compute an authentication tag which 
is concatenated to the source state to form the message that is to be transmitted to 
the receiver. We will use the notation ( S , £ , T , f )  to denote A-code without secrecy.
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In authentication theory, we sometimes consider multiple transmissions: that is, 
a key is used to authenticate multiple messages. An attack is said to be spoofing of 
order r if the opponent has seen r communicated messages and tries to construct a 
fraudulent message under a single key. The opponent’s chance of success in this case 
is denoted by Pr. In particular, Po =  Pi and P\ =  Ps-
1.2 Bounds on the performance of the A-codes
1.2.1 Information-Theoretic Bounds for A-codes
In this subsection, we review some fundamental lower bounds on A-codes which are ob­
tained by using information theory. The security and efficiency o f an A-code (<S, S ,A 4 , f )  
(or (<S ,£ ,T ,/ )  for A-code without secrecy) can be measured by a number of parame­
ters: the deception probabilities Pi and P s , and the size of key space \S\, the size o f the 
message spaces \M\ ( o r  authentication tag |T|). The goal of authentication theory is 
to examine the relationships among these parameters and give constructions that for a 
given source and deception probabilities, have the shortest possible length for the key 
and transmitted message.
We assume that the reader is a familiar with the basic concepts o f information 
theory. A brief review is given in Appendix A. We use X  to denote a set and X  a 
random variable defined on X . Let H ( X )  denote the entropy of the random variable X , 
and let I (X\Y)  denote the mutual information between X  and Y.  We state Simmons’ 
information-theoretic bounds.
T heorem  1.1 (S im m on s’s bou n d  [100, 26]) For any A-code (<S, £, M , f ) ,  we have
(i) P7 >
(ii) Ps >
where E  is the random variable defined on S, and M f, M  are random variables on A4 
such that m' ^  m, m, m' € M . In other words, M ' x M  are random variables on 
M' x M  =  { ( m ', m); vn! ^  m e  M } .
From Theorem 1.1, we have the following corollary. 
C orollary  1.2 In an A-code
Ps > 2~hW m\
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These bounds show how authentication codes provide protection. For the imperson­
ation attack, we see that Pj is lower bounded by the mutual information between the 
transmitted message and the key. This means that in order to have a good protection 
against impersonation attack, i.e., Pj be small, we must give away a lot of information 
about the key. On the other hand, from Corollary 1.2 we know that in the substitution 
attack, Ps is lower bounded by the uncertainty about the key when a message has 
been observed. Thus we cannot waste all the key entropy for protection against the 
impersonation attack, but some certainty about the key must remain for protection 
against the substitution attack.
A general form of Simmons’ bounds for protection against spoofing of order r, 
proved independently by Rosenbaum [90] and Pei [80], is
Pr >  2~I(E'M'\Mr')
where I (E ; M'\Mr) is the mutual information between a string of r transmitted mes­
sages and the key.
1.2.2 Combinatorial Bounds of A-codes
In this subsection, we review some combinatorial lower bounds for A-codes.
In our model of A-code, each source state s maps to a message m. We see among all 
the messages in M ,  at least |5| must be authentic, since every source state maps to a 
different message in M .  Similarly, for the substitution attack, after the observation of 
one legal message, at least \S\ — 1 of the remaining \ M \ -l  messages must be authentic. 
Thus we have







The above theorem shows that in order to have good protection, i.e., PD be small, 
\M\ must be chosen much larger than |«S|. For a fixed source space, an increase in the 
authentication protection implies an increase in message size.
Next, by multiplying the two bounds in Theorem 1.1 and the bound in Corollary
1.2 together, we have
D >  PrPs >  =  2~h{e) .
Since H(E)  <  log|£|, we obtain the famous square root bound.
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Moreover, the above bound can be tight only if \S\ < +  1.
The square root bound gives a direct relation between the key size and the protec­
tion that we can expect to obtain.
The following theorem follows immediately.
T h eorem  1.5 In an A-code (S,S,A4,  f ) ,  assume that Pd =  1 /q, then
(i) \e\ >  <?;
(ii) \M\ > tf|S|.
We call an A-code optimal if the bounds (i), (ii) of Theorem 1.5 can be met with 
equality.
In the remainder of this subsection, we give some characterisations of A-codes from 
some combinatorial objects.
Given an A-code (<S, £, Ad , / ) ,  we can associate an \S\ x \M\ matrix A, called the 
incidence matrix, where A is a binary matrix whose rows are labelled by encoding rules 
(i.e. key) and columns by codewords (i.e., message), such that A(e ,m)  =  1 if m  is a 
valid codeword under e, and A(e, m) =  0, otherwise.
An authentication matrix B  of an A-code without secrecy is a matrix o f size \S \ x |<S| 
whose rows are labelled by the encoding rules, columns by the source states, and 
B(e,  s) =  t ii t is the tag for the source state s under the encoding rule e.
The following combinatorial bounds are the extensions of Theorem 1.3 for A-codes 
to protect against spoofing of order r.
T h eorem  1.6 (%) In an A-code with secrecy
P . > J £ L T  < _ 1 2
(ii) In an A-code without secrecy
Pi> |S|* — I l i )\M i =  1, 2,....
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An A-code that satisfies (i) and (ii) of Theorem 1.6 with equality, that is with Pi =  j 
for A-code with secrecy and Pi =  |«S|/|.M| for A-code without secrecy, is said to provide 
perfect protection for  spoofing of order i. The opponent’s best strategy in spoofing of 
order i for such an A-code is to randomly select one of the remaining codewords.
A-codes that provide perfect protection for all orders of spoofing up to r are said to 
be r-fold secure. These codes can be characterised by using combinatorial structures 
such as orthogonal arrays and ¿-designs.
An orthogonal array OA\(t, k , v ) is an array with Xvl rows, each row of size k, from 
the elements of set X  o f v symbols, such that in any t columns of the array every ¿-tuple 
of elements of X  occurs in exactly A rows. Usually t is referred to as the strength of 
the OA.
E xam ple  1.1 The following table gives a OA.2(2, 5 ,2) on the set { 0 , 1 } :
0 0 0 0 0 
1 1 0  0 0 
0 0 0 1 1 
1 1 0  1 1  
1 0  1 0  1 
0 1 1 0  1 
1 0  1 1 0  
0 1 1 1 0
A t — (vjk,  A) design is a collection of b subsets, each of size k , of a set, A , of size 
v where every subset of size t occurs exactly A times.
The incidence matrix of a t -  (u, k, A) design is a binary matrix, A =  (a^), of size 
b x v such that a# =  1 if element j  is in block i and 0 otherwise.
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E xam ple 1.2 The following table gives a 3—(8,4,1)  design on the set { 0 , 1, 2, 3 , 4 , 5 , 6,7}.
7 0 1 3  
7 1 2  4
7 2 3 5
7 3 4 6
7 4 5 0
7 5 6 1
7 6 0 2
2 4 5 6
3 5 6 0
4 6 0 1
5 0 1 2
6 1 2  3
0 2 3 4
1 3  4 5
with incidence matrix: ,
1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1
0 1 1 0  1 0  0 1
0 0 1 1 0  1 0  1
0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1
1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1
0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1
1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1
0 0 1 0  1 1 1 0
1 0  0 10  1 1 0
1 1 0  0 1 0  1 0
1 1 1 0  0 1 0  0
0 1 1 1 0  0 1 0
1 0  1 1 1 0  0 0
0 1 0  1 1 1 0  0
The main theorem relating A-codes with r-fold security and combinatorial struc­
tures are due to a number of authors, including Stinson [105], and Tombak and Safavi- 
Naini [114]. The following are the most general forms of these theorems.
T heorem  1.7 ([114]) Let the source be r-fold uniform. Then an A-code provides
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r-fold security against spoofing if and only if the incidence matrix of the code is the 
incidence matrix o f a (r +  1) — (|.M|, |<S|, A) design.
In the above theorem, an r-fold uniform source is a source for which every string 
of r distinct source states has probability [¿j(|s|_1).1.(|s|_r+1) -
T h eorem  1.8 Let Pq =  Pi =  • • • =  Pr =  |<S|/|A4|. Then the authentication matrix is 
a OA(r  +  1, |e>|,£), where £ =  |.M|/|<S|.
1.3 Other Issues
1.3.1 Other types of attacks
Tombak and Safavi-Naini [114] consider other types of attacks, similar to those for 
secrecy systems. In a plaintext attack against A-codes with secrecy, the enemy not only 
knows the codeword but also knows the corresponding plaintext. In chosen content 
attack the enemy wants to succeed with a codeword that has a prescribed plaintext. It 
is shown that by applying some transformation on the A-code it is possible to provide 
immunity against the above attacks.
A-codes with secrecy are generally more difficult to analyse than Cartesian A-codes. 
Moreover, the verification process for the former is not as efficient. In the case of 
Cartesian A-codes, verification of a received codeword, (s , t) amounts to recalculating 
the tag using the secret key and the source state s to obtain t! and comparing it with the 
received tag t. For an authentic codeword we have t — t'. In the case of A-codes with 
secrecy, when m  is received, the receiver must compare m with all authentic codewords 
under his secret key to see if m is valid. Otherwise there must be an inverse algorithm 
that allows the receiver to find and verify the source state. The former process is costly 
and the later does not exist for a general A-code. For these reasons, the majority of 
research has been concentrated on Cartesian A-codes.
1.3.2 Authentication codes and error-correcting codes
An error correcting code (EC-code) provides protection against random channel error. 
Study of error correcting code was motivated by Shannon’s channel capacity theorem 
and has been an active research area since early 1950s. Error correcting codes add
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redundancy to a message in such a way that a codeword corrupted by the channel noise 
can be detected and/or corrected. The main different between an A-code and EC-code 
is that in the former redundancy depends on a secret key while in the latter it only 
depends on the message being coded. There exists a duality between authentication 
codes and error correcting codes. In words of Simmons [99], “ ...one (coding theory) is 
concerned with clustering the most likely alterations as closely about the original code 
as possible and the other (authentication theory) with spreading the optimal (to the 
opponent) alterations as uniformly as possible” .
The relationship between EC-code and A-codes is explored in the work of Johansson 
et al [62], who showed that it is possible to construct EC-codes from A-codes and vice­
versa. Their work uses a worst case analysis approach in analysing the security of 
A-codes. That is, in the case of substitution attack, they consider the best chance of 
success an enemy has when the transmitted message ranges over all possible messages. 
This contrasts with the information theoretic (or game theory) approach in which the 
average success probability of the enemy over all possible codewords is calculated.
The work of Johansson et al [62] is especially useful as it allows bounds and asymp­
totic results from the theory of error correcting codes to be employed to derive upper 
and lower bounds on the size of the source for A-codes with given £, T , and Pp.
1.3.3 Authentication with arbiter
In the basic model of authentication discussed above, the enemy is an outsider and 
we assume that the transmitter and the receiver are trustworthy. Moreover, because 
the key is shared by the transmitter and the receiver, the two principals are crypto­
graphically indistinguishable. In an attempt to model authentication systems in which 
the transmitter and the receiver are distinguishable and to remove assumptions about 
the trustworthiness of the two, Simmons [99] introduced a fourth principal called the 
arbiter. The transmitter and receiver have different keys and the arbiter has access 
to all or part of the key information. The system has a key distribution phase during 
which the transmitter uses its key to produce a codeword and finally a distribution 
phase during which disputes are resolved with the aid of the arbiter. The arbiter in 
Simmons’ model is active during the transmission phase and is assumed to be trust­
worthy. Yung and Desmedt [122] removed this assumption and considered a model in 
which the arbiter is only trusted to resolve disputes. Johansson [63] and Kurosawa [70] 
derived lower bounds on the probability of deception in such codes. Johansson [65] 
and Taylor [113] proposed constructions.
3 0009 03278974 0
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1.3.4 Shared generation of authenticators
Many applications require the power to generate an authentic message and/or to verify 
the authenticity of a message to be distributed among a number of principals. An 
example of such a situation is multiple signatures required for a bank account or in 
a court room. Desmedt and Frankel [39] introduced systems with shared generation 
of authenticators (SGA-systems). Safavi-Naini [91], van Dijk, Gehrmann and Smeets
[44], and Martin and Safavi-Naini [73] further studied such systems. In a SGA-system 
there is a group V  of transmitters endowed with an access structure T that determines 
authorised subsets of V. Each principal has a secret key which is used to generate 
a partial tag. The system has two phases. In the key distribution phase, a trusted 
authority generates keys for transmitters and the receiver and securely delivers the 
keys to them. In the communication phase, the trusted authority is not active. When 
an authorised group of transmitters want to construct an authentic codeword, using 
their key information, each group member generates a partial tag for the source state 
s which needs to be authenticated and sends it to a combiner. The combiner is a fixed 
algorithm with no secret input that combines codeword using its secret key. Martin and 
Safavi-Naini [73] give a general construction for SGA-systems by combining A-codes 
and secret sharing schemes, van Dijk et al [44] propose an efficient construction for 
SGA-systems, based on maximum rank distance separable codes.
1.3.5 Broadcast authentication codes
Another interesting extension of Simmons’ traditional authentication code is broadcast 
authentication codes, or multireceiver authentication codes (MRA-codes for short). In 
an MRA-code, a sender wants to authenticate a message for a group of receivers such 
that each receiver can verify authenticity of the received message. The receiver are 
not all trusted and may collude to construct fraudulent messages on behalf of the 
transmitter. This is a useful extension of traditional point-to-point authentication code 
and has numerous applications. For example, a director wants to give instructions to 
employees in an organisation such that each employee is able to verify authenticity of 
the received message. Providing such service using digital signature implies that the 
security is based on unproved assumptions.
Unconditionally secure multireceiver authentication codes are introduced by Desmedt, 
Frankel and Yung in [41]. They have been further studied by other authors (see 
[52, 71, 66, 111, 93, 94, 95]).
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1.3.6 Multiple authentication
As noted before, in the theory of A-codes possible attacks by the enemy are limited 
to impersonation and substitution. This means that the security of the system in only 
for one message and after that the key must be changed. To extend protection over 
more than one message transmission, a number of alternatives exist. The most obvious 
one is to use A-codes that provide protection against spoofing of order i. However, 
little is known about construction of codes for multiple messages. Vanroose, Smeets 
and Wan [119] suggested key strategies in which the communicants change their key 
after each transmitted codeword, using some pre-specified strategy. In this case the 
key information shared by the communicants is the sequence o f keys to be used for 
consecutive transmission slots. The resulting bounds on the probability of deception 
generalise the bounds given by Pei [80], Rosenbaum [90] and Walker [120]. Another 
successful approach proposed by Wegman and Carter [121] uses a special class of hash 
functions together with one time pad of random numbers.
1.4 Computationally Secure Authentication Systems
A message authentication code (MAC) is a symmetric key cryptographic primitive 
that provides computational security against authentication attacks. Although, in this 
thesis, we will only consider unconditional secure A-codes, a brief introduction to MACs 
is included for the sake of completeness.
Message authentication codes (MACs) provide message integrity and are one of 
the most important security primitives in current distributed information systems. 
Informally, A MAC consists of two algorithms. A MAC generation algorithm, G =  
{ G k; k =  1, . . . ,  N }  takes an arbitrary message, s, from a given collection S  o f messages 
and produces a tag, t =  Gk(s), which is appended to the message to produce an 
authentic message m =  (s , t). A MAC verification algorithm, V  =  {Vk : k =  1, . . . ,  N }, 
takes authenticated messages of the form (s,t)  and produces a true or false value, 
depending on whether the message is authentic or not. The security of a MAC is 
measured by the best chance of an active spoofer to successfully substitute a received 
message ( s ,Gk(s)) with a fraudulent one, m' =  (s ',t ), such that Vk(ml) produces a 
true result. In MAC systems, the communicants share a secret key, and are therefore 
not distinguishable cryptographically.
Security of MACs can be studied from the point o f view of unconditional or com­
putational security.
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Unconditionally secure MACs are equivalent to Cartesian authentication codes. 
However, in MAC systems only multiple communications are of interest. Computa­
tionally secure MACs have arisen from the needs of the banking community; see, for 
example, Preneel, Chaum, Fumy, Jansen, Landrock and Roelofsen [82]. They are also 
studied under other names, such as keyed hash functions and keying hash functions 
(see, for example, [5]).
1.4.1 Unconditionally secure MACs
When the enemy has unlimited computational resources, attacks against MAC sys­
tems and the analysis of security are similar to that of Cartesian A-codes. The enemy 
observes n codewords of the form (s*,^),2 =  1 in the channel and attempts
to construct a fraudulent codeword (s, t) which is accepted by the receiver. (This is 
the same as spoofing of order n in an A-code). If the communicants want to limit 
the enemy’s chance of success to p after n message transmissions, the number of au­
thentication functions (number of keys) must be greater than a lower bound which 
depends on p. If the enemy’s chance of success in spoofing of order i =  1, • • •, n, is 
Pi, then at least I/P1P2 • • -pn keys are required [48], [121]. For pi = p , i  =  1,..., n , the 
required number of key bits is — n log2p. That is, for every message, — log2p key bits 
are required. This is the absolute minimum for the required number of key bits.
Perfect protection is obtained when the enemy’s best strategy is random choice of a 
tag and appending it to the message; this strategy succeeds with probability p =  2-fc, 
if the size of the tag is k bits. In this case the number of required key bits for every 
extra message is k.
Wegman and Carter [121] gave a general construction for unconditionally secure 
MACs that can be used for providing protection for an arbitrary number of messages.
Their construction uses universal classes of hash functions. Traditionally, a hash 
function is used to achieve fast and good average performance over all inputs in various 
applications. By using a universal class of hash functions it is possible to achieve 
provable good average performance without restricting the input distribution.
Let h : A  —> B  be a hash function mapping the elements of a set A  to a set B. A 
strongly universal^, class o f hash functions is a class of hash functions with the property 
that for n distinct elements o i , ..., an o f A  and n elements b i,..., bn of B, exactly \H\/bn 
functions map a* to bi, for i =  1,..., n. Strongly universal hash functions give perfect 
protection for multiple messages as follows. The transmitter and the receiver use a 
publicly known class of strongly universal hash functions, and a shared secret key
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determines a particular member of the class used by the transmitter and the receiver. 
Stinson [107] shows that a class of strongly universal that maps a set of a elements to 
a set of b elements is equivalent to an orthogonal array O A x(2,a,b) with A =  \H\/b2. 
Similar results can be proved for strongly universal classes of hash functions.
1.4.2 Wegman and Carter construction
Wegman and Carter [121] show that, instead of strongly universal family of hash 
functions one can always use a strongly universal family of hash functions, together 
with a one time pad of random numbers. The system works as follows. Let B  denote 
the set of tags consisting of the sequences of k bit strings. Let 7i denote a strongly 
universal class of hash functions mapping S  to B. Two communicants share a key 
that specifies a function h G l~i together with a pad containing &-bit random numbers. 
The tag for the jth  message is Sj ® r ,̂ where rj is the jth  number on the pad. It can be 
proved that this system limits the enemy’s chance of success to 2~k as long as the pad 
is random and not used repeatedly. The system requires nk +  K  bits of key, where K  
is the number of bits required to specify an element of 7i, n is the number of messages 
to be authenticated, and k is the size of the tags.
This construction has a number of remarkable properties. Firstly, for large n the key 
requirement for the system approaches the theoretical minimum of k bits per message. 
This is because for large n the number of key bits is effectively determined by nk. 
Secondly, the construction of MAC for multiple communications is effectively reduced 
to the construction of a better studied primitive, that is, strongly universal class of 
hash functions. Finally, by replacing the one-time pad with a pseudorandom sequence 
generator, unconditional security is replaced by computational security.
Wegman and Carter’s important observation is as follows. By not insisting on the 
minimum value for the probability of success in spoofing of order one, it is possible to 
reduce the number of functions and thus the required number of keys. This observation 
leads to the notion of almost strongly universal class.
An e - almost universal (or e-AU) class of hash functions has the following property. 
For any pair x ,y  G A, x ±  y, the number of hash functions h with h(x) =  h(y) is at 
most equal to e\H\. The e-almost strongly universal (or e-ASU) hash functions have the 
additional property that for any x  € A, y e  B  the number of functions with h(x)  =  y 
is |7f|/|F?|. Using an e-almost strongly universal class of functions in the Wegman and 
Carter construction results in MAC systems for which the probability o f success for an 
intruder is e.
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Stinson [107] gives several methods for constructing AU and ASU hash functions. 
Johansson et al [62] establish a relationship between ASU hash functions and error 
correcting codes. They use geometric error correcting code to construct new classes of 
e-ASU hash function of small size. This reduces the key size.
Krawczyk [69] shows that in the Wegman-carter construction, e-ASU hash functions 
can be replaced with a less demanding class of hash functions, called e-otp-secure. The 
definition of this class differs from other classes of hash functions, in that it is directly 
related to MAC constructions and their security; in particular, to the Wegman-Carter 
construction.
Let s 6 <S denote a message that is to be authenticated by a A; bit tag h(s) ® r, 
using by Wegman and Carter’s method. An enemy succeeds in a spoofing attack if he 
can find s' ^  s ,t' =  /i(s') © r, assuming that he knows H  but does not know h and r. A 
class %  of hash functions is e-otp-secure if for any message no adversary succeeds in the 
above attack scenario with probability greater than e. In [69], Krawczyk shows that a 
necessary and sufficient condition for a family %  of hash functions to be e-otp-secure is
Vax ±  a2, c, P r h(h(ai) © h(a2) =  c) <  e,
where al7a2 G A.and c G B  are in the form of bit strings. The need for high speed 
MACs has increased with the progress in high speed data communication. A successful 
approach to the construction of such MACs uses hash function families in which the 
message is hashed by multiplying it by a binary matrix. Because hashing is achieved 
with exclusive-or operations, it can be efficiently implemented in software. An obvious 
candidates for such a class of hash functions, originally proposed by Wegman and Carter 
[29, 121], is the set of linear transformations from A  to B. It is shown that this forms an 
e-AU class of hash functions. However the size of the key - the number of entries in the 
matrix - is too large, and too many operations are required for hashing. Later proposals 
by Krawczyk [69] and by Rogaway [89] are aimed at alleviating these problems, and 
obtains a fast software implementation. The former uses Toeplitz matrices, while the 
latter uses binary matrices with only three non-zero entries per column. In both cases, 
the resulting family is e-AU.
The design of a complete MAC usually involves combining a number of hash func­
tions following results proved by Stinson [107]. The role of some of the hash functions 
is to produce high compression (small 6), while others produce the desired spread and 
uniformity (see Rogaway [89]).
Reducing the key size of the hash function is especially important in practical 
applications, because the one-time pad is replaced by the output of a pseudorandom
1.4. Computationally Secure Authentication Systems 17
generator with a short key (of the order of 128 bits). Hence it is desirable to have the 
key size of the hash function of similar order.
1.4.3 Computational security
In the computationally secure approach, the protection is achieved because excessive 
computation is required for a successful forgery. Although a hash value can be used 
as a checksum to detect random changes in the data, a secret key must be used to 
provide protection against active tampering. Methods for constructing MACs from 
hash functions have traditionally followed one of the following approaches: the so- 
called hash-then-encrypt and keying a hash function.
Hash-then-encrypt
To construct a MAC for a message x  with this method, the hash value of x  is calculated 
and the result is encrypted using an encryption algorithm. This is similar to signa­
ture generation, where a public key algorithm is replaced by a private key encryption 
function.
There are a number of drawbacks to this method. First, the overall scheme is slow. 
This is because the two primitives used in the construction, i.e., the cryptographic 
hash functions and encryption functions, are designed for other purposes and have 
extra security properties which are not strictly required in the construction. Although 
this construction can produce a secure MAC, the speed of the MAC is bounded by 
the speed of its constituent algorithms. For example, cryptographic hash functions 
are designed to be one-way. It is not clear whether this is a required property in the 
hash-then-encrypt construction, where the output of the hash function is encrypted 
and one-wayness is effectively obtained through the difficulty of finding the plaintext 
from the ciphertext.
A serious shortcoming of this method is that existing export restrictions, which 
usually apply to encryption functions, are inherited by MACs constructed using this 
method.
Keying a hash function
In the second approach a secret key is incorporated into a hashing algorithm. This op­
eration is sometimes called keying a hash function (see Bellare et al [9]. This method 
is attractive, because of the availability of hashing algorithms and their relative speed 
in software implementation. Moreover the algorithms are not subject to export restric­
tions. *
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Although this scheme can be implemented more efficiently in software than the 
previous scheme, the objection to the superfluous properties of the hash functions 
remains.
The keying method depends on the structure of the hash function. Tsudik [117] 
proposes three methods of incorporation the key into the data. In the secret prefix 
method, the key is prepended to the data, Gk(s) =  H(k  | s), while in the secret 
suffix method it is appended to this data and we have Gk{s) =  H(s  | k). Finally, the 
envelope method combines the previous two methods with Gk(s) =  H(k\ | s | kf) and 
k =  ki | k2.
Instead of including the key into the data, the key information can be included 
into the hashing algorithm. In iterative hash functions such as MD5 and SHA, the key 
can be incorporated into the initial vector, compression function or into the output 
transformation.
There have also been some attempts at defining and constructing secure keyed 
hash functions as independent primitives, namely by Berson, Gong and Lomas [14], 
and Bakhtiari, Safavi-Naini and Pieprzyk [5]. The former proposes a set of criteria 
for secure keyed hash functions and give constructions using one-way hash functions. 
The latter argues that the suggested criteria for security is in most cases excessive 
and relaxing them allows constructions of more efficient secure keyed hash functions. 
Bakhtiari et al also give the design of a keyed hash function from scratch. Their design 
is based mostly on intuition principles and lacks a rigorous proof of security. A similar 
approach is taken in the design of MDX-MAC by Preneel and van Oorschot [83], which 
is a scheme for constructing a MAC from an MD5-type hash function. It is conjectured 
that MDX-MAC is a secure MAC.
1.4.4 Security analysis of computationally secure MACs
The security analysis of computationally secure MACs has followed two different ap­
proaches. In the first approach, the security assessment is based on an analysis of some 
possible attacks. In the second approach, a security model is developed and used to 
examine the proposed MAC.
Security analysis through attacks
Consider a MAC algorithm that produces MACs of length m using a k bit key. In 
general an attack might result in a successful forgery, or in the recovery of the key. 
According to the classification given by Preneel and van Oorschot [84], a forgery in 
a MAC can be either existential - the opponent can construct a valid message and
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MAC pair without the knowledge of the key, or selective where the opponent can 
determine the MAC for a message of his choice. Protection against the former type of 
attack imposes more stringent conditions than the latter type of attack. A forgery is 
verifiable if the attacker can determine with a high probability whether the attack is 
successful. In a chosen text attack the attacker is given the MACs for the messages of 
his own choice. In an adaptive attack the attacker chooses text for which he can see the 
result of his previous request before forming his next request. In a key recovery attack 
the aim of the attacker is to find the key. If the attacker is successful, he can perform 
selective forgery on any message of his choice and the security of the system is totally 
compromised.
For an ideal MAC any method to find the key is as expensive as an exhaustive 
search of 0 ( 2 k) operations. If m < k, the attacker may randomly choose the MAC for 
a message with the probability of success equal to l / 2 m. However, in this attack the 
attacker cannot verify whether his attack has been successful.
The complexity of various attacks is discussed by several authors: Tsudik [117], 
Bakhtiari et al [6], Bellare et al [10]. Preneel and van Oorschot [83, 84] propose con­
structions resistant to such attacks. Some attacks can be applied to all MACs obtained 
using a specific construction method while other attacks are limited to particular in­
stances of the method.
1.4.5 Formal security analysis
The main attempts at formalising the security analysis o f computationally secure MACs 
are due to Bellare et al [9], and Bellare and Rogaway [11]. In both papers, an attack 
model is carefully defined and the security of a MAC with respect to that model is 
evaluated. Bellare et al [9] use their model to prove the security of a generic construction 
based on pseudorandom functions, while Bellare and Rogaway [11] use their model to 
prove the security of a generic construction based on hash functions.
M A C  from pseudorandom functions
The formal definition of security given by Bellare et al [11] assumes that the enemy 
can ask the transmitter to construct tags for messages of his choice, and also ask the 
receiver to verify chosen message and tag pairs of his choice. The number o f these 
requests is limited, and a limited time t can be spent on the attack. Security o f the 
MAC is expressed as an upper bound on the enemy’s chance o f succeeding in its best 
attack. #
The construction proposed by Bellare et al applies to any pseudorandom functions.
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Their proposal, called XOR-M AC, basically breaks a message into blocks. For each 
block the output of the pseudorandom function is calculated on the black, and the 
outputs are finally XORed. Two schemes based on this approach are proposed: the 
randomised XO R scheme and the counter based scheme.
The pseudorandom function used in the above construction can be an encryption 
function, like DES, or a hash function, like MD5. It is proved that the counter based 
scheme is more secure than the randomised scheme, and if DES is used, both schemes 
are more secure than CBC MAC. Some of the desirable features of this construction 
are parallelizability and incrementality. The former means that message blocks can 
be fed into the pseudorandom function in parallel. The latter refers to the feature of 
calculating incrementally the value of the MAC for a message s' which differs from s 
in only a few blocks.
M A C  from hash functions
The model used by Bellare and Rogaway [11] is similar to the above one. The enemy can 
obtain information by asking queries; however, in this case queries are only addressed 
to the transmitter.
A family of functions { iT }  is an (e,t,q, L)-secure MAC [10] if any adversary that 
is not given the key k, is limited to spend total time t, and sees the values of the 
function Fk computed on q messages si, $2, * * • ? sq of its choice, each of length at most 
L , cannot find a message and tag pair (s, t), s ^  s*, i =  1 , . . . ,  q, such that t =  Fk(s) 
with probability better than e.
Two general constructions for MAC from hash functions, the so-called NMAC, the 
Nested construction; and HMAC, the Hash based MAC, are given and their security 
is formally proved [11].
Weak collision-resistance is a much weaker notion than the collision resistance of 
(unkeyed) hash functions because the enemy does not know the secret key and finding 
collision is much more difficult. More precisely, a family of keyed hash functions {F k}  
is (e, i, q, L)-weakly collision-resistant if any adversary that is not given the key fc, is 
limited to spend total time t, and sees the values of the function Fk computed on q 
messages m i, m2, . . . ,  m q o f its choice, each of length at most L, cannot find messages 
m and m! for which Fk(m) =  Fk(m!) with probability better than e.
With some extra assumptions similar results are proved for the HMAC construction.
A related construction is the collisionful keyed hash function proposed by Gong [57]. 
In his construction, the collisions are selectable and the resulting function is claimed 
to provide security against password guessing attacks. Bakhtiari, Safavi-Naini and
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Pieprzyk [7, 8] question the security o f Gong’s function and a key exchange protocol 
based on collisionful hash functions and show attacks on their systems.
Chapter 2
 ̂ Authentication Codes and Universal 
Hashing
In this chapter, we study the application of algebraic curves over finite fields to the 
constructions of universal hash functions and unconditionally secure authentication 
codes.
The concept of universal hash family was introduced by Carter and Wegman [29] 
in 1979, and has found numerous applications in computer science, including cryptog­
raphy, complexity theory, search algorithms and information retrieval, etc. In cryptog­
raphy, one of the most interesting classes of universal hash functions is called strongly 
universal hash family, also known as two-point based sampling, or pairwise indepen­
dent random variable [109]. It is known [121, 107] that the strongly universal hash 
families provide a very powerful tool for constructing unconditionally secure authen­
tication codes when the number of authenticators is exponentially small compared to 
the number of possible source states.
The theory of algebraic curves over finite fields has many applications in coding the­
ory ([116]) and it has been observed by several authors that coding theory, universal 
hash families and authentication codes are closely related. (More details will be given 
in Section 2.1) This has led researchers to naturally consider the algebraic-geometric 
codes based on some specified algebraic curves to construct universal hash families and 
authentication codes [16, 17]. In this chapter, we will pursue this direction of research. 
However, unlike the earlier approach, which composes a family of efficient geometric 
codes to obtain an strongly universal hash family, known as “composition method” , and 
whose detail will be given in Section 2.1, we will instead provide a direct construction 
of strongly universal hash families from the algebraic curves over finite fields without 
using the composition method. We also note that direct construction of universal hash 
families without using composition method has been also proposed by Helleseth and 
Johansson [59]. They used exponential sums over finite fields and obtained strongly
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universal hash families and authentication codes that had the best performance com­
pared to those previously known. We show that our constructions result in new classes 
of strongly universal hash families and authentication codes which are even better than 
those of Helleseth and Johansson [59], and so yield new authentication codes with the 
best performance known so far.
In Section 2.1, we review some basic definitions o f universal hash families, and their 
connections with authentication codes. In Section 2.2 we present our new construc­
tions from algebraic curves. We compare various parameters o f the constructions with 
previously known results in Section 2.3, and finally conclude the chapter in Section 2.4.
2.1 Universal hashing
Universal families of hash functions were introduced by Carter and Wegman [29], and 
were further studied by many authors, we refer to [109] for a through account o f recent 
developments in this field. We are interested in the application of universal hashing to 
authentication codes.
Consider a hash family H, which is a set of N  functions such that h : A  —» B  for 
each h G 7/, where \A\ =  k and \B\ — t. There will be no loss of generality in assuming 
k >  £ and we call %  an (IV; k, £) hash family. We first review the relevant definitions 
and results as follows.
D efin ition  2.1 An (N;k,£) hash family is called e-almost universal (e-AU  for  short) 
if for any two distinct elements au a2 e  A, there are at most eN  functions h e U  such 
that h(ai) =  h{a2).
The following lemma, due to Bierbrauer, Johansson, Kabatianskii and Smeets [17], 
establishes the equivalence between e-AU and error-correcting codes.
Lem m a 2.1 If there exists a q-ary code with codeword length N , cardinality M , and 
minimum Hamming distance d, then there exists an e-A U (TV; M , q) hash family, where
e — 1 ~ d/N. Conversely, if there exists an e-A U hash family, then there exists a code 
with parameters as above.
D efinition 2.2 An (N; k, £) hash family is called e-almost strongly universal (e-ASU  
for short) if,
1. for any element a £ A and any element b G B , there exist exactly N/£ functions 
h 6 H such that h(a) =  b.
2.1. Universal hashing 24
2. for  any two distinct elements ai, £ A and for any two (not necessarily distinct) 
elements &i,&2 G B, there exist at most eN/£ functions h G 7i such that h{ai) — 
b%,i — 1, 2.
e-ASU are strictly related to A-codes. An A-code, (<S, £,7~), with (authentication) 
mapping /  : S  x E —>• T , Pi =  1/|T| and Ps, associates a unique function he from S  
to T  for each key e E E, defined by he(s) =  / ( s ,  e). It is straightforward to verify that 
7i =  {h e : e £ £ }  is an e-ASU hash family from S  to T,  where e =  Ps- Conversely, given 
an e-ASU (iV; k , hash family P  from A to P , we can associate an A-code (S , E,T),  
where <S — A, T  =  B  and \E\ =  \H\, and each key e £ E corresponds to a unique hash 
function he G %  indexed by e. The (authentication) mapping /  : S  x E —¥ T  is defined 
by f ( s , e )  =  he(s). It has been observed by several authors [17, 107] that the resulting 
A-code has Pj =  1/i and Ps =  e. In summary, we have the following result.
Lemma 2.2 If there exists an A-code (S ,E ,T )  with Pi =  1/\T\ and Ps, then there 
exists an e-ASU (N ;k,£)  hash family, where e =  Ps, N  =  \E\,k =  |<S| and £ =  \T\. 
Conversely, if there exists an e-ASU hash family, then there exists an A-code with the 
above parameters.
Earlier research on A-codes had been mainly devoted to the constructions which 
ensure that the opponent’s deception probabilities are bounded by l/£. In terms of 
e-ASU hash families, e =  l/£. Such codes were shown to be equivalent to orthogonal 
arrays, and from the results in [107] we know that \E\ >  k(£ — 1) -f 1. This means 
that for fixed security (i.e. l/£), the key size increases linearly with the size of the set 
o f source states-a similar situation with the “one-time pad” . Thus for the large size 
sources, many bits of keys are to be stored and “secretly” exchanged.
The significance of e-ASU hash families in the construction of A-codes that was 
first observed by Wegman and Carter [121], is that by not requiring the deception 
probability to be the theoretical minimum, that is allowing e >  l/£, we can expect 
to significantly reduce the key size. As shown in [17, 107, 121], by allowing Ps > Pi 
(i.e. e >  l/£), it is possible to have the size of source states to grow exponentially with 
the key size. This observation is very important from practical point of view, we may 
deal with the scenarios where we are satisfied with deception probability slightly larger 
than l/£, but have limited key storage.
A very useful method of constructing an e-ASU hash family is to compose an AU  
hash family and an ASU  hash family with appropriate parameters. The following
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lemma is due to Stinson [107], and independently proved by Bierbrauer, Johansson, 
Kabatianskii and Smeets [17].
Lem m a 2.3 (C om p osition ) Let U i be an ex-AU hash family from A i to B x and let 
% 2 be an e2-ASU hash family from B\ to B 2. Then
% =  {h 2hl :h i  e n u h2 e n }
is an e-ASU hash family from A\ to B2 with e <  +  e2.
It is worth noting that previous constructions of e-ASU hash families for large 
\A\ were based on the above composition construction. The constructions giving good 
performance use Reed-Solomon codes [17, 107], or more general geometric codes [16] as 
the e-AU hash family in the above composition construction. Helleseth and Johansson 
[59] gave the first direct construction of e -  ASU  hash family without using the above 
composition construction, by using exponential sums. For large |A|, the construction 
results in e-ASU hash family whose performance was better than all the previously 
known constructions. The goal of this chapter is to give another direct construction 
(without using composition) of e-ASU hash families and authentication codes by using 
algebraic curves over finite fields. The constructions result in new classes o f A-codes 
with better performance than those previously known.
2.2 Constructions
In this section, we describe a construction of e-ASU hash families based on algebraic 
curves over finite fields which can later be used to construct A-codes using Lemma 2.2 
Before giving the construction we need some concepts and notations. For further 
results on algebraic curves over finite fields, we refer to [103, 116].
We fix some notations for this Chapter.
£ -  power of a prime;
F* -  the finite field of £ elements;
X  -  a projective, absolutely irreducible, complete algebraic curve defined 
over Fq. We simply say that X  is an algebraic curve; 
g =  g(X)  -  the genus of X ; 
f£i{X) -  the function field of X ;
~ the set o f all F^— rational points on X  with all coordinates be­
longing to F*.
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A divisor G  o f X  is called rational if
Ga =  G
for any automorphism o  G Gal(F*/F*), where F* is a fixed algebraic closure of F* and 
G al(F*/F /) is the Galois group of F*/F*. In this paper we always mean a rational 
divisor whenever a divisor is mentioned.
We write vp for the normalised discrete valuation corresponding to the point P  
of X . Let x  G F£(A ')\{0} and denote by Z(x)  and N(x),  the set of zeros and poles 
respectively, of x. We define the zero divisor of x  by
M o  =  XZ vp {x )p  (2-1)
P e z ( x )
and the pole divisor o f x  by
M oo =  XZ { - v p (x ) )P .  (2.2)
P e N (  x)
Then (rr)o and (x)oo are both rational divisors. Furthermore, the principal divisor of x 
is given by
div(z) =  (x )0 ~  Woo- (2-3)
The degree of div(:c) is equal to zero, i.e.,
deg(M o) =  XZ M x ) =  XZ { ~ vp (x )) =  deg(M oo)- (2-4)
P ez(x ) p <e n (x )
For an arbitrary divisor G  =  ^ m p P  of X,  we denote by vp(G) the coefficient mp of 
P. Then
g  =  X Z M G ) p .
For such a divisor G  we form the vector space
L(G)  =  {x G  F^(A')\{0} : div(z) +  G >  0} U {0 }.
Then L(G)  is a finite-dimensional vector space over F*, and we denote its dimension 
by 1(G). By the Riemann-Roch theorem (see [103, 116]), we have
1(G) >  deg(G) +  1 - 0 ,  (2-5)
and equality holds if deg(G) >  2 g - l .
Now we are ready to describe the construction.
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Let T  be a subset of ¥ i (X ) ,  i.e., T  is a set o f F^-rational points o f X.  Let D  be 
a positive divisor with T  fl Supp(P) =  0. Choose an F^—rational point R  in T  and 
put G =  D  -  R. Then deg(G) =  deg(D) -  1, L(G)  C L(D)  and F* fl L(G)  =  {0 }. 
Moreover we have
L(D)  =  F* 0  L(G) =  { a  +  f\f G L (G )}.
Each element (P, a) G T  x F* can be associated with a map h(p]Ci) from L(G)  to F/ 
defined by
h(p,a) ( f )  =  f ( P )  +  a -
Lemma 2.4 L etU  =  {h {P,a)\(P, a) G T x F *}. 7/deg(P>) >  2 $ + l, then the cardinality 
o fR  is equal to £\T\.
P roo f. It is sufficient to prove that {h(p,a)}(p,a)eTxFt are pairwise distinct.
Assume that h ^ a) =  f°r (P, <*) and (Q,P)  in T x F*, i.e.,
h{P,a)(f) =  hW ) (f) (2.6)
for all /  G L (6?). In particular,
a  =  h(P,<*)(°) =  h(Q,P)(°) =  P- (2 -7)
It follows that,
f ( P )  =  H Q )
for all /  G L(G). This yields that
e(P) =  e(Q) (2.8)
for all e G L(D)  since L(D) =  F* 0  L(G).
Suppose that P  is different from Q. As deg(Z) -  P)  >  deg(£> -  P  -  Q) >  2g -  1, 
we obtain by the Riemann-Roch theorem
l(D - P )  =  deg(D) - g ,  l(D -  P  -  Q) =  deg(D) -  g -  1.
By the above results on dimensions, we can choose a function u from the set L(D -  
P) ~ L(D — P  — Q). Then it is clear that u(P) =  0 and u(Q) ^  0. This contradicts 
e (P) — e {Q)• Hence P  =  Q. The proof is complete.
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Theorem 2.5 Let X  be an algebraic curve and T  a set o f F¿-rational points on X . 
Suppose that D  is a positive divisor with deg(D) >  2# + 1  and T  D Supp(D ) =  0. Then 
there exists an e — ASU  (iV; A;, £) hash family with
N  =  t\T\, k =  ¿ W - 1 =  e =
Proof. Let R £ T  be an F^-rational points on X  and put G  =  D  — R. Define
A  :=  L(G), B  :=  F*
and
%  {/i(p>a)|(P, a) £ T  x F^}.
It is easy to verify that for any element a £ A =  L(G) and b £ B  =  F*, there exist 
exactly \T\ =  N/£ pairs (P, a) £ T  x F* such that
h(P,a)(a) — a(P) +  a  =  b,
i.e., there exist exactly N/£ functions /i(pjQ) G TL such that /i(p,a)(a) =  b.
Now let a i ,a2 be two distinct elements of A  and 61,62 two elements of B. We 
consider
m :=  max | {/¿(p,q) G P|/i(p,<*)(ai) =  fyp,c*)(a2) =  62) |
a l ^ ° 2  € ^  '■
61.62 € B
=  max | {(P , a) £ T  x F^|oi(P) +  a =  61; a2(P ) +  =  62}  |
«1 ^ “ 2 € A
¿>1,62 £ B
=  max | {(P , a) £ T  x  F*|(ai — 02 — 61 +  62)(P ) =  0; a2(P ) +  «  — 62}  |.
«1 ^<>2 € A
61.62 G B
As a i ~ a 2 £ L(G) -  {0 }  and 61 -  b2 £ F*, we know that 0 ^  ai — a2 — 61 +  b2 £ L(D).  
Thus there are at most deg(D) distinct zeros of ai — a2 -  bi +  b2 in T. Since a  is 
uniquely determined by P  from the equality a2(P)  +  oc =  b2, we have that at most 
deg(D ) pairs (P, a) £ T  x F g  satisfy
(ai — a2 — 61 +  62) (P ) =  0 and a2 (P ) +  a =  b2l
1'e”  .  1 deg ( D ) Nm <  deg(P ) =  |T | - y -
Hence we can take e =  deg(D)/|T|. This completes the proof.
The above theorem gives a construction of e-ASU hash families based on general 
algebraic curves over finite fields. In the examples below, we apply the theorem to 
some special curves to obtain e-ASU families with nice parameters.
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Example 2.1 Consider the projective line X . Then g =  g (X )  — 0.
(a) Let d be an integer between 1 and £, and P  an F ¿-rational point o f X . Put
D  =  dP, T  =  X ( F £) -  { P } .
Then deg(D) =  d >  2g +  1, \T\ =  £ andT nSwpp(D)  =  0. By Theorem f . l ,  we obtain 
an e-ASU (N; k , £) hash family with
N  =  i 2, k =  ( d, e =
The e-ASU hash family with the above parameters can also be found in [17].
(b) Let d be an integer between 2 and £. Put T  =  X ( F £). As there always exists 
an irreducible polynomial of degree d over F£, we can find a positive divisor D  such 
that deg(D) =  d and T  n Supp(jD) =  0. Then deg(D ) =  d >  2g +  1, \T\ =  £ +  1. By 
Theorem 2.5, we obtain an e — ASU (N; k,£) hash family with
d
N  =  e (e  +  i) , k =  e d , e =  ^ -
Example 2.2 Consider an elliptic curve X  with i  +  [2\/?J F¿-rational points (such 
an elliptic curves exists), where [-J denotes the integral part o f a real number. Let d be 
an integer between 3 and £ +  |_2\/£J — 1, and P  an F ¿-rational point o f X . Put
D  =  dP, T =  X ( F e) -  { P } .
Then deg(D) =  d >  2g +  1, \T\ =  £ +  [2\/£\ — 1 and T  D Supp(D ) =  0. By Theorem
2.5 we obtain an e-ASU  (N ; k,£) hash family with
N  =  i ( i  +  \ 2'/l\ — 1), k =  ed~\ e = --------- %=------- .
t  +  L2\Aj — 1
E xam ple 2.3 Let £ be a square and put r =  y/l. Consider the Hermitian curve X  
defined by
yr +  y =  x r+1.
Then the number of F¿-rational points of X  is equal to r3 +  1 =  £y/£ +  1 and the genus 
of X  is g =  yT tW l ~  l ) /2 .  Choose an F¿-rational point P  and put D  =  dP for  an 
integer d betw een2g+l =  i - y / l + l  andr3 =  £y/i. D efineT  to be the set X ( F £) - { P } .  
Then deg(D) =  d >  2g +  1, \T\ =  £\T£ and T  D Supp(D ) =  0. By Theorem 4.1, we 
obtain an e-ASU (N;k,£)  hash family with
n  =  i 2\Ti, k = d
i\Ti
e —
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E xam ple  2.4 Let £ be a square and put r =  y/i. Consider a sequence of algebraic 
curves Xm given in [53] as follows. Let X\ be the projective line with the function field 
F*(Af) =  F^(rci). Let Xm be obtained by adjoining a new equation:
x rTO+  X,
X rto—1
Xr—1 to—1 +  r
for  all m >  2. Then the number of F ¿-rational points of Xm is more than (r2 — r)rm~l , 
and the genus gm of Xm is less than rm for allm >  1. Choose an integer c between 2 and 
y/l— 1 (c is independent of m), an F ¿-rational point Pm of Xm and put D m =  c£m/2Pm. 
Let Tm be a subset of Xm(F¿) — {P m} with
\Tm\ =  (r2 -  r )rm~l =  £m/2{yÎ£ -  1).
By Theorem 4-1, we obtain a sequence of e-ASU (Nm-,km,£) hash families with




y f £ - l
2.3 Comparisons with previous constructions
From Lemma 2.2, one can easily translate the e-ASU hash family from Theorem 2.5 and 
Examples 2.1- 2.4 to A-codes in a straightforward manner. In particular, we phrase 
the construction of Example 2.4 in terms of A-code as follows.
C oro lla ry  2.6 The construction in Example 2.4 results in an A-code C =  ( S ,£ ,T )  
with the following parameters
|S| = \ s \  = e m/ 2 ( e V e  - 1 ), \ r \  = e,
and with deception probabilities
Pl =  t  Ps =  7 T ~ c
where £ is a prime power and a square, c and m are integers satisfying 2 <  c <  \f£ — 1 
and m >  1.
In the sequel, we make some comparisons between various parameters of the above 
A-code with those in [16] and [59], which are known to have the best performance 
among all the previously known construction.
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C om p are w ith  H elleseth  and Joh ansson ’s con stru ction  In [59] Helleseth and 
Johansson applied exponential sums over finite fields to construct an A-code C 0 =  
(So, So, To) with the parameters,
|£o| = qT^ D M \  M  = q r + \  |75| = q
and with deception probabilities
D -  1
y/W 5
where p, q are prime powers and q =  pe for some integer e, and D  and r are integers 
satisfying 0 <  D  <  and r >  1.
To compare the performance of our construction and that o f Helleseth and Johans­
son [59], we will choose two A-codes C  =  (<S, £, T )  and Co =  £o5 7o) such that the
sizes of keys, the lengths of authenticators, and the success probabilities in imperson­
ation and substitution attacks for them are the same. We then compare their sizes of 
source states.
Suppose q =  l  and 2r =  m + 1. Let D  =  [2{cqTl2~l +  l j  =  [2 (rfl™-3)/4 +  1)J. Since 
2 <  c <  y/f, it follows that D  <  2(^/qq{m~3}/4 + 1 )  =  2(g(">-D/4 + 1 )  <  as desired 
by Helleseth and Johansson construction. From these parameters, we have
• Pi =  Pi =  1 // ;
• Ps =  c/ {V l -  1) <  2c/ V l +  <  1 /q + { D -  1 ) / ( v % (m- 3)/4) =  P s ;
• |T| =  |7o| =  £', and
• |£| =  £m/2(£\f£ - £ ) <  (̂m+3)/2 =  g(™+3)/2+i =  gr+i =  1 ^
On the other hand,
|6b| =  qr(D~lD/P J)
<  qD(m+1)/2
<  £((m+l)/2)2(c6(m- 3)/4+l)
<  £c(m+l)( (̂m-3)/4+l)
It follows that
logi l<s| >  (c -  1)1^ 
l°g£ l*5o| ~~ c(m +  +  1)
For given c, we know log£ |«S|/log  ̂|<S0| is at least 0 (& n+2'>li ¡rri). As m  increases, the 
size of source states of A-code C  significantly exceeds that of C 0.
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Next, we show that if we allow the size of authenticators in our construction to be 
slightly larger while keeping the size of key and deception probabilities for two codes to 
be the same, then the increase in the size of the source size in our construction is even 
more significant. To this end, we first want to have the probabilities of substitution 
attacks (i.e. the overall security level) for two A-codes are the same. Let £ =  qA and 
c =  \(q2 -  l ) / q +  (D  -  1 )/\f(f{q2 -  1)1 +  L Then Ps «  Ps- 
Next, let r =  2m 4- 5. Then we have
\S\ =  q2m(q6 -  qA) <  q2m+5 =  qr+1 =  \So\.
It yields that the key size of Co is at least as large as that of C.




> ^ ((g 2 —1)/q+(D—l)/y/q^iq2 — i))q‘
> q4(D—l)q2rn~r/ 2
= q4(D-l)qm- 5/ 2
Without loss of generality, we may further assume that D  > p. It follows that (D  — 1) >  
(D  -  [D/p\), and we have |«S0| =  qr{D~[D/pJ) <  ^2m+5)(D- 1). As we have seen \S\ >  
q4(D-i)qm~5/ \  It follows that the size of the source of A-code C0 linearly increases with 
m  while the size of source for C exponentially increases with m. By choosing large m 
the size of source in C significantly exceeds that of Co- We note that the authenticator 
length o f C is four times that of C0, and the success probability in impersonation has 
reduced from 1 / q  (of Co) to 1 / q 4 (of C).
C om p a re  w ith  B ierbrau er ’ s con stru ction  In [16] Bierbrauer applied the compo­
sition method to geometric code and obtained an A-code C ' =  («S', £ ', T ') with the 
parameters
|«S'| =  \S'\ =  q2s+t, \ T \ = q t
and with deception probabilities,
where q is a prime power, and s ^  t are natural numbers.
Now consider A-codes C  and C '. We again want the success probabilities of sub­
stitution attacks for the two codes to be the same. Let £ =  q2t and c =  2. Then we
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have Ps — 2/(q* — 1), and so Vs ~  P's . Next, let m =  [(2s — t)/t\. Then
\ S \  =
— q2t(m/2) g2t ̂ gt _  -Q
<  q2s-tq2t 
_  q2s+t
=  \Q-
On the other hand,
15 1 >
_  2̂ tq2s~2t
It follows that
logg |«S| _  2 ¿ ( 1  +  q ^ q 8̂  _  tq8̂  
l ogg l^ ' l -  s (l  +  ^ _t) ~  « ( l  +  9a_t) ~~ s '
If we fix i, which determines the deception probability of substitution attack, then 
the ratio for the sizes of source states of the two A-codes is at least 0 ( q s/s). It follows 
that as s increases the size of source in our construction can be significantly increased.
2.4 Conclusion
We have given constructions of universal hash families and authentication codes from 
general algebraic curves over finite fields. The construction is different from the pre­
vious ones in two respects: firstly, it is the first direct construction based on algebraic 
curves without using “composition method” ; secondly, the construction yields new 
classes of authentication codes and universal hash families which are substantially bet­
ter than those previously known.
Chapter 3
Multireceiver Authentication Codes
Multireceiver authentication codes (MRA-codes) are introduced by Desmedt, Frankel 
and Yung (DFY) [41] as an extension of Simmons’ model of unconditionally secure 
authentication. In an MRA-code, a sender wants to authenticate a message for a group 
of receivers such that each receiver can verify authenticity of the received message. 
The receivers are not trusted and may try to construct fraudulent messages on behalf 
of the transmitter. If the fraudulent message is acceptable by even one receiver the 
attackers have succeeded. This is a useful extension of traditional authentication codes 
and has numerous applications. For example a director wants to give instructions to 
employees in an organisation such that each employee is able to verify authenticity 
of the message. Providing such service using digital signature implies that security is 
based on unproven assumptions and the attackers have finite amount of computational 
resources. We will be only concerned with the unconditionally secure model, that is, 
there is no computational assumptions or limitations on the attackers’ resources.
A multireceiver A-code can be trivially constructed using traditional A-codes: the 
sender shares a common key with each receiver and to send an authenticated message, 
constructs n codewords, one for each receiver, concatenates them and broadcasts the 
result. Now each receiver can verify its own codeword and so authenticate the mes­
sage. In this construction collaboration of even n -  1 receivers does not enable them 
to construct a message that is acceptable by the nth receiver simply because the n 
codewords are independently constructed. If we assume that the size of the malicious 
groups cannot be too large, for example the biggest number of collaborators is w -  1 
(w <  n ) , then we can expect to save on the size of the key and the length of the code­
word because the tags can have dependencies. This is the basic motivation of studying 
MRA-codes that are more efficient than the trivial one described above. DFY gave 
two constructions for (w ,n ) MRA-codes based on polynomials over finite fields and 
finite geometries. DFY description of MRA-code is basically an operational descrip­
tion of the system: that is the way the system works. Kurosawa and Obana (KO)
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[71] studied (w,n)  MRA-code, again using the operational description o f these codes, 
derived combinatorial lower bounds on the probability of success in impersonation and 
substitution attacks, and characterised Cartesian MRA-codes that satisfy the bounds 
with equality. They showed that DFY polynomial construction is in fact an optimal 
(smallest sizes of transmitter and receiver keys) construction.
In this chapter we start by giving a formal definition of an M RA-code and use it to 
derive information theoretic bounds on the probability o f success in impersonation and 
substitution attack against a single receiver for a general MRA-code. These bounds are 
used to obtain lower bounds on the the number of keys of the transmitter and receivers, 
and also lower bound on the length of the transmitted codeword in terms of deception 
probability of the system. This is followed by a review of the known constructions of 
MRA-codes, pointing out their shortcomings and giving constructions that alleviate 
these shortcomings.
3.1 The Model
An extension of the conventional model of authentication, proposed by Desmedt, 
Frankel and Yung (DFY) [41], is when there are multiple receivers. The system works 
as follows. First the key distribution centre (KDC) securely distributes secret keys to 
the transmitter and each receiver. Next the transmitter broadcasts a message to all the 
receivers who can individually verify authenticity of the message using their secret key. 
There are malicious groups of receivers who use their secret keys and all the previous 
communications in the system to construct fraudulent messages. They succeed in their 
attack even if a single receiver accepts the message as being authentic.
An MRA-System has three phases:
1. K ey  d istribution : The KDC (key distribution centre) privately transmits the 
key information to the sender and each receiver (the sender can also be the KDC).
2. B roadcast: For a source state, the sender generates the authenticated message 
using his/her key and broadcasts the authenticated message.
3. V erification : Each receiver can verify the authenticity of the broadcast message.
Denote by X i  x • • • x X n the direct product of sets X\,. .  . X n, and by be the 
projection mapping of X i  x • • • x on X*. That is, pt : X i  x • • • x Y n — > X it be  defined 
by P i ( x i , x 2,\ . . jX„ )  =  Xi. Let gx : X\ — > Y i  and g2 : X 2 — > Y 2 be two mappings. We
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denote the direct product of g\ and g2 by g\ x g2, where gi x g2 : X\ x  X 2 — > Yi x I 2 
is defined by (gi x <72) (^ i ? £2) =  (p i (^ i ) ,<72(^2)) • The identity mapping on a set X  is 
denoted by 1^.
D e fin ition  3.1 Let C  =  ( S , M , £ , f )  and Ci =  (<S,.Mt,£t,/*), i — 1,2, be
authentication codes. We call (C\ Ci, C2, .. ., Cn) a multireceiver authentication code 
(M RA-code) if there exist two mappings r  : £  — > £\ x • • • x £n and 7r : M. — > 
M i  x • • • x M n  such that for  any (s ,e )  £ S  x  £  and any 1 <  i <  n, the following 
identity holds:
Pi(wf(s ,e ) )  =  / ¿ ( ( l s x piT)(s,e)).
Let Ti =  PiT and 7r* =  pin. Then for each (s, e) £ S  x £, we have
7r»/(s ,e ) =  /¿ (Is  x Tj)(s, e).
We assume that for each i the mappings T{ : £  — > £i and 7r» : M  — »■ M * are surjective. 
We also assume that for each code Ci the probability distribution on the source states 
of Ci is the same with that in the A-code C, and the probability distribution on £i is 
derived from that o f £  and the mapping r*.
Let T  denote the sender and R u . . . , R n  denote the n receivers. In order to authen­
ticate a message, the sender and receivers follow the following protocol.
1. The KDC (or the sender) randomly chooses a key e £ £  and privately transmits 
e to  T  and e* =  7r*(e) to the receiver 1 <  i <  n.
2. If T  wants to send a source state s £ S to  all the receivers, T  computes m =  
/ ( s ,  e) £ M  and broadcasts it to all receivers.
3. Receiver Ri checks whether a source state s such that /¿ (s ,e j) =  7r*(ra) exists. If 
such an 5 exists, the message m  is accepted as authentic. Otherwise m  is rejected.
We adopt the Kerckhoff’s principle that everything in the system except the actual 
keys o f the sender and receivers is public. This includes the probability distribution 
of the source states and the sender’s keys. From Definition 3.1 we know that the 
probability distribution of the sender’s key induces a probability distribution on each
receiver’s key.
Attackers could be outsiders who do not have access to any key information, or 
insiders who have some key information. We only need to consider the latter group as 
it is at least as powerful as the former. We consider the systems that protect against
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the coalition of groups of receivers (up to a maximum size) and study impersonation 
and substitution attacks.
Assume there are n receivers R i , . . . ,  Rn. Let L =  { i i , . . .  Q {1, • • • > —
£h x • • • x £it and RL — {R il, • • •, Rit }. We consider the attack from R l on a receiver
Ri, where i L.
Impersonation attack: RL, after receiving their secret keys, send a message m  to 
Ri. Rl is successful if m  is accepted by Ri as authentic. We denote by P i[i, L] the 
success probability of R l in performing an impersonation attack on Ri. This can be 
expressed as
Pj[i,L\ =  max m axP (rais accepted by Ri | e^) (3.1)
m£M
where i £ L.
Substitution attack: R l , after observing a message m  that is transmitted by the 
sender, replace m with another message m '. Rl is successful if m' is accepted by Ri 
as authentic. We denote by Ps[i,L], the success probability of R l in performing a 
substitution attack on Ri. We have,
Ps [i,L] =  max max max P(Ri  accepts mr|m, e^) (3.2)e £ , m£A4 M.
3.2 Information-Theoretic Bounds
In the following Theorem 3.1 we derive bounds on deception probability of a group 
of insiders who have access to part of the key information. The bounds generalise 
Simmons’ [100] and Brickell’s bounds [26].
T heorem  3.1 Let Pi[i,L] and Ps[i,L\ be defined as in equation (3.1) and (3.2). As­
sume that M 1 x M  =  { (m (  m); m! /  m, m  G M.},  then
1. Pj[i,L] >
2. Ps [i,L] >  2 -^ M''TiW,EL)̂
P roo f. 1. We define an impersonation characteristic function x i  on M  x Si x El by,
1
X / ( m , e * , e L ) =  <
0
if m  is a valid for e G S in C
such that Tj(e) =  e* and tl(c) =  e^;
otherwise.
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From the definition of the impersonation attack we can express P j[z,/]  as,
Pj[i,L] =  maxP(7Tj(m) is valid in G El )mG.M
=  max V  X i(m ,e i ,eL)P(ei\eL))- 
m€M
For given L C { l , . . . , n }  and i ^ L, let P (ra ,e^e/,) be the joint probability distri­
bution induced by the system. If ljzj(ra, e^e^) =  0 then P(ra, e^e^) =  0. Indeed, if 
P (m , ê , e ,̂) ^  0 then m  is a valid message for e with Tj(e) =  and t^(c) =  e/,, which 
contradicts the definition o f X /(m ? e*, e^).
/(M ;P ,| P l ) = £  P ( M , E j |g L ) ,& P (m ,e i ,e L ) p (M \ E L )P{Ei\EL )
=  £  P (m , e» e£) log P(^ j ^ eIT
m&M,eie£i,eL€£L




=  E  P(.m,eL) ^ P ( ei|m,eL)lo  g ^ ^ ) 1 •
meM,eL££L 
P (m ,e L )^  0
For each pair (m,eL) with P ( m , e L) ^  0, if Xi(m i eiieL) =  0 then P(ei|m,e^) =  0. In 
this case, P fe lra , eL) log It; follows that the summation taking over in
the above identity is restricted to all e* for which x i { m i eiieL)— 1- Thus we have,
I (M;Ei\EL) E
m£M.,eL&£L 
P (m ,e L ) ^  0
P (m ,e L) P(e*|m, eL)xi(rn , e*, eL)
. ln(y P(eilm,eL)xj(m,ei,eL)>\ 
* o  P (e i |e L)x /(m ,e i ,eZ/) /
By log-sum inequality, we have,
I (M;Ei\EL) > Y P ( m ,e L)
m&M,eL&£L
P (m ,e L )^ 0
Y  P{6i\m, eL)xi (m, et, eL)
Gi££i
•log
Y ,  P(ei\m,eL) x i (m ,e i ,e L )
€j ££j _____________
Y . P(ei\eL)xi(rn,ei,eL)
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For each pair (m ,eL), as we have noted before, if P ( m ,e L) ±  0 and x /(ra ,e i,eL) -  0, 
then P(ei\m, e^) =  0. It follows that
Y  P(ei\m,eL)xi('m,ei ,eL) =  1,
tii(zEi
and
Y  P(ei\eL)Xi(m,ei,eL) =  P ^ m )  is valid in Ci\eL).
We obtain,
I(M;Ei\EL) >  -  Y  P ( m ’ ei )  log P(-Ki(m) is valid in Cj|ez,)
m€A4,e£,€5i,
Since,
=  -  Y  P ( eL) Y1 P (m \eL) logP(7T*(m) is valid in Ci\eL). 
c l ^ l  m eM
Pi[i,L}
> Y  p ( ^ ) maxP(7Tj(m) is valid in Cì \cl)m eM
> Y  P (*l) Y  P(m\eL)P(ni(m)is  valid in C^ei,) ,
Lm eM  -
by Jensen inequality, it follows that,
log P,[i,L\ >  Y  P ( eL) Y  P (m \eL) logP(7T i(m) is valid in Ci\ei,)
e L ^ L  m eM
> -I(M;Ei\EL).
Therefore, Pj[i,L] > 2~J(M'Ei\EL\
2. In the substitution attack Rl receives the key information from the sender, observe 
a message m that is transmitted by T  and construct a fraudulent message m. Rl 
succeed if m! is accepted by Ri as authentic. We denote by Ps[i,L\ the successful 
probability that Rl perform substitution attack on R .̂ We have,
Ps[i,L\ =  max max max P(ni(m)  is valid in Ci\m, e i )  
£l€£l meM m’^meM
Now we define a substitution characteristic function X s(m\ m , e*, eL) by
Xs(rri ,m,ei ,eL) =  <
1 Xi(m'ieiieL) =  l and Xi{m ieh eL) — l , m ' ^ m,
0 otherwise.
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We introduce a random variable M'  which only takes values when
X s ( m ' , m , e h eL) =  1
. It follows that there is a joint probability distribution P(m', m, e*, ep) such that 
P(ra, e*, e^) is the probability distribution given in the system and such that if x s (m' , e 
0 and P (m , e», e^) ^  0 then P ( m e*, e^) =  0.
7 (M ';P *|M ,P L)
Ep(m',m,ei,eL) l°g P(M' | M ,£L )P(£i | )
=  E P ( m ,,m ,e i,eL)log
P(m/,ei[m,eL) 
P{m' |m,eL )P(ei |m,eL)
m1 (EM.' ,mEM





P(m ', m, eL) ^  P(ei\m', m, eL)
6j
eL ££l ,P(m,m,eL)^  0
* Uo P(m'|m,eL)P(ei|m,eL)
If P(rn', m, eL) /  0 then x s (m'> m > e*> et )  =  0 implies P fe lm ', m, eL) =  0, and so
P (ei|m , m, Ci, eL) log F ( e j K e l r  =  0.
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Thus the summation taken over Si in the above identity is restricted to all ei for which 




p (m ', 771, eL) Y  eL)Xs{m', rn, ei} eL)
eL ,P (m ' ,m,eL )^ 0
P(ejlm/,m,eL)xs(m/,m,ej,eL) \ 
PteilmjeLixshn'jm^ez,) /
> E P(m!, 77i, eL) ^  ra, eL)xs(™ ', e,-, eL)
eL€£L,P(m',m,ei,)^0
( 2 2  P(e,|m',m,eL)xs (m'.m,ei ,eL)''
• l o g ^ ---------------------------------/  y P(ei|m,eL)xs(m/,m,ei,eL)
\ ei€̂ i /
Again, if P(ra',ra, e^) ^  0 and X s(jn ! , m ? ei? ep) =  0 then P ^ r a ' ,  ra, e/,) =  0. 
follows that,
] T  P(ei\m!,rn,eL)xs(rri,rn,ei,eL) =  1 ,
and,




> -  E  P (m ,,m , eL) logP(7Tj(m/) is valid in Ci\m, eL)
m' ClM' ,m€M.,eL€.£L
Since,
Y P ( m , eL) Y P(rn'\eL, rn) logP ^ra') is valid in Ci|ra, eL)
mEM,eL££L m'EM'
Ps[i, L]
>  E  ■p(ei) E  p (m \eL) E  P(m'\m,eL)P{iri(m') is valid in Ci\m,eL)
m EM  m'EM.'
> ’E  p (eL,m) E  P{rn'\m,eL)P{-Ki(rn') is valid in Ci\m,eL).
eL€£L,m€:M m'eM'
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By Jensen’s inequality, it follows that, 
logP s[i,L ]
>  E  P(eL,m)  ^  eL) l ogP^ ^ra ' )  is valid in Ci\m, ejf)
eL,meM m'eM'
We obtain
C oro lla ry  3.2
Ps [i,L] >  2~I(M'',Ei\M’EL\
Ps [i,L} >  2~H(Ei\M’EL\
P ro o f . The corollary follows from Theorem 3.1 by noting that
J(M '; Ei\M, El ) =  H{Ei\M , EL) -  H{Ei\M\ M, EL),
A (w ,n ) MR A-code is an MRA-code in which there are n receivers such that no 
subset of w — 1 receivers can construct a fraudulent codeword acceptable by another 
receiver. We note that in this definition, the only requirement is that the chance of 
success of the attackers is less than one but it is possible that some coalition of attackers 
can have a better chance of success than an outsider.
A (w ,n ) MRA-code is perfect against impersonation attack if the chance of success 
of any group of up to w — 1 receivers in an impersonation attack is the same as an 
outsider. Similarly, a (w,n)  M RA-code is perfect against substitution attack if the 
chance o f success for any group of up to w -  1 receivers in a substitution attack is the 
same as an outsider.
L em m a 3.3 A sufficient condition for  a (w, n ) MRA-code to be perfect against imper­
sonation attack is that P(ei\eL) =  P (e j) fo r  all w-subsets L U {*}, i $ L o f { 1 , . . . ,  n} .
P ro o f . Consider the A-code Cl =  (5, M t, £i). We define an authentication function 
x(m j, et) on M i  x 5 , as,
X s im ,  e>) =  <
1 if mi is authentic for the key e* 
0 otherwise.
3.3. Combinatorial Bounds 43
We have P (7r*(ra) is valid in Ci) =  E eie£* x (7rt ( ^ ) J ej)P(e,-). Because of the definition 
of Xi(m i en eZ/)j we know that for any such that r^ e ) =  ex, and t* =  e*, we have 
x (7r*(m),ej) =  X/ (m J e*5 eL)* Thus, it follows that,
P/[z,L] =  rnaxrog^ P (mis  accepted by P^e^)
=  maxmeM EeieSi X/(™, ̂ P ^ e x , )
=  maxTO£M Eei€5i ei)P(ei\eL)
=  P/W-
In the above lemma, P7[i] is the success probability of an outsider in impersonation 
attack and is given by,
PAi] =  max P ( R i  accepts m) =  m a x P ( 7Ti(m) is valid in Ci).
m€M meM
It should also be noted that a (w, n) MRA-code which is perfect against impersonation 
attack is not necessarily perfect against substitution attack.
3.3 Combinatorial Bounds
Let (C; . . . , Cn) be an MRA-code. Define Pj and Ps as follows.
p i =  max {Pi[i, L]\LU{*}
Ps =  max {P s [i, L}}LU{i}
where maximum is taken over all possible w-subsets L U { i }  (i 0  L) o f { 1 , 2 , . . . ,  n} .  In 
other words, P / and Ps are the best chances of a group of w — 1 receivers to succeed 
in impersonation and substitution attacks against a single receiver, respectively. We 
define the deception probability of a (w,n)  MRA-system as PD =  m ax{P j, Ps }.
T h eorem  3.4 Let (C; . . . ,  Cn) be a (w, n ) MRA-code. Assume that
Pd < 1/q,
and there is a uniform probability distribution on the source S. Then,
(i) \Si\ > q2, for eachi e  {1 , . . . , n } ;
(ii) \E\ >  <f
(Hi) \M\ >  qw\S\.
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The bounds are tight and there exists a system that satisfies the bounds with equality.
P r o o f . (i) For each (w — l)-subset L o f { 1 , . . . ,  n }  and any i E { 1 , . . . ,  n }  where 
i L, using Theorem 3.1 and Corollary 3.2 we have,




It follows that \Si\ >  q2.
(ii) Assume that Li =  { 1 , . . . ,  i — 1, i +  1 , . . . ,  w },  i =  1 , . . . ,  w. We have,
1 w
( - ) 2w> n  Pi[i,Li\Ps [i,Li] >  2^i=i 
Q i=1
>  2 “  E r=i H(Ei\Elt...tEi- 1) _  2~H (EU...,EW)
>  O-H(B) >  o-iogl^l -  J _
2  -  ~  \ £ [
Therefore, \S\> q2w.
(iii) Since r  : S — > S\ x • • • x Sn induces a mapping from S to E\ x • • • x £w, we 
have I (M ; E ) >  / ( M ;  jE7x, . . . ,  Ew). It follows that
2~I(M;E) <  2-I(M-,Eu ...,Ew) _  2 - ' E 7 = i I (M 'Ei\Eu-,Ew)
_  2_ ^r=i
W w
=  n  <  n  p Ah Qi],
i—1 *=1
where Q* =  { 1 , 1 } .  Since for each 1 <  z <  w, we have,
it follows that,
Pi[hQi\<Pi[hLi\ <  - ,
Q.
2 - I (M ;E )  _  2~{H{M)-H{M\E))  _  2 “ #  (M )2 #  (M|£) <  / V
”  9 *
Since 5  is assumed to be uniformly distributed, we know that
H(M\E) =  H(S) =  \og\S\. 
Hence \M\ =  2log|-A/i| >  2^ (M) >  which proves (iii).
The bounds are tight as it is easy to verify that they are satisfied by the polynomial 
construction by Desmedt, Frankel and Yung (described in section 3.5.1), in which we 
have, PD =  1 /q, |̂ | =  q2, for all 1 <  i <  n, \S\ =  q2w and \M\ =  qw\S\ and so the 
lower bounds are satisfied with equality.
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3.4 Comparison with Kurosawa et al Bounds
Kurosawa and Obana [71] formalise (w ,n ) MRA-codes as follows. Let Si, S2 ,---,^n 
denote the set of decoding rules o f receivers P i, • • - Rn, respectively, and let <S and M. 
denote the set o f source states and senders codewords, respectively.
D efin ition  3.2 ([71]) We say that ( S , M , E i r  • • ,Sn) is a (w, n) multireceiver A-code 
if fo'r ^(^¿i 5***5 £iw) o>rbd V(ei, * * *, €-w)5
P (E iw =  ew\Eix =  ei, • • •, Eiw_ 1 =  ew_i) =  P (E iw =  ew).
Probabilities of success in impersonation and substitution attacks, Pi and Ps, for (w, n) 
MRA-codes are then defined as
Pi =  max max P(Ri  accepts m )
Ri m '
Ps =  Y , P (  m ) m axm axP(R f accepts m'\Ri accepts m )
Ri m! m
where maximum is taken over m1 such that the source state of m! is different from that 
of m. With these definitions, they derived the following bounds. Assume t  — |Ad|/|<S|.
T h eorem  3.5 (Theorem 9 [71]) In a (w,n) MRA-code, Pi >  1 / y/i. Equality holds 
if and only if P (R {1, . . . ,  Riw acceptm) =  l/£ and P (R j  acceptsm) =  1/  y/i fo r  any m 
and any R j.
T h eorem  3.6 (Theorem 10 [71]) In a (w,n) MRA-code without secrecy, if Pi =  1 / y/i, 
then Ps >  1 / \Tl. Equality holds if and only if
P(Ri1, • • •, Rik accept m'\Ri1, . . . ,  Rik accept m) =  1/1
P(Rj accepts m'\Rj accepts m) =  1/  y/1
forVRj,Vm and VW such that the source state of m is different from that o f m!.
T h eorem  3.7 (Theorem 11 [71]) In a (w ,n ) MRA-code without secrecy, if Pi =  Ps — 
1 / y/I, then \£j\ > (y/I)2 for \/j. I f equality holds, then each rule o f Ej is used with 
equal probability.
Kurosawa and Obana characterised Cartesian MRA-codes that satisfy PT =  Ps =  
1/ yfi and observed that DFY polynomial construction is in fact an optimal construc­
tion and has the least number of keys for the transmitter and the receivers, and the 
smallest size of the authenticator.
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Definition 3.2 does not specify the relationship between the encoding functions of 
the transmitter and the receivers and only requires the independence o f receivers’ keys 
for any set o f w receivers. This independence, as shown in Lemma 3.3, is sufficient 
to ensure that the success probability o f w — 1 receivers against another receiver in 
impersonation attack by any is the same as that o f an (outside) opponent. We give 
a general definition o f MRA-codes in terms o f commutative mappings, and for (w, n) 
M RA-codes only require the success probability o f attackers in impersonation and/or 
substitution attacks to be less than one. However we do allow coalition o f insiders 
to have higher chance of success compared to an outsider. KO ’s definition o f ('w , n) 
M RA-codes corresponds to our definition o f (w , n) MRA-codes that are perfect against 
impersonation attack (see Lemma 3.3).
In the following we give a comparison between bounds obtained in Theorem 3.4 
and the bounds derived by Kurosawa and Obana in [71]. Let £ —
1. In [71] the first part of Theorem 9 proves that,
1
P i > y t
We show that our Theorem 3.4 (iii) implies that,
PD =  m ax{P j, Ps }  >
This is because assuming Pd =  m a x {P /,P s } =  l/q and using Theorem 3.4 (iii), 
we have _____
\M\ >  </w|c>| J^L
\ \ M \
1
W
Our result applies to general MRA-codes. Kurosawa et al result is stronger as 
p s >  l/q implies PD >  l/q , but only applies to MRA-codes that are perfect 
against impersonation attack.
2. Theorem 10 and 11 in [71] in fact prove the following result(see also the intro­
duction in [71]).
T h e o re m  3.8 (KO  [71]) For a (w ,n ) MRA-code without secrecy, if Pj =  Ps =  
, then \S\ >  £2 and |£| >  ( \/£)2 fo r  all 1 < i < n .
This result can be also obtained from Theorem 3.4. Indeed, since Pj — Ps 
we have PD =  i  =  ±, where q =  y fi  By our Theorem 3.4 (i) and (ii) it followsVt 9
that,
I£i > q 2 = ( ^ ) 2 -
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\£\ > q 2w =  ( V e )2w =  (£)2,
proving the desired result.
This result applies to all (w, n ) MRA-codes and does not require the code to be 
perfect against impersonation attack. It also applies to codes with secrecy.
3. The second part of Theorems 9, 10 and 11 in [71] do not have any counterpart 
in this paper.
3.5 Constructions
3.5.1 DFY Polynomial Construction
In [41], Desmedt, Frankel and Yung gave two constructions for MRA-codes: one is 
based on polynomials and the other based on finite geometries. We briefly review 
DFY’s polynomial construction because generalisations of this scheme will be discussed 
later. Details of the geometric construction can be found in [41].
Assume there is a sender T, and n receivers R i , . . . ,  Rn. DFY polynomial scheme 
works as follows. The key for T  consists of two random polynomials Po(x) and P\(x), 
each of degree at most w — 1, with coefficients in G F(q), where q >  max{|<S|, n }. The 
key for Ri consists of Po(i) and P\(i). To authenticate a source state s £ G F (q ), T 
broadcasts (s,A(a;)) where A (x) =  Po(x) +  sP i(x). Ri accepts (s,A(a;)) as authentic 
if A (i) =  Po(i) +  sPi(i). It is proved [41] that the construction results in a MRA-code 
with Pd =  1/q and the following parameters:
\S\ =  q, \£i\ = 92> Vi € {1,. . .  ,n } , \£\ = 22w, and |.M| =
and so the bounds in Theorem 3.4 can be achieved with equality.
The trivial construction for MRA-codes (as noted before), requires the sender to 
store many key bits and produces a long tag for the authenticated message. DFY 
scheme significantly reduces the size of the key storage and the length o f the authen­
tication tag. However the order of the field G F(q) must be chosen bigger than the 
size of the source and the number of the receivers. In fact q, which can be thought 
of as the security parameter of the system, (Pi =  Ps =  1/#), determines the size of 
the key storage and the length of the authentication tag. This makes the construction 
very restrictive because although it is acceptable to have the key storage, and length 
of the tag, $ function of the security parameter of the system, but having the number 
of receivers and the size of the source bounded by it, is not reasonable. In particular
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when the size of the source or the number of the receivers are very large, Pj and Ps will 
be unnecessarily small and the key storage of the sender and the receivers, together 
with the length of the authentication tag will become prohibitively large.
In practice, we might be satisfied with deception probabilities higher than 1 /q, but 
have limitation on key storage or communication bandwidth. So it is desirable to look 
for constructions that accommodate this situation. In Section 3.5.2 we will give such 
a construction.
3.5.2 A  Construction based on (n, m, w)-Cover-Free Family
In this section we present a general construction for (w , n) MRA-codes by combining 
an arbitrary A-code with an (n ,m ,w )~ cover-free Family.
Definition 3.3 Let X  =  { x \ , . . . ,  x m} and B =  { P i , . . . ,  B n} be a family o f subsets of 
X . We call (X , F) an (n, m, w) Cover-Free Family (CFF) if B io (¡L Bix U • • • U B iw_x 
fo r  all B io,B ix, . . . ,  B iw_x E B, where B^ ±  B ik if j  ±  k.
CFFs were introduced by Erdos et al in [46] and [47], and also implicitly studied by 
Fujii, Kachen and Kurosawa in [52] in connection with MRA-codes. An (n, w , 2) CFF 
is exactly a Sperner family. A trivial CFF is the family consisting of single element 
subsets, in which case n =  m. Non-trivial CFFs are those with n >  m. A good CFF 
is one that for given m  and w , n is large. Finding good CFFs with the largest possible 
n is believed to be a hard combinatorial problem [45]. Constructions of CFFs rely on 
various areas of mathematics such as finite geometries, design theory and probability 
theory [46, 47].
Assume that (X ,B )  is an (n ,m ,w ) CFF and (< S ,T ,£ ,/)  is an A-code without 
secrecy. We construct a (w ,n) M RA-code as follows.
1. Key Distribution: The KDC randomly chooses an ra-tuple of keys ( e i , . . . ,  
em) E £ m, and privately sends ( e i , . . . , e m) to the sender T  and e* to every 
receiver Rj for all j  with x% E Bj, 1 <  i <  m.
2. Broadcast: For a source state s E <S, the sender calculates ai — /(s ,e^ ) for all 
1 <  i <  m  and broadcast (5, a\ , . . . ,  arn).
3. Verification: Since the receiver Ri holds the keys {e j  | for all j  with Xj E -E }̂, 
Ri accepts (s, a\,. . . , am) as authentic if for all j  satisfying Xj E B i, aj =  f ( s , ej).
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Assume that the probabilities of impersonation and substitution attacks for the 
underlying A-code, C, is Pj and Ps , respectively, and let
a =  m in lli^ jB ^  U • • • U Biw_x |; for all Bi o , . . . ,  Biw_x G B }.
T h eorem  3.9 The above scheme is a (w ,n ) MRA-code and the probabilities o f imper­
sonation and substitution attacks are (P /)a and (P s)a, respectively.
The proof of the theorem is straightforward. In this scheme the sender is required to 
store ra[log |£|1 bits, and the receiver Ri to store |P*| [log \£\] bits. The authentication 
tag is of size ra[log \T\].
In [52], Fujii, Kachen and Kurosawa gave a definition of broadcast authentication 
which can be seen as a special case of DFY definition of M RA systems. Fujii et al also 
gave a construction for their broadcast authentication system which is a special case 
of the above construction, when the cover-free family has constant block size; that is 
\Bi\ =  c ,i =  l , . . . , n .
An important property of this construction is that it allows a complex system, such 
as a (w ,n) MRA-code, to be constructed from two simpler ones, an A-code and a 
cover-free family, such that the security of the former can be described in terms of the 
properties and parameters of the latter. Another advantage of this construction is its 
flexibility in choosing system parameters. That is w and n are determined by the cover­
free family while Pj and Ps are determined by the A-code and the cover-free family 
and so it is possible to fix w and n but change the A-code to obtain MRA-codes that 
provide the required protection. The following examples compare this construction 
with DFY polynomial scheme.
E xam ple 3.1 Assume that the size of the source state is only one bit (for example, 
yes and no/ and we need a (2,70) MRA-code with the probabilities o f impersonation 
and substitution attacks not greater than 1/2. Using D F Y  polynomial scheme we need 
a finite field G F (q ) with q >  70; it follows that [log#] >  7, and so the sender must 
store at least 28 bits and each receiver must store at least 1 4  bits. The length of 
the authentication tag is at least 1 4  bits, and the probabilities o f impersonation and 
substitution attacks are (|)7. Now we use our construction. It is easy to see that the 
Sperner family consisting of all 4-subsets of a set of 8 elements gives a (70 ,8 ,2) CFF. 
We define the underlying A-code C  =  (5 , T , £, f )  as follows. L etS  =  T =  G F (2), £  =  
G F (2)2, and f  : S  x £ y T  be given by f ( s , (e, e')) =  e +  ser. Then C  is an A-code 
with Pi =  Ps =  \. Applying our scheme, the sender and each receiver need to store
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only 16 bits and 8 bits, respectively. The length o f authentication tag is o f 8 bits and 
the probabilities o f impersonation and substitution attacks are both 1/2.
E xam p le  3.2 Assume that the size of the source state is very large, for  example 220 
bits (i.e. |<S| =  2220). A direct computation shows that the D F Y  polynomial scheme 
for  (2,70) M RA-code requires that the sender and each receiver to store 222 and 221 
bits, respectively. The length o f authentication tag is 221 bits while the probability 
of success in impersonation and substitution attacks is not greater that 1 /2220. In 
many applications the deception probability o f around 1 /220 is acceptable. Consider 
an A-code that is constructed from a universal hashing family (see [107]) with the 
following parameter: 220 bits o f source state, 445 bits of authentication key, 20 bits 
o f authentication tag and the probability o f impersonation and substitution attacks no 
greater than 1 /2 19. Combining with the (70,8,2) CFF, our construction results in a 
(2, 70) MRA-code in which the key storages for  the sender and each receiver are 3560 
bits and 1780 bits, respectively. The length o f the authentication tag is 160 bits and the 
deception probability is bounded by 1 /219.
We note that this construction is only suitable for the case when the number of mali­
cious receivers compared with the total number of the receivers is not very large. This 
is due to the following result.
L em m a 3.10 ([47]) In a non-trivial (n ,m ,w ) CFF, <  n.
In [45], using probabilistic methods the authors proved that (n, O (logn), w) CFFs 
exist for small w. Finally, we point out that M RA-code constructions that are based 
on CFFs are not perfect against impersonation or substitution attacks.
3.5.3 M RA-codes for Multiple Message Transmissions
In the basic model o f M RA-codes, security analysis is for a single message transmission 
(only impersonation and substitution attacks are considered) and for a second message 
no protection is guaranteed. To provide protection for multiple message transmission 
one possibility is to use a new key after each broadcasted message. This is very in­
efficient both in terms o f going through a key distribution phase after each message 
and the amount o f key information required for each message. In the following we pro­
pose systems that use a single key distribution phase for multiple message transmission 
and compared with using a new key for each message require less key information per 
communicated message.
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Generalised D F Y  scheme for multiple messages
Assume messages are all distinct and t <  |<S|. The scheme consists of the following 
steps:
1. Key distribution: KDC randomly generates t + 1 polynomials Pq(x ), Pi<as),. . . .  
Pt(x) of degree at most w — 1 and chooses n distinct elements xi, X2 , * * ’ > xn of 
G F(q). KDC makes x^s public and privately sends (Pq(x ), P\(x), • • •, Pt(x)) to 
the sender T, and (P0(£*)> Pi(£*), * • *,  Pt(xi)) to the receiver Ri.
2. Broadcast: For a source state s, T  computes A s(x ) =  Po(x) +  sP\(x) +  • • • +  
stPt(x) and broadcasts (s, A s(x)).
3. Verification: Ri accepts (s ,A s(x)) as authentic if A s(xi) =  Po(xi) -b sPi(xi) +  
----- b stPt(x i).
The above scheme is a multi-receiver authentication code in which each key can 
be used to authenticate up to t messages. To prove the security o f the scheme, we 
consider the scenario where for a given key (Po(x), P i(x ), • • •, Pt(x )), t source states 
Si, S2 , • • •, st have been authenticated and there are w — 1 receivers who want to con­
struct a fraudulent codeword that is acceptable by one of the other receivers. Without 
loss of generality, we may assume that the malicious receivers are P i, R 2 , • • •, Rw-i- 
Let Pi(x) — aw +  dux -b • • •, +  diWx w, 0 <  i <  t. Since Si, * * •, st have been sent, 
A ai{x), A82(x), • • • , A at(x) given by
A Sj(x) =  bj0 -b bjix -I--------b bjw-\xw~l , for all 1 < j < t ,
are publicly known, and the w -  1 receivers R u P 2, * • •, Rw-i know their keys 
(PoiXi), P i(xi), ■■■, Pt{ Xi)), • • • , (P0(xw- 1), P i(xm- i ) ,  ■■■, Pt{xw- 1)),
It follows that the malicious receivers know the following two matrix equations,
&00 0*10 •
1-------
0 '  1 1 . • 1 * h o bu  ■ ’ biw—1
&01 t t l l  • • Utl S i S2 • * s t
=
h o h i  * ’ h w —i
_ &QW—1 &lw—l ' * O'tw—1 _ . s i
at .b2 . atbt J .  ho bt 1 • * h w —1 _
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and,
1 X\ . .  . ~w~1 " Xl
1 X2 . . . « .w -1  x2
1 3?«;—1 . . .  /*.«>-1 ^w—1 .
■ P o (* i) • • Pt(x l )
Po(x2) • • Pt(x 2 )
^00 ^10 • • * « i0
a>oi a n  • * * atl
O'Ow—l dlui — l ' * ’ ^ tw—
_ Pofaw—l) * ' * Pt{Xw—l) 
The matrix equations can be rewritten as,
A M t =  B , 
X ^ A  =  C,
(3.3)
(3.4)
where A, M t, B , X w- i  and C  denote the corresponding matrices. We first give a lemma, 
which says that knowing M$, X w- i ,  B  and C  cannot determine A. In other words, the 
matrix satisfying (1) and (2) is not unique.
L em m a 3.11 There exist q different matrices D  such that D M t =  B  and X w- i D  =  C.
P ro o f . It is sufficient to prove that there exist q different matrices D  such that 
D M t =  0 and X w- i D  =  0. First, we observe that given an n x m  matrix D 0 =  (dij), 
we can associate it with a polynomial in x, y,






Conversely, a polynomial F ( x ,y )  can be written in the form (3) for some n x m  matrix 
D 0. Now consider the polynomial,




where D  is a w x (t 4- 1) matrix and D  ^  0. Clearly, F (x i , y )  =  F ( x 2 , y ) — • • • —
F  {xw_1? y) — 0 for all y. It follows that,
' 1 x x • • • ry.W-1 '
1 x 2 • • • ~W~ 1 x2
D  =  0.
1 %w—l ’ ’ ’ «.w-1•̂ w—1 _
Now, we may choose (t 4- 1) distinct elements yi, y2 , * * *, yt+i in GF(q)  such that,
F (x i ,  yi) =  F (  x 2,Vi) = • • • — F (x w--i ,Vi) = 0, for all 1 <  i <  1 4-1.
Thus we have,
‘ 1 Xi • Xl ' 1 i  •• • i  "
1 x 2 *. . rr.W-1 x 2 D yi 2/2 ’ • • yt+i
1 x l *.. r w~1 ^w—l _ . vi yi • • v i + i .
1 1 ••• 1
Since 2/i 2/2 ••• Vt+i
. y\ 2/2 •* ’ y\+ i _
ilarly, we have
is a Vandermonde matrix, the desired result follows. Sim-
1 1 ••• 1
Sl S2 * * * St
=  0.
m m m O ̂L bl b2 st J
For each r G GF(q),  we also have (rD)Mt  =  0 and X w_i(rD )  =  0. Thus there are 
q different matrices { r D  \ r G G F(q) }  with the desired property. So we complete the 
proof of the lemma
T heorem  3.12 [111] The above scheme is a (w,n) MRA-code in which every key can 
be used to authenticate up to t messages.
To authenticate t consecutive messages, using basic DFY scheme, 21 polynomials 
are required while in the above scheme we only need t 4- 1 polynomials. So the key 
storages for the sender and receivers are (t 4- l)u ;[log^] bits and (w +  1) flog ̂ ~| bits, 
respectively, which is reduced to nearly half o f that of the DFY scheme. The length of 
the authentication tag for both constructions are the same and equal to tw [log q~\ bits
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U sin g C over-F ree  F am ily  C on stru ction
To extend the construction o f Section 3.5.2 to support multiple messages it is only 
required to replace the underlying A-code by an A-code that provides protection against 
spoofing of order t , t >  1. In an spoofing o f order t attack on an A-code, the enemy has 
access to t authenticated codewords and wants to construct a fraudulent one. An A ­
code provides perfect protection against spoofing o f order t if the enemy’s best strategy 
is randomly selecting one of the remaining codewords. It is straightforward to see that 
in the construction given in Section 3.5.2, using an A-code that provides protection 
against spoofing o f order t ensures that probability of success in spoofing of order t 
(which can be defined similar to A-codes) is equal to (Pt)a, where Pt is the probability 
o f success in spoofing o f order t for the A-code used in the construction.
By replacing the underlying A-code with a Wegman-Carter type construction [4] one 
can obtain an M RA-code for multiple authentication using universal hash functions.
3.5.4 A  Construction from Error-Correcting Codes
We first give a definition for optimal MRA-codes.
D e fin ition  3.4  An MRA-code is called optimal if the bounds in Theorem 3.4 are met 
with equality.
The important property of optimal MRA-codes is that, for given cheating proba­
bility, the number of keys for transmitter and receivers is minimum and the tag length 
for codewords is the smallest.
D FY [41] gave two constructions for MRA-codes: one based on polynomials and the 
other based on finite geometries. Kurosawa and Obana [71] showed that the polynomial 
construction is optimal. No other optimal construction was known so far. In this section 
we use error-correcting codes (E-codes) to construct MRA-codes. First, we present two 
constructions which can be used to derive an MRA-code from an arbitrary E-code and 
then show that the constructions result in new optimal MRA-codes.
A linear [n, k] code C  over GF(q)  is a linear k dimensional subspace of G F(q)n. The 
dual code is denoted by C L and is the collection of vectors that are orthogonal to all 
vectors of C . Minimum distances o f C  and Cf_L are denoted by d and d', respectively.
C o n stru ctio n  I
Let C  be a linear [n, k] error-correcting code (E-code) over GF(q)  with a generator 
matrix G  e  (G F (q ) )kxn. We construct an M RA-code with n receivers from C  as 
follows. Assume that S  =  GF(q)  is the set o f source states and G is publicly known.
3.5. Constructions 55
1. Key distribution: T  randomly chooses (a,/3) G G F(q)k x G F {q )k. T  then cal­
culates the codewords aG  =  u =  (u i , . . . ,  un) and fiG =  v  =  (f i , • • • ? vn)> an(I 
privately transmits (it*, u*) to the receiver Rj for each 1 <  i <  n. That constitutes 
the secret key of Ri.
2. Broadcast: To authenticate a message s e S ,  the sender T  computes 7 =  a  +  s/3 
and broadcasts (s, 7) to all the receivers.
3. Verification: For each z, Ri accepts (5, 7) as authentic if yi =  U{ +  svi, where
y  =  (2/1, =  7  G.
Lem m a 3.13 In the above construction, let the probability distribution on the source 
and sender’s key space be uniform. Let L =  {¿1, . . . , ii\ Q { 1 , . . .  , n }  and i 0  L. Then 
Pj[ij L] =  Ps [i, L] =   ̂ if and only if there exists a codeword c =  (cx, . . . ,  cn) G C  such 
that Cjj =  • • • =  CiL — 0 and Ci =  1.
P roo f.
Sufficiency: Assume that there exists a codeword c G C  satisfying the required 
property of the theorem. Let u =  a G , v  =  fiG, where (a, /3) is the key chosen by the 
sender T. Because of the linearity of the E-code, we know that for any t, if G GF(q) 
we have u +  tc, v  +  ifc G C. Since R l has the key information . . .  ,Uit) and 
(vh , .. . , v it)), then for all t,t' G GF(q), (uh , . . .  ,u i v Ui +  t) and .. . , v it,Vi +  if) 
produce all possible keys of Rlu{i}- It follows that R l have no information about R\s 
key, and hence P/[z, L\ =  Ps[i, L] =  K
Necessity: Assume that there is no codeword c in C  satisfying the required property 
of the theorem. We prove that (u*15. . . ,  U{t) and (u^, . . . ,  Vit) uniquely determine Ui 
and Clearly, there exist Ui and Vi such that {uh , . . . ,  uit1Ui) and (vh , . . . ,  vin Vi) are 
subcodewords of C. We only need to show that such ui and Vi are unique. Indeed, 
if there exist two subcodewords (uh , . . . ,  uiv v*), (uh , . . . ,  u^u'f) in C, it follows that 
(uh , • • •, Uiv u^ — (uix, . . . ,  Uit, u'f) =  (0, . . . ,  0, Ui — u'f) is also a subcodeword in C, and 
so is ( 0 , . . . ,  0,1), which is a contradiction. In this case we have P/[z, L) =  Ps [i, L] =  1, 
proving the necessity.
T h eorem  3.14 Let C  be a linear [n, k] code overGF(q) with d' the minimum distance 
of its dual code, C L. Then Construction I  results in a (w , n) MRA-code with P7 =  p s =  
l/q ,w  =  df — l < k ,  and the following parameters,
|«S| =  q, \M\ =  qk\S\, \£\ =  q2k and \Si\ =  q2.
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P r o o f . We show that the resulting M RA-code is a (d! — l , n )  MRA-code, but 
not a (d ',n ) MRA-code. Let G  be a generator matrix of C. Recall [72] that C L 
has the minimum distance d! if and only if every d! — 1 columns of G  are linearly 
independent and some d1 columns of G  are linearly dependent. For each d! — 1 columns, 
indexed by {¿ l5. . . ,  2rf/_2, ¿}, the restriction of G  to these d! — 1 columns results in a 
k x (d! — 1) matrix 6r{tlv..,id/ ¿}- It follows that e* G G F(q)d>~1 can be expressed as 
a linear combination o f k rows of 6r{tlv..>t- , where e* G G F(q)d'~1 is the vector 
with the zth entry being 1 and other entries being 0. This implies that there exits a 
codeword c  =  ( c i , . . . ,  cn) G C  such that =  . . .  =  c* , =  0 and Ci =  1. Thus, by
Lemma 3.13, we have Pi[i, L] =  Ps[i, L] =  l/q for any d' — 1 subset { i } u L  o f { 1 , . . . ,  n}  
with and so the M RA-code is a (dr — l ,n )  MRA-code with Pi =  Ps =  l/q. In
a similar manner, we can prove that there exists a d'-subset L U {¿ }  o f { 1 , . . . ,  n )  such 
that Pi[i ,L ] =  Ps[h I ]  — lj so the code is not a (d', n) MRA-code.
In general the M RA-code derived from an E-code is not optimal and does not satisfy 
bounds o f Theorem 3.4. In the following we will show that for a well-known class of 
E-codes the construction results in optimal MRA-codes.
A maximum distance separable (MDS) E-code has maximum possible minimum 
distance and its parameters satisfy d =  n — k + 1 . We are only interested in linear MDS 
codes. An important property of MDS codes is that its dual code is an MDS code too 
(page 318 in [72]).
This means that for an MDS code d' =  n — (n — k) +  1 =  k, or k =  d' — 1. That 
is, the resulting (uu, n) M RA-code can protect against the largest size set of cheaters. 
Using this result and theorem 3.14 it is straightforward to prove the following.
C o ro lla ry  3.15 I f the linear code C  in Construction I  is an [n, k\ MDS code over 
GF(q) ,  then Construction I  results in an optimal (fc, n) MRA-code with Pi — Ps =  l/q. 
The MRA-code has the following parameters,
|S| =  q5 \M\ =  qk\S\, \S\ =  q2k and |̂ | =  q2.
A special class o f MDS codes are Reed-Solomon code with the following generator 
matrix,
G =
1 1 • • •  1
X i ‘ * *En
,w—1 mW —
x 2 ' • •  X n
where x\s are n distinct elements in GF(q).
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C orollary  3.16 I f the linear code C  in Construction I  is an [n,k] Reed-Solomon code, 
then Construction I  coincides with D F Y ’s construction.
3.5.5 Construction II
Construction I can be seen as a generalisation o f D F Y ’s construction. Construction II 
is based on the properties of the dual code and can be used for large size sources which 
makes it of practical interest. We first describe the construction and then discuss its 
properties.
The basic idea is to use vectors of dual code for verification process. The sender’s 
secret key is an £ x w matrix U which defines the generator matrix G =  [Ig \ U] of a 
linear code. To authenticate a source state s G <S the sender generates the codeword 
c =  sG and broadcasts it to the receivers. Each receiver Ri has a codeword di o f the 
dual code. To verify authenticity of a broadcasted vector x, receiver Ri calculates x-di  
(*•’ denotes vector inner product) and if it is zero, it accepts the codeword as authentic.
Let S C GF(q)£ denote the set of source states obtained by defining an equivalence 
relation ~  over G F(q)l\ {0} as follows: s ~  s' s =  rs' for some O ^ r  € GF(q).
It is easy to verify that this relation is in fact an equivalence relation. We define S  as the 
set of equivalence classes obtained from rs-/. It follows that \S\ =  p — ql 1 = -----\-q+l.
The three phases of Construction II are as follows.
1. Key distribution: The sender T  randomly chooses an £ x w  matrix G  G G F{q) ixw) 
(and so [Ig\U] is the generator matrix of a linear [ l +  w,I\ code in its systematic 
form). Assume that q >  n (this assumption is not necessary1). T  chooses n 
distinct elements x \ , . . . , x n G GF(q)(  these elements are public and are used 
as the identities of the receivers), and then calculates and secretly transmits 
U (l ,X i , . . .  , x f  l ) T  =  oil G GF(q)ixl to Ri, which consists of the secret key of 
R i,i =  l , . . . , n .
2. Rroadcast. To authenticate a source state s — (s i , . . . ,  s@) G <S, T  computes 
sU =  t =  (¿ i , . . . ,  tw) G GF(q)w and broadcasts (s, t).
3. Verification: For each i, R̂  accepts (s, t) as authentic if sa{ =  t ( l ,  x u . . .  x f _1)T.
T heorem  3.17 Construction II results in a (w,n) multireceiver A-code with Pj =
1 Instead, the sender may choose a w x n matrix M =  ( M i , . . . ,  Mn) over GF(q) such that any w 
columns of M  are linearly independent and the secret key of Ri is
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Ps =  1/q. It has the following parameters,
l$l = ^ fp  Î 1I = 9wI5I- \£ \ = vew and \£i\ = <f-
P r o o f . First, we prove that PT — Ps =  1/q. It is sufficient to show that for each 
L  C { l , . . . , n }  with \L\ =  w — 1 and i 0 L , Pi[i,L\ =  Ps[i,L] =  1/q. Without 
loss o f generality, assume that L =  { 1 , . . .  ,w — 1} and i =  w, and that after the key 
distribution, R L hold the keys
U (  l , x 1, . . . , x ' ?  1)T =  a 1, U ( l , x w- i , . . .  , x™_\)T =  aw_!.
Let F =  {U  € G F (q )exw; U( l , Xl, . . .  , x ? - 1)T =  a u . . . .  U{ l , x w. u . . . , xZz\)T =  
a w_i } .  That is, F  is the set of possibles authentication keys of the sender T  in accor­
dance with the keys o f R l . We define a mapping <j>: F — > G F(q)£xl by,
(j)(U) =  U(l,  x w, .. x w~l )T5 ) 5 VC/ G F.
It is straightforward to verify that (j> is one-to-one from F onto G F(q)£xl. This also 
implies that R'ws key C/(l, x w, . . . ,  x™~l )T =  <j>(U) is independent o f the keys of R L.
In the impersonation attack, R l , generates a codeword (s,t),s G S  and t G T  =  
G F (q )w, and hopes that it will be accepted by Rw as authentic. It follows,
P r„„ rl _  m o v  \\u-,ueF and aU(i,xVJ,...,x%-1)T=t(i,xw,...ix Z -1)T}\Fi[w,L/\ — m a x (Sjt)e<SxT ifi
— l i-i
In the substitution attack, R L, after seeing a broadcast authenticated codeword (s,t) ,  
generates a new codeword (s', t ;), s' ^  s, and hopes that (s', t') will be accepted by Rw 
as authentic. It follows that,
Ps [w,L]
m a x * , W K W t e s* . ^ r 1)T=t(i,xw.....x™-1)TiS,u(hxw,...,x™r1)T=t'(hxwi\{U]UeF,sU(l,xw, . . . ,x ^ -1)T = t ( l , x w,...,x^ 1)T }|
,xw — l\ T 11
Similarly, we have Pi[i, L] =  Ps[i,L] — 1/q for any w subset {¿} U L of { l , . . . , n }  
with i $  L. Thus we have proved that Pi =  Ps =  1/q- The proof of the cardinality 
parameters are obvious.
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C orollary  3.18 Let q >  n be a prime power. There exists a (w, n ) multireceiver 
A-code with the following parameters,
\S\=q +  l, \M\ =  qw\S\, \S\ =  q2w, and \Si\ =  q2
with probability of success in impersonation and substitution attack given by Pi -  
and Ps =  respectively.
The corollary follows from the theorem when £ =  2. The resulting M RA-code meets 
the bounds of Theorem 3.4 and hence is optimal.
It is interesting to note that for w =  n =  1, the above construction results in a 
conventional (one-sender to one-receiver) A-code with the following parameters
|<?| = -̂—4, \M\ =  q\S\, \e\ =  \£i\ =  qe,
Q ~  1
and the probability of success in impersonation and substitution is given by Pi =   ̂
and Ps =  respectively. Conventional A-codes with these parameters have been 
constructed from finite geometries. In particular, for £ =  2, the A-code has the same 
parameters as the A-code of Gilbert, Mac Williams and Sloane [56]. We note that 
Construction II is more suitable for MRA-codes with large source space. In the DFY 
construction and Construction I, the order of the field GF(q)  determines the lower 
bound on the success probabilities in impersonation and substitution, and at the same 
time bounds the size of the source that can be used in the system (|£| <  q). This 
can result in inefficient constructions for larger sources. For example a source of size 
2100 results in probability of deception lower bounded by 2~100 which is unnecessarily 
low. The price paid for this low probability is bigger key sizes which for practical 
applications is not acceptable. This restriction is removed in Construction II, and by 
choosing appropriate £ the size of source can be increased to the required level.
Chapter 4
Multireceiver Authentication Codes with 
Dynamic Senders
Collaborative and multi-user applications, such as teleconferences and electronic com­
merce applications, require secure communication among members of a group. Com­
pared to providing confidentiality, ensuring integrity and authenticity of information 
is much more difficult as in the latter subgroups o f participants can participate in a 
coordinated attack against other group members, while in the former they are passive. 
It is also worth emphasising that the two goals of confidentiality and authenticity in 
group communications are independent and authenticated messages might be in plain 
form, readable by public.
We consider the following scenario. There is a set o f users and a Trusted Authority 
(TA). During initialisation of the system, TA generates keys for all participants and 
securely gives the keys to them. Later, each user can broadcast a message which is 
verifiable for its origin and integrity by every other user, individually. We assume that 
users are not all trusted and may collude to construct a fraudulent message, to be 
attributed to another user. We assume security is unconditional and does not rely on 
any computational assumption.
The obvious method of providing protection in the above system is to use a conven­
tional point-to-point authentication system and give a shared key to each pair of users. 
Now to construct an authenticated message, a user will construct the authenticator 
for every other user, concatenate it together and append it to the message. This will 
allow every receiver to individually verify the message, by verifying the authenticator 
which is constructed using his shared key. Two immediate drawbacks of this system 
are that it requires a very large key storage, and produces a very long tag for a message 
resulting in high communication cost. A more serious problem is that the construction 
does not provide any security. This will become clear in the later discussions.
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Multireceiver authentication systems (MRA-codes) [41] can be seen as the first at­
tempt in providing authentication in group communication. However in this model the 
sender is fixed. In [111] this limitation is removed and the sender can be any group 
member. The extended model is called MRA-code with dynamic sender, or DMRA- 
codes for short. DMRA-codes capture the essential aspect o f authentication problem 
in groups but the model allows only one sender while in many applications such as dy­
namic conference key distributions, group members interact with each other and more 
than one sender exists. Moreover, the only known non-trivial construction [111, 94] is 
very inflexible and for large size groups, or sources, results in very inefficient construc­
tions with many key bits and long authenticators. In summary, although DMRA-codes 
do provide a promising starting point for authentication in group communication, for 
practical applications more general, flexible and efficient models and constructions are 
required.
Our goal is to have solutions that are efficient both in terms of storage and com­
munication cost. To achieve our goal we propose two new assumptions.
• The largest size of collusion set is w.
• There are at most t transmitters (senders).
These are both reasonable assumptions. The first assumption effectively bounds 
the power of attackers, and the second one is similar to the degree of spoofing in a 
conventional authentication system but is more complex to protect against as the t 
messages are from different originators and so a new type of attack, that is changing 
the originator of a message, is introduced.
This new attack points to the fact that in a DMRA-code with t dynamic senders 
an authenticated message must carry some information about its origin. The attack 
works because in general we allow the same message to be sent by more than one 
sender. This is a realistic requirement in many applications such as a voting system 
with many participants and only a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ answer. In this attack, that we call 
directional attack, an intruder firstly changes the origin information o f a message that is 
already sent by P j, and then resends and attributes it to jPj. This could give him a high 
success chance if P̂  and Pj share some key information which is used for generation of 
authenticators. This observation immediately rules out direct application o f schemes 
that establish a common key among two or more users, including the scheme described 
above, the construction based on symmetric polynomial [111], or application o f KDP 
and its more general form ( i , j ) -cover-free family [112] for key distribution. It is worth
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noting that all such constructions can be immediately used to provide confidentiality 
in group communication, but exactly because they result in a shared key among two 
or more participants they cannot be used in group authentication systems.
To include information about the origin in a broadcasted message, a simple ap­
proach would be to attach identity information to the message and then authenticate 
the result. Although this added information could protect against directional attack 
but will effectively increase the size of the of message space, which in the case o f a 
small source and a large number of participant such as the voting system mentioned 
above, is not acceptable. We will show that this information is theoretically redundant 
and can be removed in an optimal system. In the rest of this chapter we assume that 
identity information is appended to the authenticated message.
The contributions o f this chapter can be summarised as follows.
1. We formalise the model of DMRA-codes so that is allows more than one sender.
This generalises the model o f MRA-codes we study in the previous Chapter.
2. We propose a general ‘synthesis’ construction for DMRA-codes by combining a 
key distribution pattern (KDP) [77] and an A-code, such that the protection 
of the resulting system can be determined by the protection of the A-code and 
parameters of the KDP. The construction is especially attractive as it reduces 
construction o f a DM RA-code to the construction of suitable KDPs and A-codes, 
and so allows direct application of the previously known results in these latter 
two areas to the construction of DMRA-codes.
3. We consider a DM RA-code with t senders, tDMRA-code for short, and give two 
new constructions for such systems. The first construction is algebraic and uses 
polynomials in two variable and has a similar flavour to the optimal construction
for the single sender case. The second construction is a ‘synthesis’ construe-  ̂
tion which is combinatorial in nature and combines a perfect hash families and 
an arbitrary A-code to obtain a tDMRA-code. The construction provides the 
generality and flexibility that we noted earlier in the synthesis construction of 
DM RA-codes from KDP and A-codes.
4. To show the applicability of our results, we give an interesting application of 
DM RA-codes by constructing a secure dynamic conference system. Security 
means that messages from a conferencee is only readable, and verifiable for  its 
authenticity, by other conference members. We note that a secure conference
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key distribution protocol can be immediately used for a conference system that 
provides confidentiality for conference members, however no assurance about the 
origin of messages can be given and so the system does not provide any ac­
countability. Our construction is built on an optimal dynamic conference key 
distribution system proposed in [24], and for large group sizes, as long as the 
conference size is relatively small, effectively adds authentication without any 
extra cost (extra key bits).
5. Although our main analysis is for Cartesian A-codes in the context o f uncondi­
tional security our main constructions are universal. That is they can also be used 
for A-codes with secrecy and MACs (Message Authentication Codes), resulting 
in tDMRA-codes in which protection is determined by the security property of 
the underlying primitive A-system (A-code with or without secrecy, and MAC) 
and parameters of a combinatorial structure, a KDP or a perfect hash function 
family. This is a very interesting property that allows a primitive authentication 
system be used for efficient authentication in large groups.
In section 4.1 we give the model and the definitions. In section 4.2 we extend 
previous results for single sender case by proving lower bounds on the size o f the key 
and codeword spaces, and give an optimal construction that meets the bounds. We 
also describe an efficient construction from key distribution pattern. In section 4.3 
we consider systems with multiple senders and present two constructions. In section
4.4 we propose a secure dynamic conference system. Computationally secure group 
authentication systems are discussed in section 4.5 and section 4.6 concludes our results.
4.1 The Model
A (w ,n ) MRA-codes [41] is an interesting extension of the classical A-systems where 
a fixed sender can authenticate a single message for a group of n receivers such that 
collusions of up to w receivers cannot construct a fraudulent codeword which is accepted 
by another receiver. Bounds and construction for MRA-codes are given in 3
An extension of the MRA-code model is when the sender is not fixed and can be any 
member of the group. We call the system MRA-code with dynamic sender. There are 
many applications for such systems. For example, allowing the sender to be dynamic 
introduces the notion of authenticating with respect to a particular originator. That is, 
to verify authenticity of a received message a receiver must first assume an originator
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for the message and then verify the message with respect to that particular originator. 
Thus a broadcast message in general carries information about its origin, together 
with its real con ten t. This origin information can be appended to the real content and 
authenticated, or appended to the authenticated form of the real content. An attacker 
succeeds by either changing the origin, or the real content and hence the system must 
provide both origin (entity) authentication and message authentication.
In the model of M RA-code with dynamic senders, there are n users V  =  { P i , . . . ,  Pn}, 
who want to communicate over a broadcast channel. The channel is subject to spoofing 
attack: that is a codeword can be inserted into the channel or, a transmitted codeword 
can be substituted with a fraudulent one. An attack is directed towards a channel, 
consisting of a pair o f users { Pi, Pj} ,  P* as the sender and Pj as the receiver. A spoofer 
might be an outsider, or a coalition of w insiders. The aim of the spoofer(s) is to 
construct a codeword that Pj accepts as being sent from p .
A  TA, generates and distributes secret keys for each users. The TA is only active 
during key distribution phase. The system consists of three phases.
1. Key Distribution: The TA randomly chooses a key e G S and applies a key 
distribution algorithm
r  : S — > Si x • • • x Sn, r(e) =  (e1}. . . ,  e„) 
to generate a key e* for user Pi, 1 <  i <  n, and secretly sends e* to p .
2. Broadcast: A user Pi constructs an authenticated message and broadcasts it. For 
this, Pi uses his/her own authentication algorithm,
Ui : S  x Si — > M i, Ui(s, ei) =
where P  and M i  are the set of keys and authenticated codeword for p .  The 
codeword sent by Pi for a source state s G S  is (i, Ufis, ei)) =  (i, ra*).
3. Verification: A user Pj, j ,  1 <  j  <  n, uses his/her verification algorithm Vjt to 
accept or reject the received codeword. That is, the key ej determines a set of 
verification algorithms {V^; 1 <  i <  n , j  ^  i }  with
Vji : M i  x Sj — > {0 ,1} ,
such that Vjfimi, ej) =  1 if Pj accepts mi as an authenticated codeword sent from 
Pi and Vjfimi, ej) =  0 otherwise.
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We assume that after a key distribution phase, there are at most t users who 
broadcast their authenticated messages and the messages all come from a set S of 
source states. For the simplicity, we also assume that each sender may only broadcast 
a single message. We will adopt the Kerckhoff’s principle that details of the system, 
except the actual keys, are public. We call the system a (w, n) tDM RA-code and 
represent it by C  — (<S, or in Cartesian authentication system, by
C =  (S ,£ , {A i ,£ i ) i< i<n)-
To assess the security , we define the probability o f success in various attacks. 
Let B  and A he two subsets of { l , . . . , n }  with \B\ =  ¡3 <  t and \A\ =  a  <  w. 
Without loss of generality, let B =  {k\,. . . ,  kp} and A =  { i \,. . . ,  £a}, and denote Pb =  
{P kl, . . . ,  Pk/3}  and PA =  {Pen . . . ,  Pia}. Assume that after seeing the authenticated 
messages (skl, akl) , . . . ,  (sk0, ak0) broadcast by Pkl, . . . ,  Pkj3, respectively ( skl, . . . ,  sk/3 
are not necessary distinct), PA want to generate a message (s*, a*) such that it will be 
accepted by Pj as an authenticated message broadcast by Pi. We further assume that 
i , j  & A .1
Let P[PA, PB, Pi, Pj] denote the probability of success for malicious users PA in 
constructing a fraudulent message such that Pj accepts it as authentic and broadcast 
by Pi, after the broadcast messages from PB are seen. We assume the malicious users 
use their optimal strategy and want to maximise their chance of success. They can 
choose the message and the channel, that is Pi, Pj, to achieve this goal.
It is easy to see that if A C A', then P[PA, PB, Pi, Pj] <  P[PA>, PB, Pi, Pj]- Thus, 
without loss of generality, we assume that \B\ =  w. For each 0 <  k <  t, we define
Pok =  maX P[PA,P B,Pi,Pj]
where the maximum is taken over all possible A, B, i , j  such that \A\ =  w, \B\ =  k and 
i , j  0  A. We then define the overall probability of deception, denoted by PD, as
PD =  ma x {P Do, PDl, . . . ,  PD J .
D efin ition  4.1 A MRA-code with dynamic senders C  =  {S ,£ ,  {A ,^ } i< i< n )  is called 
a (w ,n ) tDMRA-code if PD <  1.
1 There are other possible attacks for the case i E A or j  £ A. For example, a user claims to have
received a message from other user that was never sent, or after broadcasting a message then denies 
having sent it. To avoid such attack in conventional A-codes, a new participant called an arbiter 
who in the case of a dispute arbitrates between transmitter and receiver, is introduced. The resulting 
A-code is called A-code with arbiter, or A 2-code. Similar attacks can be considered for tDMRA-codes.
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4.2 DMRA-codes with a Single Sender
We start with the simplest (w, n ) tDM RA-code in which t =  1 and simply call it (w, n) 
DM RA-code. This is exactly the same model as M RA-code with dynamic sender 
introduced in [111]. In section 4.2.1 we give combinatorial lower bounds on the key 
size for each user, and also the size of the authenticator, and show the tightness of the 
bounds by giving a construction that meets the bound, and so is optimal. In section
4.2.3 we will give the ‘synthesis’ construction.
4.2.1 Bounds
Efficiency of a (w , n) DM RA-code C — (S, S , {Mi,  £t}i<*<n) can be measured in terms 
of the size of each user’s key space, \Si\ and the size of the authenticated message space,
|M i |. We do not really need to consider the the size of key space for TA, \£\, as after 
the key distribution phase TA does not need to remember the key and so can erase his 
key. The following lower bounds can be used to determine the best performance of a 
DM RA-code.
T h e o re m  4.1 ([94]) In a (w,n) DMRA-code C  =  (S, £, {Mi, £i\i<i<n) with Pd <  l/<7 
and uniform probability distribution on the source S , we have:
(i) |£»| > q2(w+1\ for  each i G {1,2, . . . ,  n },
(ii) \Mi\ >  qw+1\S\, for  each i G {1, 2 , . . . ,  n}.
P ro o f . For each i, 1 <  i <  n, Pi is a possible sender and so the (w,n) MRA-system 
with dynamic sender induces a (w, n - 1) MRA-code, in which the probability of success 
in impersonation and substitution attacks are both 1 /q- By applying Theorem 4.1, we 
obtain the required results. In Section 4.2.2 we will show that the bounds are tight by 
giving a construction that meets them.
4.2.2 An optimal construction
The following construction is a slightly modified version of the construction given in 
[111]. We show that the construction has the minimum length of keys for users and 
the authenticator, and meets the bounds in Theorem 4.1 with equality. We first briefly 
review Blom key distribution scheme.
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Blom key distribution scheme
Let q >  n be a prime power. The TA randomly chooses a symmetric polynomial, 
F(x, y ), with coefficients in GF(q) and of degree less than or equal to w. For 1 <  i <  n, 
the TA computes the polynomial Gt(x) =  F(x, i) and gives Gi(x) to user Pu i.e., Gt(x) 
is the secret information of Pi. The key associated with the pair o f users Pi and Pj is 
calculated as, %  =  Gi(j) =  Gj(i). It is proved [23] that the scheme is unconditionally 
secure against the collusion of w users in the following sense: the coalition o f any w 
out of n users, say Pj15. . . ,  Piw, has no information about the key kij for the pair i, j, 
where i , j  { ¿ i , . . .  , iw}.
(w,n) MRA-code with dynamic sender based on Blom’s scheme
The (w,n) MRA-code with dynamic sender based on the Blom ’s scheme, works as 
follows. Let S  be the set of source states and q >  max{|«S|,n} be a prime power.
1. K ey  d istribu tion : The TA chooses n distinct numbers a* in GF(q)  (associate 
a,i to user P*, 1 <  i <  n). These values are public and are used as identity 
information for users. Then the TA randomly chooses 2 symmetric polynomials 
of degree less than w with coefficients in G F(q ),




, ¿ =  0,1,
where Ai is a (w -I-1) x (w 4-1) symmetric matrix for i  — 0,1. For 1 <  i <  n, 
the TA computes the polynomials
i  \
Gu(x) =  Fi(x, ai) =  (1, x , . . . , x w)Ae 0>i ¿ =  0,1,
n w
\ ai /
and gives the 2-tuple of polynomials, (Goi(x), G u (x)), to user This constitutes
the secret information of P*. 2
2. B roadcast: For 1 <  i <  n, assume that the user Pi wants to generate the 
authenticated message for a source state s G S. Pi computes the polynomial 
Mi(x) = G0i(x) +  sGu(x) and broadcasts (s, ai, Mi(x)).
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3. Verification: The user Pj can verify the authenticity of the message in the 
following way. Pj accepts (s, di, Mi(x)) as authentic and being sent from Pi if
M iicij)  =  G o j(d i) +  s G i j ( d i ) .
Theorem 4.2 The above scheme is a (w,n) MRA-code with dynamic sender with
Pi =  Ps =  !/<?•
Proof. Assume that after seeing an authenticated message (s, a*, Mi(x)) broadcasted 
by the user Pi, the users P\ , . . . ,PW want to generate a new message (s ',a* ,M[{x)), 
where s' ^ s such that the user Pj will accepts it as authentic, i.e. M[(aj) =  Goj(di) +  
s'G\j(di). First, we observe that for each m G GF(q) each user, say Pt, can calculate
i
the polynomial Got(x) +mGit(x) =  (1, x, • • • ,  xw 1) ( i 4 0 +  mAi) at It follows that
V <  /
for each m  G GF(q), Pi, ... ,PW can calculate a (w +  1) x w matrix D[m] such that the 
following identity holds,
1 ••• 1
(A q +  mAi)
a i do = D[m\. (4.1)
d w1 d ww .
Since (s, dU Mi(x)) is broadcasted, it follows that PU. . . ,PW know the following poly­
nomial,
(  i  \
g(x ) =  (1 , x , • • •, xw)(Aq +  sAi)
di
\ a f  J
By combining equation (4.1) and the polynomial g{pc), P\,. . . ,  Pw can also calculate 
matrices B and C such that the following equations hold.
A0 +  sA\ 
1 . . .  1 '
(A q +  mAi )
d\ aw
C
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We claim that in the equations (4.2) and (4.3) above, knowing C  and D[m\ for all 
m G GF(q)  can not determine the 2-tuple matrices (A0,Ai) .  In fact, there exist q 
distinct 2-tuple matrices (A0, A x) satisfying equations (4.2) and (4.3). This is equivalent 
to the following statement: There exists a 2-tuple o f matrices (A0, A i) ^  (0 ,0) such 
that the following equations hold
A q +  sA\ —
1 ••• 1
(Ao +  mAi)
ai • • aw
a™ • • awUtw .
0 (4.4)
0 for all m  G GF(q)  (4.5)
Indeed, consider the symmetric polynomial,
F (x ,y )  =  (x - a i ) - - ( x - a w) ( y - a i )
(  i
(y  o>w)
=  (1 , x , - - - , x w)A
y
\ y w
where A  is a (w + 1 ) x (w + 1 ) symmetric matrix and A  ^  0. We define A 0 =  — sA  and 
A\ =  A, then it is not difficult to verify that (A$,Ai)  satisfies the desired properties.
We note that since (—5̂ 4, 4̂) satisfies equations (4.4) and (4.5), so does (—rsA,rA)  
for all r G GF(q). This implies that there are q distinct 2-tuple of symmetric poly­
nomials which are equally likely to be chosen by the TA. For each 2-tuple matrices 
(AqjA i ) of the from (—rsA, rA), let
i  \
(1, aj, • • •, aJ)(Ao -h s'A\) =  d.
\ ai J
Then it is straightforward to verify that d =  0 if and only if r =  0. This is equivalent 
to that the q distinct possible 2-tuple polynomials (F0(ar, y), Fi(x, y)) chosen by the TA 
result in q distinct values of the form F0(ai, aj) +  s'Fi{ai, af). Therefore the probability 
of message substitution attack Psmessage is 1/q. Similarly, we can prove Ps t.t =  p T =  
l/q. •
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We see that in this construction the size of each user’s key is \£{\ =  q2(w+l\ for all 
1 <  z <  n, and the size o f codewords is Mi =  qw+2 =  ^w+1|5|. Thus we have shown 
that the bounds given in Theorem 4.1 are satisfied with equality.
This construction, although optimal, is very restrictive as q determines not only 
deception probability but also the size of the key space and the length of the tag. More 
specifically, for PD =  1/q key size for each user and authenticator lengths are both of 
order O (log^). For large size sources, and/or large groups, the construction requires 
very high values for q which results in unnecessarily high protection at the expense of 
very large key spaces and long authenticators.
4.2.3 A  General Construction
In the following we show a general construction for (w,n)  DMRA-codes by combining 
a key distribution pattern and an A-code such that the security of the resulting system 
is determined by the security o f the underlying A-code and the parameters of the key 
distribution pattern. The importance of this construction is that it provides a much 
higher degree of flexibility in the design o f DMRA-codes and results in constructions 
that are practical. The construction can be seen as an extension of the MRA-code 
construction in [111] but uses KDP instead of a cover-free family.
Key distribution patterns (KD P) [77] are explicitly or implicitly used by numerous 
authors to construct key distribution systems [45, 58, 75, 78, 85, 110, 112]).
Let X  =  { x u x 2, • • •, x v}  be a set, and B =  {B u P 2, • • •, B n}  be a family of subsets of 
X .  The set system (X , B) is called a (n, v, w) key distribution pattern (or K D P ( n , v, w) 
for short) if
|(Bi n B i ) \ ( u r =1f t . ) | > i
for any w -1-2 subset { i , j ,  £i, . • •, £w}  o f { 1 , 2 , . . . ,  n}.
Assume there are n users P i , . . . ,  Pn- Let (X , B) be a K D P ( n , v,w)  and (S, A q, So) 
be a Cartesian authentication code such that the probability of deception (imperson­
ation and substitution attacks) is bounded by 1/q. Associate Bi to P*, 1 <  i <  n. Both 
(X , B) and (S ,Ao,£o)  are public.
1. Key distribution: For each 1 <  j  ^  TA randomly chooses an authentication 
key ej G So and gives ej to user Pi if Xi G Bj. Thus, user Pi receives a |£^|-tuple, 
(eil5. . . ,  e*|B |) G SoBi\ as his/her secret authentication key.
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2. Broadcast: When Pi wants to construct an authenticated message for a source
state s G S, he computes \Bi\ partial authenticators eit (s), 1 <  t <  \Bi\, and 
broadcasts (s, (5) , . . . ,  (s)) together with his identity i.
3. Verification: A user can verify authenticity and origin o f the broadcast message 
in the following way: Pj uses the origin information, i, to determine the set 
£ij =  { eith<t<\Bi\ n {e jk}i<k<\Bj\ and accepts ( ¿ ^ ( s ) , . . . ,e i|Bi|(s)) as authentic 
and sent from P* if for all e E Sij, e(s) is the same as the corresponding component 
in
T h eorem  4.3 Let the deception probability of the underlying A-code (S, Ao,£o) be 
bounded by 1/q. Then the above construction results in a (w,n) DMRA-code C  =  
{S, S, {Ai,  £i}i<i<n) with Pd <  1/q. The code has the following parameters
\£\ =  \£0\v, \£i\ =  |i0||Bil and\Ai\ =
P ro o f. Assume there are w colluding users , P i , . . .  ,P W, who see a broadcast message, 
and want to construct a fraudulent message to be accepted by Pj and attributed to 
Pi. Since |(Bi Pi Bj) \ (Uf=1Bt)\ >  1, it follows that there exists at least one keys 
from the A-code that is known to P* and Pj, but is unknown to P i , . . . ,  Pw. Because 
the success probability of colluders in correctly guessing this key is not better that 
the outsiders, and because of the properties of the underlying A-code, their success 
probability is bounded by 1/q.
The construction also works for general A-codes in which case the broadcast code­
word by Pi is (mh • • where =  e ^ s ) .
The main advantages of the construction is its flexibility in the choice of parameters 
for different applications. The following example shows the effectiveness of the above 
construction.
E xam ple 4.1 Assume a network with 5000 users such that the biggest size o f colluding 
subsets is 5 and messages are strings of size 250 bits (i.e. |P| =  22™).
1. Using the optimal construction we have:
- The key storages for the TA and each user are 42 x 250 bits and 12 x 250 bits, 
respectively;
- The length of the authenticator is of 6 x 250 bits;
- P d <  1 /2250 (unnecessarily low).
2. Using the construction given in this section: Assume PD <  1 /2 19. This is 
acceptable for all practical purposes. We use an A-code that provides enough protection,
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and, a K D P with n =  5000 and w =  5. We use the A-code which is based on universal 
hashing families constructed from geometric codes given in [16], with the following 
parameters: |S| =  2250, authenticator length of 20 bits, and the key length o f 125 bits. 
Next we use the probabilistic method developed in [45], to construct a K D P ( n ,v ,w )  
with n =  5000, v =  3928, w — 5 and \B{\ =  1123 on average. Combining the two, we 
obtain a (h,5000)-DMRA code with the following parameters.
- The key storages for  the TA and each user are 591 Kbits and 140 Kbits respectively;
- The length o f authenticator is 2.5 Kbits;
- Pd <  1 /2 19.
Comparing the optimal construction and the previous scheme shows that the key 
storage and the communication cost are dramatically reduced in the latter, while the 
deception probability has only increased from  1 /2250 to 1 /219 which for practical purposes 
is insignificant.
This construction is especially important in practical applications where secure key 
storage and communication bandwidth are scarce and valuable resources.
To obtain key efficient constructions from Theorem 4.3 we require a K D P ( n ,v ,w )  
with small v. The trivial key distribution K D P ( n ,v ,w )  with w <  n — 2 has B equal 
to the collection of pairs of X , and so n =  and \B{\ =  v — 1 for all 1 <  i <  n.
A ‘good ’ K D P ( n ,v ,w ) ,  is one that for given v and w, n and \Bi\ are as small as 
possible for 1 <  i <  n. The constructions in [77] and [58] both require v =  0 (n )  
which is much better than the trivial construction with v =  0 ( n 2). Dyer, Fenner, 
Frieze and Thomason [45] gave a probabilistic construction with v =  O(logrc), but an 
explicit construction having v =  O (logn) is not known. From [112] we know explicit 
constructions where v is a polynomial function of log n exist.
It is worth noting that the above construction based on KDPs can only result in 
‘good ’ DM RA-code (small v ) if w is small compared to n. This is to be expected be­
cause of the relationship between KDPs and cover-free families and the known bounds 
on the latter. More specifically, (X, B) where A  is a point set and B is a family of 
subsets of A , is called a w-cover-free family if Bio <£_ Bh U • • • U B iw holds for all 
B io, B h , . . . ,  B iw £ B, where B ik ^  Btj if ik ±  ij. A K D P { n , v, w) gives a w-cover-free 
family by considering B{ as the point set and { B { fl Bj\ j  =  1 , 2 , . . . ,  n and j  ±  i }  as B. 
The proof of this claim is straightforward and is omitted. Applying a result of Erdds 
et al in [47] (Proposition 3.4), it follows that if ^ +2)jw±^ >  n -  1, then \Bt\ >  n -  1. 
This means that the the size of the block in the original KDP must be more than the 
trivial scheme and so is not possible (the trivial scheme has the biggest block size).
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4.3 DMRA-codes with Multiple Senders
In this section we consider tDMRA-codes, with t >  2. In designing a (w, n ) tDM RA- 
code with t >  2, it is important to note that if the protection for a channel between two 
participants Pi and Pj is provided by a symmetric key system, then a message sent by 
Pi can be later resent and attributed to Pj. In this case Pi will accept the message as 
authentic from Pj and the success chance of the intruder is 1. To avoid this directional 
attack, Pi and Pj must have different keys.
In the following we first look at two simplistic approaches to the construction of a 
tDMRA-code and then give two constructions with provable security that are shown 
to be much more efficient.
Trivial C on stru ction  1. An obvious method of constructing a tDM RA-code is to 
use t copies of a DMRA-code with t independent keys. That is, in the key generation 
phase the TA chooses t independent keys, e1, e2, • • • e*, for a DM RA-code and gives the 
user Pi, a t  tuple, (ej, e2, • • -e*). A user Pi will use key ef to authenticate (generate or 
verify) the Ith message. In this case the size of the key for each participant is t times 
that of a DMRA-code, which for efficient DMRA-codes and small t could be reasonably 
low. The length of the tag for each message is the same as the original DMRA-code. 
However the system is unacceptable as it requires each user to carefully keep track of 
all the communicated messages and use the correct key for each particular message. If 
a message is missed, all future communications will be lost.
Trivial C on stru ction  2. A second immediate solution will be to use a (w,n — 1) 
MRA-code. In this case each user receives the key information for sending one message, 
and the key information for verifying n -  1 messages. The result is a (w, t) tDMRA- 
code with t — n. The length of tag in this case is the same as the M RA-code but the 
key storage is at least a linear function of n. This means that the key storage will be 
prohibitive for large groups.
4.3.1 A polynomial construction for tDMRA-codes
The first non-trivial construction uses polynomials (non-symmetric) in two variables, 
and can be considered as an extension of the above optimal DMRA-code.
Let S  =  GF(q ) be the set of source states. We construct a (w, n) tDM RA-code as 
follows.
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1. Key Distribution: TA randomly chooses two matrices 
. A, B e  G F (q ){w+lMw+t+1>>
, and computes two polynomials
F(x, y) =  (1, x, ■ ■ ■, xw)A( 1, «/,•••, yw+t)T
and
G{ x, y) = { 1 , x ,  ■ • • , ?/, • • •, yw+t)T■
Then he chooses n distinct numbers ai e GF(q)  and n distinct numbers bi e 
G F (q ), where (a*, bi) is Pi s identity information, and makes them public. For 
each i, 1 <  i <  n, the TA privately sends two pairs of polynomials (F(x ,  a*), G(x,  a*)), (F(b 
to Pi. This constitutes the secret information of Pj.
2. Broadcast: If Pi wants to authenticate a message Si e  GF(q), Pi calculates 
the polynomial Ufix) =  F(x,ai) +  SiG(x,ai) and broadcasts (si,Ui(x)) and his 
identity aj to other users.
3. Verification: Pj can verify authenticity of (si,U{(x)) by calculating the polyno­
mial Vj(y) =  F (b j , y) +  SiG(bj,y) and accepting (sj, Ufix)) as authentic and being 
sent from Pi if V^(a*) =  Ufibj).
T h e o re m  4.4 The above construction results in a (w ,n ) tDMRA-code
C = (S,£, {Ai, £i}i<i<n),
in which the probability o f success for  a collusion of up to w users in performing im­
personation or substitution attacks on any other pair of users is at most 1/q. The 
construction has the following parameters
\S\ =  g2(W+l)(i+t/;+l)5 |£.| _  q±w+2t+A m d \ A i\= q_ 1 1 <  i <  n.
P ro o f . Assume that { P i , . . . ,  Pw}  are the colluders. We need to consider the following 
types o f attacks: (1 ) Without seeing any communication, the colluders construct a 
message fraudulent message (st, ah Afix))  such that Pj would accept as authentic and 
sent from Pj. (2 ) After seeing t broadcast messages, (s^, Uie, Gifix)), i  1 , . . .  , t  from 
users Pix, . . . , P it, the colluders will have one of the following substitution attacks: 
(a.) For some ie, say ix , { P i , . . . , P * , }  generate a message (s '1? ah , P ' » ) ,  where 
s'. ^  5j1? such that Ph  for some j  e {  1 , . . . ,  n } \ { l , . . . ,  w},  will accepts it as authentic
*
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and sent from P (b.) colluders, { P i , . . . ,  Pw}, construct a message (s, U^(x))i
where i' ^ { ¿ i , . . . ,  it}  and s may or may not be in { s i l?. . . ,  s^}, such that Pj, j  G 
{ l , . . . , n } \ { l , . . . , u ; } ,  will accepts it as authentic and sent from Pi>. We only give a 
proof sketch for (2.b) and note that the other two cases can be proved in a similar way. 
In (2.b), the colluders construct a fraudulent message (s, <v, Ai>(x)) aimed at Pj. They 
succeed if they can correctly guess F(bj ,aif) +  sG(bj,cii), where F ( x , y )  and G(x,y)  
are the two polynomials chosen by the TA. Now for any given s , let s' G GF(q)  and 
1 +  ss’ ^  0. Consider the polynomials
Fr(x, y) =  F(x,  y ) +  r(x  - b i ) - - - ( x -  bw)(y -  ai) •••(?/ -  aw)(y -  ah ) •••(?/- ait)
Gr(x , y) =  G (x , y) +  rs'{x — bi) • • • {x — bw)(y — cl\) • • • (y — aw){y ~  ah) * * * {y ~  ah) 
Then it can be verified that
Fr(x,ai) =  F(x,ai) ,Gr(x,a i)  =  G(x,Oi) and Fr(bh y) =  F{bu y ) ,G r{bu y) =  G{bu y)
for 1 <  i <  w, and for each sit G GF(q): F(x,ait) +  SieG(x,a,it) =  Fr{x,a,it) +  
SiiGr(x,a^). This means that if instead of F(x,y) and G(x,y),  the TA had chosen 
Fr(x,y),Gr(x,y), the colluders had the same information from their secret and the 
observed messages. Now it can be verified that F(bj,ai/) +  sG(bj,ai>) =  Fr(bj,ai>) +  
sGr(bj, a*/) if and only if r =  0. Since r is an arbitrary number in GF(q), and different 
r give different Fr(bj, o</) +  sGr(bj, a*/), this implies that the success probability is 1/q.
Comparing this construction with trivial construction 2, shows marked improve­
ment of efficiency. In particular, let n independent copies of the optimal MRA-codes 
based on polynomial scheme [41] be used. It will result in a (w,n)  tDMRA-code 
C =  (S,£, {Mi,£ i} i< i<n) with parameters \S\ =  #(iHirhi+n) and \£{\ =  and
1*4*1 =  Qw+1 and so the size of the key space for the TA and users are 0 (n lo g q ) .  Thus, 
when n is much larger than t, the key storage for the TA and users can be significantly 
reduced.
4.3.2 A general construction from perfect hash families
In this section, we present a general approach to the construction o f DM RA-codes by 
combining a general A-code and a perfect hash family.
Perfect Hash Families
Perfect hash families (PHF) originally arose as part of compiler design-see [76] 
for a summary of the early results in this area. They have applications to numerous
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areas o f computer science such as operating systems, language translation systems, and 
information retrieval systems -see [32] for a survey of recent results. PHF have also 
been applied to cryptographic applications such as broadcast encryption systems [49], 
secret sharing schemes [20], and threshold cryptography [19, 37].
A  (n, m, w)-perfect hash family is a set o f functions F such that
f  , , n }  — > {1
for each /  G F, and for any A  Ç { 1 , . . .  , n }  such that, \X\ =  w, there exists at least 
a function f x  in F such that f x  is injection on A , i.e. the restriction of f x  on X  
is one-to-one. For a subset A , if the restriction of a function /  on A  is one-to-one, 
then we call f  perfect on A . We will use the notation P H F ( N ; n, m, w) for a (n, rn, w) 
perfect hash family with |F| =  N.
Let Cq =  (<S, £o,Ao)  be a Cartesian A-code (code without secrecy) with deception 
Pd <  e, and assume F =  { / i , . . . ,  f n}  be a P H F ( N ; n, n0, w +  t +  2) from { 1 , . . . ,  n}  to 
{ 1 , . . . ,  no}. We construct a (w, n) tDM RA-code C  =  (<S, £, {A j ,£ j } i< j< n) as follows.
1. Key Distribution: The TA randomly chooses N  matrices of size n0 x n0,
G 1 ~  {9uiv)l<u<noil<v<no^ • • • j  G N  =  (9UiV)l<u<n0,l<v<no
with entries v G Eo, for all 1 <  i  <  N  and 1 <  n, v <  no- For each i, 1 <  i <  n, the 
TA generates the key e* for Pi as a collection of N  matrices each with a single non-zero 
row and a single non-zero column given by,




. 0no ,//(*) J
for all 1 <   ̂ <  A . The TA then securely sends e* to P*. That is, the secret key of Pi 
consists o f the f t (i)th column and the f t (i)th row of matrix G l, for all 1 <  l  <  N.
2. Broadcast: If Pi wants to authenticate a message st € S, Pi generates his 
authenticator ai for s* by
( 5 )
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and broadcasts (i, Si, a*) to all other members. That is, Pi uses his column keys to 
generate the authenticator.
3. Verification: Pj uses his row key
to verify the authenticity of the broadcasted message (i, s*, a )̂ in the following way. 
For each l, 1 <  £ <  N, the /¿(j)th row and the ft (i)th  column of matrix Ge have 
the common entry This is used by Pj to verify if 9ft(j),ft(i)(si) 1S the correct
component of â .
T heorem  4.5 Suppose there exists a Cartesian A-codeCo =  (S ,£ q, A q) with deception 
probability Pd <  e, and a P H F ( N ; n, no, t+ itf-f 2). Then the above construction results 
in a (w ,n ) tDMRA-code C  =  (S ,£ , {A j£ j } i< j< n) with deception probability P£ <  e. 
The various parameters satisfy
\£\ =  \£0\NnK \£j\ =  |5o|(2no_1)w and |̂ -| =  lA P 10* , 1 < j < n
P roo f. Without loss of the generality, we assume that w malicious users are 
Pi, • • •, Pw, after seeing the t broadcast messages from t users, say Pw+u . . . ,  Pt+W, 
the malicious users want to perform an attack on a pair of users Pj and Pj, that 
is, they generate a message (sj,a*) and hope that Pj will accept it as an authen­
ticated message from P*. there are four cases to be considered: Case 1: Pi,P j 0 
{Pw+1? • • • 5 Pw+t}', Case 2: Pi E {P [¿,+1, • • •, Pw+t}, but Pj {P w+1, . . . ,  Pw+t} ‘ Case 3: 
Pi ^ {P«;+i5 • • • 5 Pw+t}, but Pj E {P^-fi , . . . ,  Pw+t}', Case 4- Pi, Pj E: }Pw+1, • • •, P^+t}. 
Let L =  { l , . . . , w  +  t , i , j }  C  { l , . . . , n } .  Then \L\ <  w +  t +  2. Since F is a 
P H F (N ;  n, no, w +  t +  2), it is also a P H F ( N ’,n,no,  |L|). It follows that there ex­
ists a fi  E F such that fi  is one-to-one on L. We consider the ith  component 
keys for P i , . . . ,  Pt, Pt+i, • •. Pw+t, Pi, Pj, their keys corresponding to the matrix Gl . 
Clearly, P i , . . . , P i? pooling their (row and column) keys, has no information about 
) 5 so fhe probability that P i , . . . ,  Pt can correctly generate the partial authen­
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where Pj and Ps denote the deception probability for impersonation attack and sub­
stitution attack of the underlying A-code C  =  (S, Sq,A q), respectively. The desired 
result follows immediately.
Remarks
1. We can slightly improve the key sizes for users and the length of authenticators in
the above construction. Observe that for each 1  <  i <  n, Pi has the partial keys 
9 ft(i),fe(i)’ 1S used to generate ‘partial’ authenticator that can be verified
by Pj, or to verify authenticity of ’partial’ authenticator sent from Pj, when and 
only when f £(i) =  f e(j). However, given that f £(i) =  f e(j), Pi and Pj hold 
the same £th component row and column key corresponding to the matrix Ge, 
and so Pi can use his £th component column key to verify the ith  component 
o f the authenticator sent by Pj. A similar argument applies to Pj for verifying 
authenticity of a message received from Pi. Thus we can remove the ‘partial’ key 
0/i(*)>/i(*)> • • • > 9 /n(*)iIn(¿) without reducing the security of the scheme, except that 
the verification of broadcast messages will use some column keys. In other words, 
the keys in the diagonal of matrices G 1, . . . ,  G N can be removed. In this case, we 
can save AHog |£0| bits for each user’s key and A  log |*4o| bits for each broadcast 
message.
2. The construction also results in a (w', n ) t'DMRA-code if w' +  if =  w +  t. In 
other words, there is a trade-off between the number of senders and the number 
o f malicious users the system can tolerate.
3. For a given set o f parameters, w, t and n, and a given A-code the efficiency of the 
scheme is completely determined by N, the size of perfect hash family F. Let 
N (n, m, w) denote the minimum value of N  such that a P H F (N ; n, m, w) exists. 
Thus we will be interested in perfect hash families with small N (n ,m ,w )  for 
given n, m  and w. In particular, we are interested in the behaviour of N (n, m, w) 
as a function of n, when m  and w are fixed. It is proved in [76] that for fixed 
m  and w, N (n ,m ,w )  is 0 (log n ), however, the proof is non-constructive and 
PHF that achieve this asymptotic bound are believed to be difficult to construct, 
( / (n )  =  0 (lo g n ) means that there exist constants cu c2 and n0 such that for 
n >  n0, ci log n <  f (n )  <  c2 logn.) In [3, 21] some constructions with reasonable 
asymptotic performance are given. For example, for fixed m and w, N  is a 
polynomial function o f log??.. Various other bounds on N (n , m, w ) can be found 
in [76, 3, 32, 19].
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The basic idea behind the above construction is to use N  copies of a (w, no) tDMRA- 
code with small no, to construct a (w, n) tDMRA-code with large n, using a PHF with 
suitable parameters. In the above construction the (w, n0) tDMRA-code is obtained 
through the trivial construction 2, using n0 copies of a MRA-code which itself is ob­
tained from the ‘synthesis’ of an A-code and a trivial cover-free family [111]. Using the 
method identical to the construction given in this subsection, one can use any other 
(w, n0) tDMRA-code in conjunction with the PHF to obtain tDMRA-code for larger 
number of users. The following theorem can be proved.
T heorem  4.6 Suppose there exist a Cartesian (w , no) tDMRA-code C  =  (S , £, {*4 ,̂ Si}i<Kn( 
with deception probability Pd <  e, and a P H F (N ; n, no, t -I- w +  2). Then there exists 
a (w ,n ) tDMRA-code C* — (S, £*, {A }, £ f }i<j<n) with deception probability <  e.
The various parameters satisfy
\£*\ =  \£\N, |£*| <  max {1^1^} and \A*\ <  max {1*4*1^}, 1 <  j  <  n
J l<i<no J l<i<no
4.4 A Secure Dynamic Conference System
To show the usefulness of group authentication systems we will use DMRA-codes to 
construct a secure dynamic conference system. By ‘dynamic’ we means the confer- 
encees are not predetermined and a conference can be held among any c members of 
the group. By ‘secure’ we mean a member of the conference can send a message to all 
other conference members such that collusion of up to w users, not in the conference, 
cannot learn anything about the message, and collusion of up to w members of the 
conference (insiders) cannot substitute a broadcast message with a fraudulent one. We 
note that constructing a dynamic conference scheme that allows private communica­
tion among conferencees is an immediate consequence of a key distribution scheme for 
a dynamic conference. Such schemes provide a shared key among all conferencees that 
can be used to encrypt messages. However there is no authentication in the system 
and encrypted messages can be easily substituted by a malicious group of conferencees, 
without leaving any trace, simply because the key information is shared among mem­
bers of the conference. To provide authenticity in the system we can use a DMRA-code.
In the following we give a construction that uses a key distribution system proposed 
by Blundo, De Santis, Herzberg, Kutten, Vaccaro and Yung [24] (BDHKVY for short) 
and ensures secrecy and authenticity of the communication in a dynamic conference.
K ey  D istribution  System s
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A K ey Distribution Systems (KDS) is one o f the main primitives for distributing 
keys in network and group communication [110]. In a KDS, the collection of all subsets 
o f n users is divided into privileged subsets and forbidden subsets. To each privileged 
subset, G , o f users a secret key, kg, is attached, kg is computable by each member 
o f G  and collusion of members of a forbidden set F , disjoint from G , cannot learn 
anything about kg- A TA generates and distributes secret key information to all users.
If privileged sets are ¿-subsets of V , and forbidden sets are all rc-subsets o f V, we use 
the notation (t, w) KDS. For example, a (2 ,w ) —KDS is a KDS where there is a key 
associated with each pair of users and no key k^jy can be computed by collusion of 
any w users that is disjoint from { i , j } .  A (t, w) KDS is also called a key distribution 
fo r  dynamic conferences. A  naive approach to constructing a (t, w) KDS will result in 
prohibitive cost of key generation and distribution. This can be easily seen by noting 
that a simplistic solution to (2,w ) — KDS is an n2 problem and for t >  2 complexity 
rapidly increases. BDHKVY proposed a (c, ic)-KDS in which each user has to store 
( c"^ ~ 1) \\ogq] bits o f key while the TA has to store (c^w) f l o g b i t s  of key which are 
the minimum possible storage requirements.
B D H K V Y  (c ,w )-K D S :
Before describing the schemes, we recall that a polynomial
p ( x u .. . , x c) =  y  aju...jc{x 1 y i (x2 y 2 ■ ■ ■ (x cy c
o <jl , . . . , jc<W
of degree at most w , where aju_ j c G G F (q ), is said to be symmetric if
P ( x i ,  .  • .  ,  Xc) —  P { x a(y ,̂ . . . ,  £ c r ( c ) )
for any permutation a  : (1 ,2 , — , c }  ->  (1 ,2 , . . . , c } .  The scheme consists of the 
following phases.
1. The TA randomly chooses a symmetric polynomial P ( x i , . . .  , x c) in c variables 
o f degree at most w with coefficients in G F (q ), q >  n.
2. To each user Pi the TA gives the polynomial f i (x 2 , • • •, x c) =  P{i<> £2, • • •, x c), 
that is the polynomial obtained by evaluating P(z, £2, • • • > x c )  at x i — *•
3. If the users Ph , . . . ,  Pjc want to set up a common (conference) key the each user 
Pj{ evaluates f j i (£2? • • •, x c )  at (x 2 , • • • ? x c )  — ( j i 5 - - * ? j i -u ji+ u  • • • ? ic)-
4. The common (conference) key for users Pjx, . . . ,  Pjc is equal to kju.„jc =  P ( j i ,  •.. , j c)•
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When c — 2, BDHKVY scheme coincides with Blom ’s scheme [23].
Given a (c ,w )-KDS, we can easily construct a broadcast encryption system in 
the following way. Assume that the TA wants to send a message s € G F(q) to a 
group of users Pjx, . . . ,  Pjc, or one of the users, Pjx1 wants to send s to other users in 
{ Pj2, . . .  ,P jc}. The TA, or Pjx, encrypts s as b =  s +  kjx̂ ^jc and broadcasts b. Then 
any user in {P jx, . . . ,  Pjc}  can decrypt b to obtain s, by using s =  b — kju.„jc, and 
any group of at most w users that are disjoint from {P /15 • • •, Pjc}  have no information 
about s.
However the communication is not authenticated. That is, the origin o f a message 
is not known and hence there is no accountability in the system. In the following we 
show how to add authenticity to this system without having more key bits.
1. Key Distribution: Assume that there is a BDHKVY (c,w)~KDS, where the TA
has randomly chosen a symmetric polynomial P (x i , . . . ,  x c) in c variables and of 
degree at most w , and privately transmitted the secret information P (i ,x  2 , . . .  , x c) 
to each user P¿. The field GF(q) is chosen such that q >  max{|5|, n + 2 ^  T c —2}, 
where S is the set of source states. To each group of users, { P ^ , . . . ,  Pjc}, of size 
c we associate a number NjXi_ j c such that n <  NjXtmmmj c <  2 ^  and such that if 
{ pji» • • • > p3c}  7^ , Pj'J then \Nju."Jc -  | >  2. The numbers Nju^ jc
will serve as identity information for conferences and are made public.
2. Broadcast: Assume that Ph wants to encrypt a message s e 5  and broadcast it 
such that each user in {P j2, . . .  ,P jc}  can decrypt the message and individually 
verify the authenticity and the origin of the message.
(a) Pjx constructs two polynomials, of degree at most w,
P j i  (^2) f j i  ( X 2 ,  A^lv..jc, . . . ,  ATjlt . . . j c + c  — 2)
G h  (x t )  =  f j i  0&2, j c +  +  c -  1).
Pji then encrypts s with the (conference) key to obtain b =  s+ k ju,„Jc.
(b) Pjx computes the polynomial A jx (X2 ) =  Fjx (x 2 ) +  bGj1 (X2 ) of degree at most 
w , and broadcasts (6, j u A j1 (x2)).
3. Decryption and verification: Each user Pj. in {P j2, . . . ,  Pjc}  can decrypt and 
verify the authenticity of the message broadcast by Pjx: in the same manner as 
(2.1) and (2.2), Pj. can calculate A j.fa ) .  Then, Pji verifies if A j.(ji)  =  A jx(ji) 
holds and if true, accepts the broadcast codeword as authentic from Pj1. Finally 
Pji decrypts b by s =  b -  kju^ jc to get s.
4.5. Computationally secure tDMRA-codes 82
T h e o re m  4 .7  For c >  2, the above construction provides secrecy and authenticity for  
(c, w )-K D S for  dynamic conferences.
P r o o f . Prom [24], we know that the scheme is a (c, w)-KDS. We need to show that 
it provides authenticity for the broadcast message. It is easy to see that,
x 25 • • • 5 +  c — 2) and P{xi,  x 2, Nji,...,jc +  !?•••? +  c — 1)
are symmetric polynomial in two variables o f degree at most w. Because of the prop­
erties of BDH KVY scheme [24], any colluding group of up to w users { P i , . . .  ,P n}, 
which is disjoint form { P ^ P ^ } ,  has no information about,
This is the key information used for authentication between P^ and Pj.. Using the 
optimal DM RA-code (based on Blom ’s scheme) in [111], it follows that the messages 
are authenticated.
A  few notes are in order.
1. Compared with the broadcast encryption scheme based on the BDHKVY KDS, 
the key storage of the above scheme need not to increase, if |*Sj >  (71+ 2Q  + c —2).
2. In the above construction authenticity was added to the codeword broadcast 
from one of the users in a privileged group. We can slightly modify the above 
construction such that the encrypted message can be broadcast by the TA. This 
can done by adding a dummy user for the TA, and construct a (c +  l,u ;)-K D S. 
Then the whole process in the above construction can be carried out to cater this 
setting.
3. We have assumed the same level of security for secrecy and authenticity. In 
general we can have w\ as the biggest size of colluding outsiders (not members 
o f the conference) and w2(<  w\) as the biggest size of colluding insiders.
4.5 Computationally secure tDMRA-codes
The computational model for studying tDMRA-codes so far has been unconditionally 
secure model. Although unconditionally secure schemes offer the highest possible secu­
rity but their key requirements is usually prohibitive and so such systems are usually
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impractical. In practice, data integrity is obtained by using MACs (message authenti­
cation codes) and signature schemes. MACs can be seen as the computationally secure 
version of A-codes. Numerous constructions for MACs exist. MACs can be constructed 
from block cipher systems (for example DES) in CBC mode, or using cryptographic 
hash functions like MD5 and SHA-1. MACs with provable security can be obtained 
through Wegman-Carter constructional].
A very important aspect of ‘synthesis’ constructions for MRA, DM RA and tDMRA- 
code is that they work with MACs too. Each ‘synthesis’ construction essentially com­
bines an A-code with a combinatorial structure: a cover-free family, a KDP or a PHF, 
respectively. By replacing the A-code with a MAC, a system (MRA, DM RA and 
tDMRA-code) with computational security is obtained such that the security can be 
directly related to the security of the underlying MAC and parameters of the combi­
natorial structure.
This universality of ‘synthesis’ constructions is especially important because com­
binatorial techniques, such as constructing systems for large groups that is obtained 
through recursive constructions using PHFs, can also be imported to computationally 
secure model.
4.6 Conclusions
In this chapter, we studied broadcast authentication in group communication. We 
noted that DMRA-codes could be considered as the basic primitive for this service 
and gave two constructions, one optimal and flexible and having a ‘synthesis’ nature, 
for these systems. Although the constructions assume only one codeword sent by a 
sender, but it is not difficult to extend them to multiple messages from the sender. 
When multiple messages are from different senders, a new type of attack must be con­
sidered. The aim of the attack is to tamper with the origin information in a broadcast 
message. Protection against this attack implies that the keys used by two users must 
produce uncorrelated tags and so key distribution systems that establish common key 
among participant cannot be directly used for key distribution in group authentica­
tion systems. We gave two constructions for tDMRA-codes, one algebraic and one by 
a synthesis’ method. ‘Synthesis’ constructions are especially interesting as they are 
universally applicable with A-codes, with and without secrecy, and MACs.
A DMRA-code is a powerful tool for securing group communications. We showed a 
construction for secure dynamic conference systems which provides confidentiality and
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authenticity for communicated messages.
The question o f optimality of tDM RA-code is only answered when t =  1. De­
riving information theoretic and combinatorial bounds for general DMRA-codes, and 
constructing optimal tDM RA- systems are interesting open problems.
Chapter 5
Shared Generation of Authenticator 
Systems (SGA-systems)
Share generation of authentication systems (SGA-systems) are a generalisation of Sim­
mons’ traditional model of authentication where authenticating a message (also called 
a source state) requires collaboration of a group of senders. In a traditional A-code a 
single sender holds the authentication key which is also known to the receiver. In an 
SGA-system the key information is shared by n senders. To construct an authenticated 
message for a source state each sender in an authorised group produces a partial au­
thenticator for the source state and sends it to the combiner who combines them into a 
full authenticator to be appended to the source state. In a (t , n) threshold SAG-system 
any group of t senders is an authorised group and no coalition of t — 1 (or less) senders 
can produce a valid authenticator for a source state (impersonation attack) or, after 
seeing a valid codeword can produce a valid authenticator for a different source state 
(substitution attack). This means that in a (t,n) threshold SGA-systems receiving 
an authenticated codeword implies authorisation of at least t senders. SGA-systems 
are an important cryptographic primitive in distributed systems where a number of 
parties located at distant geographic location are to collaboratively authorise an ac­
tion, sign a document or share responsibility. Unconditional security of these systems 
result in many key bits to be distributed and stored and hence the systems are not 
viable for most practical applications. However, they are the only solution for strate­
gic applications when assurance is required over a long period of time. The need for 
such systems are emphasised by the emergence of new models of computing such as 
quantum computers which could result in time efficient solutions for known hard prob­
lems. Unconditionally secure schemes provide the highest level of security and enjoy a 
conceptual clarity which is not matched by any other approach.
Threshold SGA-systems are part of a general approach to cryptography, known as 
threshold cryptography [35] which has received considerable attention in recent years 
[37]. While computationally secure threshold authentication, e.g. threshold RSA and
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DSS signature [15, 31, 39, 55, 86] have been studied extensively, the information- 
theoretic secure model, i.e. threshold SGA-systems has received much less atten­
tion. Unconditionally secure threshold SGA-systems were first introduced by Desmedt, 
Frankel and Yung [39, 41]. The basic idea behind their schemes is to combine a tradi­
tional A -code and a secret sharing scheme to construct a threshold SGA-system. We 
note that a naive application o f a secret sharing scheme to share the secret authen­
tication key among the senders is not acceptable simply because it requires full trust 
on the combiner and in fact allows him to authenticate any message of his choice and 
without requiring any collaboration from senders, after receiving partial authenticators 
from an authorised group. The key assumption in an SGA-system is that the combiner 
is not trusted and the combining operation does not require any secret information.
In [91], three systems for threshold SGA, including a key efficient system and one 
based on error correcting codes, are proposed. In [54, 73, 44], the SGA-systems with 
a general access structure are considered. In this model, the access structure, that 
is the collection of authorised subsets of senders who can authenticate a message, is 
not (t, n) threshold. In [54], Gehrmann proved an information-theoretic lower bound 
on the deception probabilities of impersonation and substitution attacks which is a 
generalisation of Simmons’ and Brickell’s bounds [100, 27] for traditional A-codes. In 
[44] an efficient construction (short key length) of SGA-systems using maximum rank 
distance codes is described. In comparison, the model in [73] is the most general one 
while the work in [44] and [91], are limited to linear threshold SGA-system and provides 
more efficiency.
In this chapter, we will concentrate on unconditionally secure threshold SGA- 
systems. This restriction allows us to derive combinatorial parameters of these sys­
tems, extend some of the known constructions and present new efficient ones. The 
main contributions of this chapter are listed below.
Combinatorial lower bounds Security and efficiency of a (t,n ) threshold SGA- 
system can be measured by a number of parameters: the overall deception probability; 
the key length of each sender and the receiver; and the lengths of the partial authen­
ticators and the full authenticator. We derive combinatorial bounds on the key and 
authenticator lengths, when deception probability is fixed. We show that the bounds 
are tight and a polynomial construction given in [41] is optimal and meets the bounds 
with equality. This remedies an important shortcoming of the previous work and allows 
us to have clear efficiency comparison of the known constructions.
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K ey  efficient schem es An optimal construction has minimum storage and communi­
cation cost for a given source space and deception probability. However, the only known 
optimal construction has very rigid conditions on parameter values that could result 
in practically unacceptable systems. In particular in the DFY optimal construction, 
the keys and authenticators’ lengths grow with an increase in the source size while the 
deception probability decreases. This means that for very large source sizes, very long 
keys and authenticators must be used and at the same time deception probability is re­
duced to unnecessary low values. Our motivation for key efficient systems is to increase 
deception probability, while keeping it in an acceptably low range, where reducing the 
key and the authenticator lengths hence saving on secure storage and communication 
bandwidth. We give two constructions that accommodate such a trade-off: the first one 
is an extension of a key efficient (t, t) threshold SGA-system in [91] to (i, n) threshold, 
and the second one is a new construction based on error-correcting codes.
R ecursive constructions We extend a recursive construction method, implicitly used 
by Blackburn et al [20] in the context of secret sharing schemes, to SGA-systems. The 
basic construction uses perfect hash families to construct a (t , n) threshold SGA-system 
from a (t , m) one, where n >  m, and its recursive nature means that it can be applied 
repeatedly to construct SGA-system for very large groups. This results in a particu­
larly efficient construction when the number of the senders is large and the size of the 
source space is small.
R obustness In the basic model of SGA-systems, protection is against impersonation 
and substitution which are the two main authentication attacks. A very important 
attack on the system is, however, disrupting the working of the system by sending 
incorrect partial authenticators to the combiner. This will result in calculating an in­
correct full authenticator which would be most likely rejected. If the chance o f success 
for such an attack is high then the service becomes unavailable for the receiver. We call 
a (t , n) threshold SGA-system (t , n) robust if it can correctly produce the full authenti­
cator even in the presence of up to t — 1 arbitrary malicious senders. We discuss system 
robustness and construct two robust SGA-systems, one with unconditional security and 
the second one with computational security in order to achieve the robustness.
The chapter is organised as follows. In section 5.1 we describe the model o f threshold
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SGA-systems and define some important parameters, and then derive information- 
theoretic and combinatorial lower bounds on (t, n) SGA-systems. In section 5.2 we 
present two efficient (t, n) SGA-systems. In section 5.3 we show how to build new 
threshold SGA-systems for large groups from old ones (small groups) by using perfect 
hash families. In section 5.4 we discuss the robustness in SGA-systems and propose 
two constructions. In section 5.5 we study multireceiver SGA-systems.
5.1 Model and Bounds for SGA-systems
In an SGA-system there are
1. a trusted authority, T  A, who produces key information and securely delivers 
them to the required parties;
2. a group o f n transmitters, T  =  {T i, T2, . . . ,  Tn}  with an access structure;
3. a combiner C  who can only be trusted on the designated combining operation 
but may collaborate with the intruders by leaking information;
4. a receiver R  who receivers codewords and is able to verify their authenticity.
Transmitters want to send a source state s E S to the receiver over a public channel. 
A transmitter has an A-code, called a component A-code, which is used to generate 
a partial codeword to be sent to the combiner, and the receiver has an A-code, called 
the channel code which is used for verifying authenticity of a received codeword. The 
combiner uses a public algorithm to combine the partial codewords and produce a 
channel codeword which is sent to the receiver. The receiver uses her A-code and a 
secret key received from the TA to verify the received codeword. All communications, 
between transmitters and the combiner, and between the combiner and the receiver 
are over public channels and subject to spoofing.
Let Q C 2r  denote the collection of subsets of transmitters that are authorised 
to authenticate source states. Q is called the access structure of the SGA-system and 
X  e  Q is called an access set. A (t,n ) threshold SGA-system  is an SGA-system where 
a X  C T  is an access set if and only if \X\ >  t. Transmitters in a non-access set 
may collude to construct a fraudulent codeword. Although an outsider may attack the 
system too, but it is sufficient to consider attacks from colluding groups of transmitters 
as they have access to some key information.
Let S be the set o f source states. An SGA-system consists of three phases.
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1. Key distribution: The TA generates and distributes keys to the receiver and 
each transmitter. We denote the sets of keys for the receiver R  and transmitter 
Ti, 1 < i <  n, by 8  and £*, respectively. We also assume that after the key 
distribution T{ and R  hold the key e* G 8{ and e G £, respectively.
2. Co-authentication: Assume that a qualified group B G T wants to co-authenticate 
a source state s e S. Each transmitter in B generates his partial codeword (or 
authenticator) /¿(s, e*) =  ra* by applying his component A-code /* : S x £ i  -> M h 
and then sends rrii to the combiner. The combiner then uses a publicly known 
combination function
Cb '■ M% —> M
i£ B
to output the channel codeword (or full authenticator) Cs(JlieB mi) =  771 and 
sends it to the receiver.
3. Verification: Assume that the receiver receives a codeword m! from the com­
biner. She first calculates the codeword m =  f ( s , e) using the channel A-code 
/  : S x 8 —> M  and the key received from the TA in the key distribution phase.
If rnf =  m then she accepts it as authentic, otherwise rejects it.
In the sequel, we will use the following notations: (S ,M , 8, f )  denotes the channel 
code for the receiver, (<S, M ,8 i, /¿) denotes the component A-code of the transmitter T<,
1 <  i <  n, and for a subset L =  {zl5 . . . ,  it} C  { 1 , . . . ,  n}, we denote 8L =  8ix x • • • x 8{t 
and Tl =
We will only consider impersonation and substitution attacks.
Impersonation attack: TL <£_ Q, after receiving their secret keys, generate a message 
m e  M ,  and hope that m is accepted by R  as authentic. We denote by Pi[L] the success 
probability of TL in performing an impersonation attack. This can be expressed as
Pi[L] =  max max P (m  is accepted by R  I eT).
eLeSL m£M. 7
Substitution attack: Tl Q, after receiving their secret keys, observe a valid mes­
sage that is transmitted to the receiver and then construct a codeword m! , and hope 
that m is accepted by R. Let Ps[L] denote the success probability o f Tl in performing 
a substitution attack. We have,
=  max max max P (m  is accepted by R  I m, e^).
eLeSL m e M m '^ m e M  V . J  1 ’  '
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We define enemy’s best chance of success in impersonation and substitution attack, 
denoted by Pj and P^, respectively, as,
Pi =  m axP/[L] and Ps =  max P5[L],L L
where the maximum is taken over all possible L £  Q.
The above model and definition is identical to the one used in [73] and for threshold 
constructions in [91]. Both of these papers have focussed on constructions of provably 
SGA-systems and have not considered efficiency of such systems.
The first information theoretic bound on the performance of SGA-systems is given 
in [54] and assumes a slightly different model. The SGA-system, this time acronym 
for secure group authentication, assumes the receiver to also have the role of the TA 
and to generate the required keys for transmitters. We note that this difference in 
the model does not affect analysis of the system as in our model the receiver is also 
assumed trusted. However, in group authentication systems the receiver constructs 
shares o f her secret key, to be used by transmitters, using a secret sharing scheme and 
the combining function is assumed to be addition. That is the combiner simply adds 
the partial authenticators to construct the authenticator for the channel code. This 
model is a special case of our model which allows a general secret sharing scheme to 
be used for combining partial authenticators.
For a set X , let X  to denote the random variable taking values on the set X  with 
respect to a probability distribution on A\ H (X )  denotes the Shannon entropy. The 
following extends Gehrmann’s results [54] to our SGA model and is a generalisation of 
Simmons” and Brickell’s bounds.
Theorem 5.1 In a (t,n ) SGA-system, the following bounds hold.
(i) Pr[L] >
(ii) PS[L] >  2~hW m’El).
Proof. Consider the channel A-code, /  : S x £  —»■ M .  Simmon’s information-theoretic 
bound gives P / >  2~T M̂'E\ where P j denotes the success probability of impersonation 
attack o f the channel A-code. Since TL has the key information eL G SL in accordance 
with the key o f channel A-code e e  £. It follows that P,[L] >  2~i(-m^ El'>. Similarly, 
by applying Brickell’s bound for A-code, we have Ps[L] >  2 h(e \m >el) .
Next we prove combinatorial lower bounds on the keys’ and authenticators’ length 
in a (t, n) SGA-system and for a given deception probability.
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T heorem  5.2 Let Pd =  1 /q be the overall deception probability o f a (t,n ) SGA- 
system. Then the following statements hold
(i) \S\ >  q2 and \M\ >  q\S\;
(ii) If \S\ =  q2, then |£*| >  q2.
P roo f, (i) We denote the overall deception probability of the channel A-code by PD. 
Clearly, PD =  l/q >  Pd - By the well-known square root bound, we have 1 / q >  Pd >  
. It follows that \S\ > q 2- On the other hand, it is clear that Pd >  Pi >  |<S|/|Ad|,
y/W
where Pj denotes the probability of success in impersonation attack o f the channel 
A-code. So |Ad | >  g|c>|.
(ii)We first observe that from the assumption that Pd =  1 /q and \£\ =  q2, we know 
that the channel A-code is perfect and H {E ) =  2 log q. For any t — 1 subset L of 
{ l , . . . , n } ,  we claim H(E\EL) =  H (E ). Let Pi[L\ denote the probability of success 
in impersonation attack by the t — 1 transmitters T^. By Theorem 5.1 we know that 
Pi[L] > 2 ~Tm ‘̂e \el) an(  ̂ PS[L\ >  2~h(<e \m'El\ It follows that
Pi[L]Ps [L] > 2 ~ i (m -,e \e l) - h (e \m ,e l )
> 2 ~ h (e \e l )
> 2 - h (e )





On the other hand,
h  =  p l >  Pi[L\Ps[L]
and so all inequalities in (5.1) hold with equality and in particular H(E\EL) =  H (E ). 
Next we prove that for any t subset K  o f { l , . . . , n } ,  H(E\EK) =  0. Since any t 
subset of transmitters can generate the channel codewords for any source states, it 
means that any t transmitters, T#, pooling their secret keys can uniquely determine 
the authentication function of the channel A-code: f e : S  —y Ad, which is uniquely 
determined by receiver’s key and so H(E\EK) =  0. Finally we show that H (Ei) >  
H (E ) for all 1 <  i <  n. Since, for any t — 1 subset L and i & L, we have,
I(E;Ei\EL) =  H(E\EL) - H ( E \ E i7EL) 
=  H{E\EL) - H { E \ E {i}UL) 
=  H(E\EL) =  H (E ).
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On the other hand,
I(E;Ei\EL) = H(Ei\EL) -H (Ei \E L,E)
< H(Ei\EL)
<
and so H (E i) >  H {E ) for all 1 <  i <  n. It follows that log |̂ *| >  H (Ei) >  H (E ) =  
2 log q, and so \8i\ >  q2, proving the desired result.
Corollary 5.3 Under the assumption of Theorem 5.2, if the bounds in (i), Theo­
rem 5.2, is met with equality, then the length o f the full authenticator is logq.
Proof. The result follows immediately by considering the channel A-code and apply­
ing the result o f A-code.
We will call a (t, n) SGA-system optimal if it meets the bounds in Theorem 5.2 
with equality.
A n  optimal construction One of the first SGA-systems proposed by Desmedt, 
Frankel and Yung [41] used Shamir’s secret sharing scheme in combination with a 
well-known A-code. The scheme referred to as DFY polynomial scheme, works as fol­
lows. Let q be a prime power such that q >  m ax{n, |S|} and S — G F(q). In the 
key distribution, the TA (or the receiver) chooses two random polynomials, P (x )  and 
Q (x), over G F (q) and with degree at most t — 1, and privately sends P (i) and Q (i) to 
transmitter T* for all 1 <  i <  n, and P (0) and Q(0) to the receiver R. To authenticate 
a message s G 5, t transmitters send their partial authenticators A s(i) =  P (i) +  sQ (i) 
and their identity i to the combiner, the combiner, using Lagrange interpolation, cre­
ates the authenticator A s(0), which is the value of polynomial A s(x) =  P (x ) +  sQ (x) 
evaluated at 0, and send the (s ,A s(0)) to the receiver. Then the receiver R  accepts 
(s , A s(0)) as authentic if A s(0) =  P (0) +  sQ(0). It is proved [41] that this construction 
results in a (t,n) SGA-system with Pj =  Ps =  l/q. The system has the following 
parameters |«S| =  q, |£*| =  \S\ =  q2 and so using Theorem 5.2, is optimal. Moreover 
the length o f the tag is log# which is the same as the size of the \M\ =  q\S\.
5.2 Efficient constructions for SGA-system
In an optimal scheme the size o f the authenticator space is inversely proportional to 
the deception probability. In the case o f DFY scheme, q which determines deception 
probability is bounded as q >  max{n, |<S|} and so grows also with an increase in the
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number of participants. This results in very inefficient systems when n is large and S  
is small where tags and keys are very long and PD is unnecessarily low. In this section 
we give two constructions that provide higher efficiency in terms of the tag and the key 
lengths.
A differentiating property of these constructions is the anonymity property. In an 
SGA-system two kinds of anonymity can be considered: first during construction of 
partial authenticators and next during submission of them. An SGA-system may re­
quire a sender to have access to the identities of other members o f a collaborating 
group, before being able to construct his own partial authenticators. In this case col­
laboration for authenticating a message requires the senders’ identity to be revealed to 
other group members. There are also systems in which this information is not necessary 
and a sender can maintain his anonymity when constructing his partial authenticator. 
A second kind of anonymity is with respect to the combiner. An SGA-system may 
require partial authenticators to carry the identity information of the senders for the 
combining operation, while in other systems combining operation does not require this 
information. We refer to these two kinds of anonymity by A1 and A2. It is not difficult 
to find scenarios that each of the above variations is necessary. For example a system 
that provides anonymity of type A1 and A2 can be used to implement a voting system. 
In such a system, the source states corresponds to possible voting outcomes and the 
aim of the vote is to select alternatives that have enough, at least t out of n, support.
5.2.1 (t,n) SGA-system based on modified den Boer A-code
Following the line of DFY construction, our first SGA-scheme can be regarded as a 
combination of the Shamir’s secret sharing scheme with a key-efficient A-code due to 
den Boer [33]. An efficient (t, t) SGA-system based on the (t, t ) threshold secret sharing 
scheme of Karnin et al [68] and den Boer A-code was proposed by Safavi-Naini in [91]. 
We extend this construction to the general (t, n) SGA-system.
Construction I
Assume that the set of source states S  consists of strings o f u bits, where u is a multiple 
of h such that u <  /i2. For each s E S  we write s =  (so, s i , . . . ,  si), £ <  h — 1, where
each Si, 0 <  i <  £, is a block of h bits. Our scheme works as follows. 1
1. Key distribution: The TA randomly chooses two polynomials P(pc) and Q(pc) 
over the finite field G F (2h) o f degree at most t — 1, and n distinct non-zero
elements X i , . . . , x n 6 G F (2h), which are public identities o f the transmitters.
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Then the TA privately sends (P (x i), Q (xi)) to transmitter T* for all 1 <  i <  n, 
and (P (0 ),Q (0 )) to the receiver R.
2. Co-authentication: For a source state s G <S, assume that a group B  o f t trans­
mitters, wants to generate the authenticator for s. Each transmitter T* G P , 
calculates his partial authenticator,
e .
o-i =  Mi +  5 I sA 2i>
i=0
where
=  P(Xi) H T j e B j & j Q  ~  x j )  
n  T j€ B , j& ( X i ~  X j Y
and \  =  Q(xi) H T j e B j & f i  ~  x j )
U T je B , j M x i ~  x j Y
and sends a* to the combiner. The combiner computes the sum of all the received 
partial authenticator from P ,
a = ' ^ 2 ai-
ieB
and m =  (s ,a ) to the receiver.
3. The receiver accepts (s, a) as authentic if a =  P (0) +  Ylj=o sj (Q W Y 3 •
Theorem 5.4 Construction I  results in a (t ,n ) SGA-system with the following param­
eters
| S |  =  2 ( m ) , \M.\ =  2 h | 5 | ,  \£\ = \£i\ = 22h
and the success probability in impersonation and substitution attacks is given by P j =  
2~h and Ps =  2l~h.
Proof. Using Lagrange interpolation, we have P (0) =  E L i and 0 (0 ) =  i ¿̂- 
It follows that
a =  E*=i +  E*=o 1)
-  P (0) +  e JLo T L i x ?
=  P (0) +  E j=o« i(E {= iA i)2i 
=  P (0) +  £ j= o  Sj(Q(0))2j.
So t out o f n transmitters are able to generate an authenticated codeword. To prove 
that Pi =  2~h and Ps =  2e~h, it is sufficient to show that for any K { l , . . . , n }  with 
\ L \ = t -  1, we have Pr[L] =  2~h and PS[L] =  2l~h. Without loss of generality, assume 
that L =  { 1 , . . . ,  t — 1}, and after key distribution, TL hold the keys ( e i , . . . ,  et-\) G 
£x x • • • x S t-1- Let F  =  {e  E S; given ( e i , . . . ,  et-\ )}. That is, F is the set of all
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possible authentication keys of the receiver R  in accordance with the given keys o f TL. 
According to Shamir secret sharing scheme we know that (P (0 ), <2(0)) is independent of 
( (P(xi ) ,Q(a: i ) ) , . . . ,  ((P (x t_ i) ,0 (a ;t_ i))), it follows that F =  £, and so |F| =  \£\ =  22h.
In the impersonation attack, T l  generates a codeword (5, a), s G S  and a G G F (2h), 
and hopes that it will be accepted by R  as authentic. Denote E(s.a) =  {e  G F; e ( s )  =  
a}. That is E(s, a) is the set of the solutions of the following equation
P(0) +  E s i Q ( 0 f  =  a.
i= 0
Using an argument identical to [33], we have |E(s.a)
\E(s.a)\ 2h 
max — r=n—  =  —rr 
seS,aeGF(q)  F 22h
— 2h. It follows that 
=  2 ~ h .
In the substitution attack, T^, after seeing a valid codeword (s ,a ), generates a new 
codeword (s', a'), s' ^  s, and hope that (s', a') will be accepted by R  as authentic. 
Denote E(s.a,s'.af) =  {e  G E(s.a)] e(sf) =  a'}. We claim that \E(s.a,s'.a')\ =  2l . 
Indeed, the numerator gives the equation
ZXs. -  si)(Q(0))2’ = a - a ' ,
2=0
which has at most 2l solutions (values of Q (0)), Using 2h for the denominator, we have 
\E(s.a,s'.a') \ =  2l . It follows,
Ps\L] =  max L J s^s'es





Similarly, we have PZ[L] = 2  h and PS[L] =  2l~h for any t -  1 subset L o f { 1 , . . . ,  n}. 
Thus we have proved the desired result. The proof of the cardinality parameters are 
obvious.
We note that in this construction Pj is only determined by the size of the finite 
field G F{2h) but P$ rapidly increases with the increase in the number of the source 
states. For i  =  0, the construction results in the DFY scheme. We also observe that 
the combining operation for the combiner is the sum of t partial authenticators, and 
so satisfies A1 but does not satisfy A2.
5.2.2 (tjTi) SGA-systems from linear error-correcting codes
In this subsection, we will give a construction from linear error-correcting code. The ba­
sic idea behind this construction is to use vectors o f the dual code for co-authentication
5.2. Efficient constructions for SGA-system 96
and verification process. Let S C  G F (q)£ denote the set of source states obtained by 
defining the following equivalence relation ~  over G F (qY : s is equivalent to s', s ~  s', 
if and only if s =  rs' for some 0 /  r G G F(q). It is easy to see that this relation is 
in fact an equivalence relation. We define S  as the set of equivalence classes obtained 
from It follows that |<S| =  =  q£~l +  ••• +  <? +  1.
C o n s tru ct io n  II
1. K ey distribution: The TA randomly chooses an £ x  t matrix U G G F (qY xt- 
Assume that q >  n + 1  (this assumption is not necessary1). The TA also chooses 
n distinct non-zero elements aq, . . .  , x n G G F(q) (these elements are public and 
are used as the identities of the transmitters), then calculates and secretly sends 
t / ( l ,  X i, . . . ,  a;*_1)T =  OLi G G F (gY  to Ti, for all 1 <  i <  n, and 17(1,0, . . . ,  0)T =  
a, to the receiver R, which consists of the secret keys of T*, 1 <  i <  n, and R , 
respectively.
2. Co-authentication: Assume that a group of t transmitters B =  { T ^ , . . . ,  T ^ t } 
want to co-authenticate a source state s G S. Each transmitter Ti in B sends their 
partial authenticator a* =  sa*  G G F{q) and their identities Xi to the combiner, 
who then computes the authenticator
a  --  (ttfcl 5 Ufc2 5 • • • 5 ®kt )
(  1 1
%ki *£/C2
t-1 t- 1 
\ x ki x k2
1
% k t
xk ~x )  v u y
( l \
0
and send (s, a) to the receiver R.
3. Verification: The receiver accepts (s, a) as authentic if a =  sa.
T h e o re m  5.5 Construction II results in a (t,n ) SGA-system with Pj =  Ps =  l/q. It 
has the following parameters,
| $ |  =  ---------7 , \Si\ = \S\=<Y, and \M\=q\S\.
P r o o f . It is easy to see that any t out o f n transmitters are able to generate
a valid authenticated codeword. We prove that P j =  Ps =  1 /q. Assume that
t — 1 transmitters Tl =  { T i , . . . ,  Tt- i }  want to perform an impersonation attack,
1 Instead, it may choose a t x (n +  1) matrix M =  (M 0, M i , . . . ,  Mn) over GF(q) such that any t 
columns of M  are linearly independent, the secret key of Ti is UM{ and the key of R is UM0.
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and after the key distribution, T, holds the key ah 1 <  i <  t -  1. Let F =  {U e  
GF{q)txm; U ( l , x u . . . , x tf 1)T =  al , . . . , U ( l , x t- 1, . . . , x tzi)T =  at- 1}. That is, F is 
the set of possible matrices that the TA may choose o f in accordance with the keys of 
Tl . We define a mapping 0 : F — > £  by
<j>(U) =  17(1,0,. . . , 0 ) T, W e F .
It is straightforward to verify that (f) is one-to-one from F onto E . It also implies that 
K s key is independent of keys of Tl . In the impersonation attack, T^, generates a 








Similarly, in the substitution attack Tl , after seeing a valid code (s, a), generate a new 
codeword (s', a'), s' ^  s. we have
Ps\L] =  max
(s,a),(s',a'),
\{e E S\ e(s) =  a, e(s') =  a'}\ 




£ -1  '
Clearly the cardinality parameters are obvious, which proves the desired result.
Construction II satisfies A2 but does not satisfy A l. Compared to Construction I, 
the length of authenticator for a codeword of the channel code is very short. However 
\£\ and |£*| must be at least equal to |«S|. This means that the key lengths are at least 
half the key lengths in DFY scheme.
The following corollary is straightforward.
C orollary  5.6 For i  — 2, Construction II results in an optimal (i, n) SGA-system.
5.3 Recursive Constructions
In this section, we introduce a new construction method for threshold SGA-systems. 
The basic idea is to build a (t , n) threshold SGA-system from a (t, m ) SGA-system, 
where n >  m , by using a perfect hash family. The construction method can be repeat­
edly used and so it has the recursive nature.
Recall that an (n, m, t)-perfect hash family is a set of functions F such that
/  : { l , . . . , n }  — y {1 , . . . , m }
for each /  ^  F, and for any X  C { 1 , . . .  , n }  such that \X\ =  t, there exists at least 
one /  E F such that f\x  is one-to-one. We use the notation P H F (N ;n ,m ,t )  for an
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(n, ra, i)-perfect hash family with |F| =  N . When m =  i, P H F (N ;n 1t^t) is called a 
minimal perfect hashing family.
We construct a (t, n) threshold SGA-system by combining multiple independently 
generated instances o f a (i, m) SGA-system, using a (n, m, t ) —perfect hash family. In 
particular, we choose the underlying threshold SGA-system to be the (t , t) threshold 
SGA-system proposed in [91], and the perfect hash family is minimal.
Construction III
Assume that the set o f source states S  consists o f strings of u bits, where u is a multiple 
o f h such that u <  u2. For each s £ S  we write s =  (so, «i, • • •, s*), i  <  h — 1, where each 
s», 0 <  i <  is a block of h bits. Let F =  { / i ,  / 2, . . . ,  / at}  be a minimal P H F (N ; n, t, i) 
from { 1 , 2 , . . . ,  n }  to { 1 , 2 , . . . ,  t } .  The three phases o f a SGA-system are as follows:
1. K ey distribution: The TA randomly chooses two numbers ¡i, A in the finite field 
G F (2 h), where (/¿, A) consists of the key of the receiver R. Then the TA executes 
a total independent N  times (t , t) Karnin-Greene-Hellman secret sharing scheme 
for the same secret (//, A), to produce elements c1, . . . ,  cN £ (G F (2h) x G F (2h)y . 
For each j  £ { 1 , . . . ,  N },  we write c3 =  ( c^- , . . . ,  ctJ), where ckj  =  (¡¿kj, h j )  € 
G F (2 h) x G F (2 h), 1 <  k <  t. Thus we have Yl)Ui A¿fcj =  ^ and £|U i =  A for 
all 1 <  j  <  N . Then the TA privately sends to %  the secret key (d^i , . . . ,  diiN), 
where
for all 1 <  i <  n and 1 <  j  <  N.
2. Co-authentication: Assume that a group of transmitters B  wants to authenticate 
a source state s =  (s0, 5i, • • •, se), each transmitter T{ in B  computes their partial 
authenticator a* =  (a*,i,. •., o*,n ) j where
i
a i , i  =  A S  S k ^ } j ( i ) J
k—0
for all 1 <  j  <  N. Then T* sends and his identity z to the combiner. After 
receiving all the partial authenticator and the identities of B , the combiner uses 
a perfect hashing function fo £ F on B  (that is /& is one-to-one on B ) to calculate 
the authenticator a by
& — ^ ^
TieB
and sends the authenticated codeword (s, a) to the receiver R.
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3. Verification The receiver R  accepts (s, a) as authentic if
a — M +  ^2 Sk^2 •
k=Q
i
T heorem  5.7 Construction III results in a (i,n ) SGA-system with P / =  2 h and 
Ps =  2l~h. It has the following parameters
|<S| =  2^£+1), \M\ =  2ft|«S|, \£i\ =  22hN, and \£\ =  22h.
P roof. In the key distribution, due to the independence o f the N  times o f (t, t) secret 
sharing scheme and the properties of the perfect hashing family, the secret information 
of the transmitters consists of a (£, n) perfect secret sharing scheme. It is easy to 
verify that any t out of n transmitters can generate a valid authenticated codeword. 
We are left to show that Pj =  2~h and Ps =  2f~h. We may regard the system 
consisting of N  independently generated instances of Safavi-Naini’s (t, t) SGA-systems, 
S G A i , . . . ,  S G A n . For any group of transmitters L with \L\ =  t — 1 and each (t,t) 
SGA-system SGA*, we use P f GAi[L] and P f GAi[P] to denote the success probabilities 
of impersonation and substitution attacks for L in S G A j. From [91] we know that 
pSGAi j^j _  2-h anc[ p|GA^[̂ ] — 2e~h. The channel codeword (s , a) is one chosen from 
the N  channel codewords of the N  independent (t , t) SGA-system and so it follows 
that
Pi =  max m ax{P7SGAi[L]} and Ps =  max m a x {P fGAi[L]}
L SGAj L SGAi
where L runs through all the t - 1 subset of { 1 , . . . ,  n }, and SGA* runs over the N  (t, t) 
SGA-systems. Thus we immediately have P7 =  2~h and Ps =  2l~h. The cardinality 
parameters are obvious, proving the desired results.
It can be seen that Construction III satisfies A2 but not A l. This is in contrast to 
Construction I which satisfies A l but not A2.
Now we analyse the efficiency of Construction III. Firstly, the key length for the 
receiver and the authenticator length are the same with Construction I, while the size 
of key for each transmitter has increased N  times (from 2h bits to 2hN  bits). Thus 
the key storage for the transmitters of the resulting system depends on the size of 
the hashing family. It is important to know the minimum value of A , denoted by 
N {n ,m ,t), for given n, m and t and such that a P H F (N ;n ,m ,t )  exists. It is well 
known that [3, 76] N (n ,m ,t)  is 0 (logn ) but the existence result is non-constructive 
and it is believed that a construction with good asymptotic performance is difficult. In 
[3], the authprs give several constructions from known combinatorial objects, in which 
A  is a polynomial function of logn (for fixed m, and t).
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An important feature o f this constructing is that it results in particularly efficient 
systems when the size o f the sender group is large but the size of the source space is 
sm all. We noted that in D FY polynomial construction or our proposed error-correcting 
code construction, the finite field G F(q) must be chosen such that q >  m ax{n, |<S|}, and 
the deception probability, the size of the keys and the length of the authenticator are 
all determined by q. Although it is acceptable to have the key storage and the length of 
authenticator as a function o f the probability o f success, having the number of senders 
and the size o f the source bound by this probability is not reasonable. We give an 
example which shows how to overcome this shortcoming of the optimal construction 
by using our recursive construction method.
E x a m p le  5.1 Assume that the size o f source is very small, say one bit (that is |<S| =  
2), we want to have a (t ,n ) threshold SGA-system with n »  t >  2. Using the known 
optimal construction, the finite field G F(q) must be chosen such that q >  n and we 
have Pd <  1 /n, \£i\ =  \£\ >  n2 and \M\ =  |<S|# >  2n. Now suppose that we are 
satisfied with Pd >  1 /2, without requiring the lower deception probability Pd =  1 /q, 
we would expect to save some key sizes and authenticator length by increasing the 
deception probability o f the straightforward optimal construction. This can be achieved 
by applying our construction method. We first choose the first prime power p such 
that p >  t , then we construct a (t ,p ) SGA-system  (<S, £°, M °) , using D F Y  optimal
construction over G F (p). It has the following parameters: |<S| =  2, \£®\ =  |£°| =  
p2, \M°\ =  2p with the deception probability Pp =  1/p. Next, we use the construction 
method identical to Construction III to obtain a (t,n ) with the underlying (t ,p ) SGA- 
system and a (AT; n,p, t) perfect hash family. The resulting (t , n) threshold SGA-system  
(<S,£i,£, M) has the following parameters: |«S| =  2, \Si\ =  p2N, \S\ =  p2, \M\ =  2p and 
the deception probability Pd <  1/p. While n is much larger than p, both the key size of 
the receiver and the length o f the authenticator, even the key size of each transmitter 
can be significantly reduced.
We note that the method of Construction III can be repeatedly applied, and so it 
is recursive.
5.4 Robust SGA-systems
In this section, we consider a different type of attack in SGA-systems. In authentication 
attacks the aim of the colluders is to construct a fraudulent codeword acceptable by the
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receiver and security of the systems is measured with respect to this attack. However 
a system can be targeted by the attacker and be made largely ‘unavailable’ which in 
the context of authentication means the majority of messages received by the receiver 
are rejected. Without loss of generality we assume that intruders are a colluding group 
of senders who use their key information this time to disable correct functioning of 
the combiner. Their attack consist of injecting partial authenticators or substituting a 
partial authenticator with a fraudulent one. The attackers are successful if the combiner 
accepts the set of partial authenticators and constructs the full authenticator based on 
them which with a very high chance result in the acceptance of the codeword by the 
receiver..
A (t, n) threshold SGA-system is called (£, n) robust if the chance o f incorrectly 
calculating the full authenticator in the presence of up to [£ — 1) malicious senders is 
not bigger than Pp. We are mainly interested in the case that £ =  t and call such 
systems simply robust. This is reasonable as £ < t means that colluding senders have 
a better chance of success in robustness attack and £ > t means authentication attack 
can give them a better success chance and in both cases it is enough to consider only 
that particular type of attack.
A similar concept is studied in the context of threshold signature schemes the main 
difference being that in a robust SGA-system we do not assume an authenticated 
channel between each sender and the combiner while in robust threshold signature 
schemes this assumption is made. Another related problem is secret reconstruction in 
a secret sharing schemes in the presence of malicious shareholders. However in this 
case the only type of attack corresponds to impersonation attack- that is a shareholder 
submitting a wrong share without seeing any other communication.
To construct a robust SGA-system, the combiner must be able to verify the correct­
ness of the received partial authenticators. We require that this verification not affect 
the chance of success in authentication attacks. This means that verification ability of 
the combiner must not rely on the authentication key as otherwise combiner’s collusion 
with the senders must be taken into account. From this point o f view robustness is 
an independent property from authentication and can be achieved using unconditional 
security approach or using computationally secure systems.
We propose two constructions for robust SGA-systems where in both cases robust­
ness in the SGA-system is achieved by adding robustness to the underlying secret 
sharing scheme. In the first construction the combiner is given some secret information
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in the key distribution phase which is used to verify the integrity of the partial au­
thenticators submitted from senders. We call the system Combiner Verifiable Scheme 
(CVS). In the second construction a commitment scheme proposed by Pedersen [81] 
is used in the key distribution phase. This allows public verification of the partial 
authenticators in the authentication phase. We call this system Public Verification 
Scheme (PVS). Both schemes provide unconditional security with respect to authenti­
cation attacks but different levels of security against robustness attack. In particular, 
the robustness CVS guarantees robustness in information-theoretic sense while PVS 
robustness relies on the difficulty of discrete logarithm problem.
5.4.1 Combiner Verifiable Scheme (CVS)
In the basic model o f SGA-systems, the combiner does not participate in the key distri­
bution phase. That is the combiner has no information secret information. In CVS the 
combiner also receives some secret information from the TA, but this secret information 
is independent from authentication key and so is not useful in performing imperson­
ation and substitution attacks. The underlying secret sharing scheme is similar to the 
unconditionally secure VSSs of BGW  protocol [13].
Construction IV
Assume that the set o f source states is S =  G F (q ) and q >  n, the construction of a 
(t, n) SGA-system with cheater detection works as follows.
1. K ey distribution The TA randomly choose a key e =  (//, A) G G F (q ) x G F(q) for 
the receiver R  and two t x  2 matrices M  =  (ai,j)i<i<t,i<j<2 , N  =  {bij)i<i<t,i<j< 2  
over G F(q) with a^i =  n and &i,i =  A. The TA also chooses n distinct non-zero 
elements x i , . . . , x n G G F(q), these elements are public knowledge and used as 
the identities of the transmitters. To each Tu the TA privately sends their secret 
information a  =  {P (x h y ) ,Q (x h y)), 1 <  i <  n; then the TA randomly chooses 
an element 0 ^  c G G F(q) and gives ec  — {P {x , c), Q (x, c), c) to the combiner as 
his secret information, where
P (x , y) =  (1, x , . . . ,  x* 1)M  ^ ^ , Q (x , y) — (1, x , . . . ,  x )N  ^ ^ ^
2. Co-authentication Assume that a group of transmitters A  with \A\ >  t wants 
to authenticate a source state s G S. Each TJ in A  computes the partial au­
thenticator a* -  Hi(y) = P f a y )  +  sQ(xi,y) and sends it together with his
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identity Xi to the combiner, the combiner verifies the integrity o f a* as follows: if 
Hi(c) =  P (x i,c )  +  Q(pCi, c) then is accepted as a correct partial authenticator, 
otherwise the combiner identifies as a cheater (assume that the message from 
Ti to the combiner has not be tampered). After the verification process, assume 
that there are t correct partial authenticators a£l =  (? / ) , . . . ,  a£l =  H£l (y ) from
the transmitters B =  {Th , . . . ,  Tit}  C A, then the combiner, using Lagrange 
interpolation, computes the authenticator m  by,




Then the combiner sends (s, a) to the receiver.
3. Verification The receiver R  accepts (s, a) as authentic if a =  fi +  sX.
T h eorem  5.8 Construction IV  results in a (t , n) SGA-system with cheater detection 
with Pj =  Ps =  1/q. It has the following parameters,
l<5|=9, \M\ =  g|S|, \£\ =  q2, and \£t\ =  q*.
Moreover, the cardinality of the set o f keys of the combiner is \Sc\ =  q2t+1, and the 
probability that transmitter T* successfully cheats the combiner is 1/q.
P ro o f. The various parameters for the system are obvious. As in D FY (t , n) SGA- 
system in [41], using Lagrange interpolation, it is easy to see that any t out o f transmit­
ters can generate the valid codeword for a source state. We are left to prove Pr =  Ps =
1/q. We only prove Ps , the proof of Pr can be done in a similar manner. Assume that a 
group of t - 1 transmitters, say L =  {T u . . . ,  T£_ x}, after observing a valid channel code­
word (s, a), replace it with (s', a') with s ±  s' and hope that it will be accepted by the 
receiver. Denote E ((s.a)) the set of the receiver’s keys for which (s, a) is a valid message.
For a given ei, G El , let E(e.L) be the set of possible key of R  in accordance with e^, i.e. 
E {eL) =  {e  G E\ there exists a key distribution with eL the keys o f L and e the key of R}. 
Thus we have,
p 9rn -  max l^ ((g?a)) n E ((s', a')) n E (eL) |
. ( s , a W , < t ) , e L \ E ((s ,a ))n E (eL)\ ’
s ^ s ’
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We claim that P(e£,) =  S. Assume that the TA has chosen the polynomial P (x ,y ) ,Q (x ,y ) ,  
where the keys for R  and each T* are (P (0,0), Q(0 ,0)), and (P (x il y ), Q(xi, y)), respec­
tively. Consider the polynomials,
P '(x, y) =  P (x , y) +  u(x - x i ) - - - ( x -  x t- i ) (y  -  a)
where u E G F(q), 0 ^  a  E G F(q). Then we have P '(x i,y ) =  P (x i,y )  for all 1 < 
i <  t — 1, and when u run through G F (q ), it will results in q different P '(0 ,0), this 
implies that ¡i is independent of P (x i, y ) , . . . ,  P (x t-u  y). Similarly, A is independent 
of Q (x i, y ) , . . . ,  Q (xt~ i,y ). A direct calculation follows that,
Ps[L] = max
(s,a), (s ',a ') ,e L 
s ^  s'
|P((s,a))nP((s/,aQ)| = 1 
|£?((s,a))| q
Assume that T* wants to cheat by submitting wrong partial authenticator such 
that the combiner accepts it in the generation of authenticator. For a source state s, Ti 
knows his partial authenticator P(x{, y) +  sQ (xi,y ) =  uy +  v. Since Ti does not know 
c, it follows that the probability of T» successfully cheat the combiner is l/q.
We have assumed that the integrity verification of the partial authenticators is 
performed by the combiner. This can be easily generalised to the scenario that each 
transmitter can verify the integrity of partial authenticators of other transmitters. This 
is done by replacing P (x ,y )  and Q (x ,y ) of degree 1 in y with polynomials of degree 
t  (with i  >  t — 1) and giving the transmitters two keys, one for generation of partial 
authenticator and the other for verification of others’ authenticators. More precisely, 
the TA gives (P (x h y )1Q (xi,y ))  and (P {x ,c i) JQ (x ,c i),Ci) ( where a  is a randomly 
element from G F(q)) to transmitter 7J, where (P (xh y ),Q {x h y)) is used to generate 
the partial authenticator of T* while (P (x , c{), Q(x, q ), q ) is used to verify the integrity 
of the partial authenticators of other transmitters. We have shown that in Construction 
IV a single transmitter can not succeed in cheating the combiner with a probability 
higher than l/q. That is, a cheating sender will be identified by the combiner with a 
probability at least 1 — l/q. It can be proved that if k transmitters (k <  n) collude 
to deceive the combiner, their success probability is at most 1 -  (1 -  l/q)k. Finally, 
we point out that Construction I can be modified for the SGA-system with cheater 
detection, if the underlying Shamir secret sharing scheme is replaced by the secret 
sharing scheme with cheater detection as being done in Construction IV.
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5.4.2 Public Verification Scheme (PVS)
Our PVS uses the commitment scheme of Pedersen’s VSSS and combines it with DFY 
threshold SGA-system. We briefly recall Pedersen’s commitment scheme. Let g and h 
be elements in G F(q) such that logp h is intractable and let g and h be public. The 
committer can commits herself to an s G G F(q) by choosing r G G F(q) at random and 
computing C (s,r) =  gshr. Such a commitment can later be opened by revealing s and 
r. It is shown [81] that C (s,r) reveals no information about s and that the committer 
cannot open a commitment to 5 as s', s' /  s, unless she can find logg h.
Construction V
Assume that the set of source states is S =  G F(q) and q >  n, our PVS for (t,n) 
SGA-systems works as follows.
1. Key distribution: Assume that (//, A) G G F{q) x G F(q) is the authentication 
key of the receiver R , and x i , . . . , x n G G F(q) are public identity information 
of the senders. The TA randomly chooses a,/5 G G F(q) and four polynomials 
F (x ), G (x ), a(x ), ¡3(x) of degree at most t — 1
F (x ) =  /¿o +  HiX H--------b H t-ixt_1
G ( x )  —  Ao T  \\X  -f- • • • T  X t - i x 1 ^
Ol{x ) =  OiQ ~b Oi\X +  * • * T  QLt—\X  ̂  ̂
f3(x) =  f t )  H~ ¡3\X +  • • • +  f t _ i r r i - 1
such that ¡i =  fi0, A =  A0, a =  a0 and ft =  ft0. The TA then send (F (x i), a (xi)),
(G (xi), P{xi)) secretly to Ri, i =  1 , . . . ,  n, and broadcasts C(/^, a*) and C(Xi, ft*) 
for i =  0 , 1 , . . . ,  n as described in the Pedersen’s commitment scheme.
2. Co-authentication: Assume that a group of transmitters A  with \A\ >  t want 
to authenticate a source state s G GF{c[). Each T* in A  computes his partial 
authenticator (a*,^), where a* =  F (xi) +  sG (xi) and ri — a (x j) +  s/3(xi), then 
sends it together with his identity X{ to the combiner. The combiner accepts
fi) as a correct partial authenticator if and only if the following holds
9a,hn =  I  
3=0
After the verification process, if there are t correct partial authenticators (a^, r^),
. . . ,  (ajt, Tit) from the transmitters in A, the combine can, using Lagrange inter­
polation, computes the authenticator a =  jF(0)-bs(jr(0) as DFY scheme and sends 
(5, a) to the receiver.
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3. Verification: The receiver R  accepts (s, a) as authentic if a =  p, +  sX.
T h e o re m  5.9 Construction V results in a (t, n) threshold SGA-system with Pi — 
Ps =  1/q. It has the following parameters:
l«s| =  <L \£i\=qS \£\=q21 and \M\ =  g|<S|.
Moreover, it is robust for  t <  n/2 and the robustness is guaranteed based on the discrete 
logarithm problem.
P ro o f . As proved in [81], because of the unconditional secrecy in the Pedersen’s com­
mitment scheme, the key distribution establishes a perfect secret sharing scheme with 
respect to the secret (/i, A). By DFY scheme, it is unconditional secure with respect 
to authenticity. The verification for the partial authenticators is straightforward, its 
security is based on the discrete problem problem as proved in [81]. Various parameters 
are obvious.
The following table compares the parameters of various constructions presented in 
this chapter with the DFY scheme.
Constructions Pi Ps \s\ 1 Et \E\ \M\
DFY 1/9 1/9 q q2 92 92
I 2~h 2 l~h 2e+i 22h 22h 2^+/h-i




i i—i 2~h 2l~h 2̂ hN 22h
IV 1/9 1/9 q 94 92 92
V 1/9 1/9 q qA 92 92
5.5 Multireceivers SGA-system
In this section we introduce a new model, called multireceivers SGA-system , which is 
basically a combination of the SGA-systems and MRA-systems. We present a con­
struction for this model which generalises both DFY schemes for multireceiver and 
multisender A-codes.
In a multireceiver SGA-system , there are four types of participants: a trusted au­
thority TA, a set o f transmitters T  =  {T J  with an access structure, a set of receivers 
R  =  {Æ J and a combiner C. The system consists of three phases:
1. K ey distribution: The TA privately transmits the key information to each par­
ticipant in the system.
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2. Co-authentication and Broadcast Transmitters in an access set generate their 
partial authenticators for a source and send it to the combiner. The combiner 
combines these partial authenticators to generate an authenticated codeword 
which is broadcasted to all the receivers.
3. Verification Each receiver can verify the authenticity of the broadcast codeword.
In such a system, attackers could be several collaborating participants of transmitters 
and receivers, may also include the combiner. We call such attacks collusion attacks. 
We consider a scenario that some of the transmitters and some of the receivers col­
laborate and share their keys, target one of other receivers for cheating. It could be 
possible that the collaboration participants determine the targeted receiver’s key, or 
part of it, and then can cheat successfully.
Assume that the opponents have access to the key information of some participants 
O, where O C  R  U T, they want to cheat one of the receivers Ri, where Ri £ O. 
We define the probabilities of success in the impersonation and substitution attacks as 
follows.
Pj[i,0] =  max P( (s ,a)  accepted by Ri\eo)-eo ,(s ,a)
Ps[i,0\ =  max P ((s ',a /) accepted by i^|(s, a), e0 ). 
where eo  € Eq is the key of participants in O.
D efin ition  5.1 A ((t,n ); (k ,m )) SGA-system with multireceiver with n transmitters 
T =  { T i , . . . , T n}  and m receivers R =  { i ? i , . . . ,  Rm} is a (t,n ) SGA-system with 
multireceiver satisfying Pi[i,0] <  1 and Ps[i,0\ < 1 for all O with \0 D T\ <  t and 
\OHR\< k.
From the definition, we know that in a ((t, n); (k ,m )) SGA-system, any t out of 
n transmitters can generate valid codeword such that every receivers can verify its 
authenticity, while it provides protect against from collusion attacks o f up to t — 1 
transmitters and k — 1 receivers. We define the probabilities of success in the imper­
sonation and substitution attacks in a ((£, n); {k ,m )) SGA-system as follows.
Pi =  maxPAi, O] and Ps =  m axPch, 01 
0 ,i L J o,i L J
where O runs over all subset of T  U R  with |0 fl T\ <  t and |0 fl P| <  k, and i runs 
over all { 1 , . . . ,  m } with Ri 0  O.
It is worth mentioning that SGA-system with multireceiver can always be con­
structed by simply using multiple multireceiver A-systems or multiple SGA-system,
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however, this trivial solution suffers from the inefficiency on the key sizes of the par­
ticipants and the length of authenticator. In this section, we give a construction that 
is much more efficient than the trivial approach.
Construction V I
Assume that the set o f source state S =  G F(q). The three phases of the system are as 
follows.
1. K ey distribution: Assume that n distinct numbers x i , . . . , x n E G F(q) \ {0 }  and 
m  distinct numbers yi,..., ym E G F(q) \ {0 }  are public identities of transmitters 
T i , . . . ,  Tn and receivers i ? i , . . . ,  Rm, respectively. The TA randomly chooses two 
t x  k matrix M. and J\f over G F(q) and constructs two polynomials,






G {x ,y ) =  ( l , x , . . . , x t X)N
1 \
y
\  y k ~ l  )
(a) For each transmitter T<( 1 <  i <  n), the TA privately transmits fi(y ) =  
F (x h y) and gi(y) =  G {xu y) to Tt.
(b) For each receiver R j{ 1 < j  < m ) ,  the TA privately transmits two numbers 
Hj =  F(0, yj) and A j =  G(0, yj) to Rj. 23
2. Co-authentication and broadcast: Assume that t transmitters B  want to authenti­
cate a source state s, each transmitter Ti in B  calculates its partial authenticator 
fi(y) sgi(y) and sends it, together with its identity xi, to the combiner. The 
combiner calculates the polynomial H(x, y) =  F (x , y) +  sG(x, y) and evaluate at 
x — 0, then broadcasts (s, 1/(0, y) to all the receivers.
3. Verification: Every receiver Rj can verify the authenticity of the broadcast mes­
sage in the following way. Rj accepts (s, H(0,y)) as authentic if
H(0,yj) -  \Xj +  s\j.
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T h eorem  5.10 Construction VI results in a ((t, n); (k ,m )) multireceiver SGA-system  
with Pi =  Ps =  1/q- It has the following parameters
|<S| = ?, \Stì\ = q2k, I£Rj \ =  92 an<̂ M\ =  g*|5|.
P roo f. (sketch) Deriving various parameters is straightforward. It is also easy to 
show that any t out of n transmitters can construct an authenticated codeword for 
source state. We are left to prove that Pj =  Ps =  1/#. It is sufficient to show that 
for any O with \0 D T\ =  t — 1 and \0 fl R\ =  k — 1, and P i[i ,0 ] =  P s[i,0 ]  =
1/q for any i with Ri 0  O fl R. Without loss of generality, we assume that O =
{T u . . . ,T t- UR i , . . . ,R k- 1}  and O holds the keys {eTl, . . . ,  eTk_^ eRl, . . . ,  e ^ . J .  Let 
F =  { e Ri G SRi\ e0 =  {eTl, • •., eTk_x,e Rx, . . . ,  eRk_x} } .  That is, F is the set of possible
keys of receiver Ri in accordance with the given keys of O. We show that eRi is
independent of e o . Indeed, consider the polynomial
F (x , y) =  £i_1) .M ( l ,«/, • • •, yk~1)T,
which is chosen by the TA. Let,
t- 1 k- 1
Q (x ,y ) = F ( x ,y )  +  r H ( x - x £) J J ( y - V j ) ,
£=1 j= 1 .
where r G GF(q). Then we have Q (x£,y ) =  F (x £,y )  for all £, 1 <  £ <  t -  1 and 
Vj) =  F(0, yf) for all j ,  1 <  j  <  k -  1. That means that both Q (x , y) and F (x , y) 
will result in the same keys for O. Since n £ i (0  -  x e) Y[kjZ\{yi ~  yf) ±  0, we know that 
Q(0,yi) =  F(0, yi) if and only if r =  0. But r can be any element o f G F(q), which 
results in q possible values of //¿. Similarly, it can be shown that Ai can take q possible 
values consistent with ej. Thus we have shown that the key eRi =  (/¿¿,\f) o f Ri is 
independent of keys e0 of O. That is, F =  ER i=  G F (q )2.
In the impersonation attack, O generate a codeword (s, A {yf) and hope that it will 
be accepted by as authentic. Let,
ERi(s.A (y )) -  { e ^  -  (//¿, A*) G F|A(^) =  m +  sAJ.
It is straightforward to show that for any 5 G G F(q) and A(y)  G GF(q)[y]  o f degree at 
most k — 1 we have \ERi(s, A (y ))| =  q, and so
Pi[0] =  max
seGF(q),A(y)
\ E R iM v ))\
|F| -  q/Q2 =  1/q.
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In the substitution attack, O, after seeing a valid codeword (s, A (y)), generate a 
new codeword (s', A '(y )) with s' ^  s and hope that (s ',A '(y )) will be accepted by R4 
as authentic. Let,
E(s.A(y), s'.A'(y)) = {er, =  {¡iu As) €  F|//j +  sA { = Afa),/*  +  s'A { =  A'(yi)}.
Then we have for any s' G G F(q) and A '(y ), \E(s.A(y), s'.A'(y))\ =  1, and so
\E(s.A(y),s'.A'(y))\Ps[0] = max
s,s 'e G F (q),A(y)A'(y) \ERi(s, A(y))\ 
Thus we have proved the desired result.
=  1/9-
5.6 Conclusions
In this chapter we proved combinatorial lower bounds and gave two key efficient con­
structions for SGA-systems, one based on den Boer A-codes and the second one based 
on error-correcting codes. We introduced a recursive construction based on perfect 
hash family to construct SGA-systems for large groups. We also studied the robust­
ness of SGA-systems and gave two construction for robust SGA-systems. Finally, we 
proposed schemes for multireceiver SGA-systems.
Chapter 6
Multiplicative Secret Sharing
Secret sharing schemes play an important role in the constructions of shared generation 
of authenticators and multireceiver authentication systems.. We propose a new method 
of construction for the multiplicative secret sharing schemes, which are interests in their 
own right.
6.1 Secret Sharing Schemes
Secret sharing schemes, introduced independently by Shamir [96] and Blakely [22], are 
one of the main building blocks of secure distributed computation. A secret sharing 
scheme gives a method of breaking a secret into shares that are distributed among 
members of a group V , called participants, such that only authorised subgroups of V  
can recover the secret. To generate the shares of a secret, a dealer uses a random input 
to select a distribution rule that determines the share given to each participant. In a 
perfect secret sharing scheme unauthorised subgroups do not learn anything about the 
secret. In a (t , n) threshold scheme, any group of at least t out of n users can recover 
the secret.
An important efficiency measure of a secret sharing scheme is the size of share. In 
a perfect scheme the size of a share is at least equal to the size of the secret. Systems 
that achieve this lower bound are called ideal A second efficiency measure is the 
randomness required by the dealer, measured by the randomness coefficient [25], which 
determines the number of random bits for each bit of secret. Bounds on randomness 
coefficient for special access structures are known but little is known in the case of 
general access structures. As noted in [25] because generation of true randomness is 
expensive the amount of randomness required by a system to achieve certain level of 
performance is an important efficiency consideration.
Most constructions of secret sharing schemes, including Shamir’s and Blakely’s orig­
inal constructions, require the secret and the shares to belong to a finite field. This is a
1 1 1
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very restrictive condition and greatly limits applications of secret sharing schemes. For 
example threshold generation of signature in RSA, or shared proof of knowledge for 
graph isomorphism require secret sets and share sets to be ring and group respectively. 
Constructing secret sharing schemes that allow the secret and share set to be less 
structured has been extensively studied. Two important approaches have been homo­
morphic schemes o f Benaloh [12] and multiplicative schemes of Desmedt and Frankel 
[40]. In a homomorphic scheme secret set and share set both have group structure 
and a homomorphic mapping between n-tuples over the share sets and elements of 
the secret set allows recovery of the secret. Multiplicative schemes require even less 
structure on the underlying sets: they only assume a group structure on the secret 
set. Each participant in an authorised group of participants can apply a function on 
its secret share. The combination of those values using the group operation results in 
the recovery of the secret. A special case of a multiplicative secret sharing scheme is a 
linear one. The aforementioned functions on the shares are then homomorphisms from 
the share space to the secret key space. Linear secret sharing schemes were introduced 
by Karnin-Greene-Hellman (for a finite field case) [68].
Shamir’s threshold scheme is a linear scheme. Desmedt and Frankel [40] constructed 
a (t, n ) multiplicative scheme where secret belongs to Z ^ N) and N  is an RSA modulus, 
by generalising Shamir’s construction to polynomial over ¿̂ >(at), with the motivation of 
constructing a threshold RSA signature scheme. The main drawback of the scheme was 
that each participant’s share was n times the size of the secret. That is the construction 
had a share expansion, defied as the ratio of the share size to the secret size, between 
n and 2n, and so was impractical for many situations. The multiplicative property of 
secret sharing scheme were extensively used in applications such as threshold cryptog­
raphy (also called function sharing [34]). Homomorphic secret sharing schemes play an 
important role in voting schemes and in proactive secret sharing [79, 60]. Linear secret 
sharing schemes are important to achieve proactive threshold cryptography (see e.g., 
[51, 50]).
6.1.1 Constructing new threshold schemes from old ones
One of the important approaches to constructing multiplicative (homomorphic, linear) 
schemes has been to use exiting multiplicative (homomorphic, linear) schemes to con­
struct new ones. In [38] a recursive method for constructing new secret sharing schemes 
from old ones was given. One attraction of this construction was that it allowed new 
multiplicative schemes with desirable parameters be constructed from some existing
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ones when the secret belongs to an arbitrary group. This construction in general is im­
practical as it requires many secret sharing schemes with lower threshold and smaller 
group size to exist, and results in schemes with a very high share expansion in the 
general case. However for t =  2 and t =  n — 1 the share expansion is equal to logn 
which is much better than the scheme in [40].
A major improvement on the above construction is a recursive construction due 
to Blackburn, Burmester, Desmedt and Wild [20]( referred to as BBDW  for short), 
who used multiple instances of a (i, m ) secret sharing scheme to construct shares for 
the same secret for a (i, n) schemes where n >  m. Later it was noted [19] that the 
share generation for the new scheme is in fact through application of a prefect hash 
family. Two important aspects of this construction are relatively small share expan­
sion, O (logn), and independence from the algebraic structure of the secret and share 
sets. Compared to the recursive construction in [38], BBDW construction guarantees 
logarithmic share expansion for any size threshold. The construction can be used to 
obtain efficient multiplicative and homomorphic schemes for large groups. In particu­
lar, since by using Karnin-Green-Hellman [68], one can always construct a (t , t) scheme, 
constructing multiplicative (t , n) schemes effectively reduces to the construction of a 
perfect hash family with the right parameters, as share expansions of order O (logn) 
can only be obtained if a perfect hash family with the right set of parameters exists.
A disadvantage of this recursive method is that many instances of the original 
scheme, O (logn) to be precise, is required. Since to produce each instance the dealer 
has to use a new randomly selected share distribution rule, the construction requires 
many random bits to be used and so randomness coefficient of the new scheme is 
O (logn) times the randomness coefficient of the old scheme. Another drawback of 
BBDW approach is that in some cryptographic settings, such as in mutually trusted 
authority free (MTA-free) environments, it might be difficult or even impossible to 
execute multiple instances of the secret sharing scheme with a common secret.
6.1.2 Our results
We introduce a new approach to constructing new threshold schemes from old ones that 
has all the advantages of BBDW recursive construction and results in a new scheme 
whose randomness coefficient is the some as the old scheme. The basic idea is to start 
with the set of shares generated for an instance of the original scheme and then form 
the shares of the new scheme as subsets of the shares o f the old one. To form the 
subsets, we introduce a new combinatorial structure, called a strong cover free family.
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Cover-free families are extensively studied by various authors [47],[111] and have found 
numerous applications in cryptography. Strong cover-free families are a special case of 
cover-free families that can be constructed in a number of ways and in particular using 
universal classes of hash functions and error correcting codes. Distributing shares to 
the new participants according to the blocks of a strong cover-free family results in 
a threshold scheme which inherits security and structural properties of the original 
scheme, that is perfectness, homomorphic and multiplicative property, with the same 
randomness of the original scheme.
Our approach, although produces similar results to BBDW, is quite different in 
nature. In BBDW  scheme the aim is to construct a (t , n) scheme by using many 
instances of a (¿, m) scheme, m  <C n. The shares of the new scheme is a vector of 
subshares and for a ¿-subset the collection of subshares in a particular component 
of the vector allows recovery of the secret. In our scheme again the shares in the 
new scheme is a vector of subshares but construction of the secret for a particular 
¿-subset requires all of their subshares. In both cases the secret remains the same. 
In BBDW  the randomness coefficient of the new scheme is a multiple of that of the 
old one, but in our approach it stays the same. However since the old scheme in the 
two methods are chosen with different parameters, and because little is known about 
the randomness coefficients of multiplicative secret sharing schemes over finite groups, 
it is not straightforward to have a general quantitative comparison of randomness 
coefficients between the two approaches.
We then introduce a new class of authentication codes, called linear A-code and 
show how to construct a SGA-system based on a multiplicative secret sharing scheme 
and a linear A-code.
This chapter is organised as follows. In Section 6.2 we give preliminary definitions 
and then recall the BBDW  scheme. In Section 6.3 we introduce our construction which 
relies on a new type of combinatorial structure, SCFF, for which we give bounds on 
parameters and constructions in Section 6.4 and 6.5. In Section 6.6 we evaluate the 
new approach and propose directions for future research.
6.2 Preliminaries
Let p  =  {P i , . . . ,  Pn}  be a group of n participants and let K, denote the set of secrets. 
We assume Pi s share is selected from the set Si. A (¿, n)-threshold scheme is a pair of 
algorithms: the dealer algorithm and the combiner algorithm. For a secret from JC and
6.2. Preliminaries 115
a randomly chosen element of 1Z, the dealer algorithm applies the mapping
T>: JC xTZ —y Si x . . .  x Sn
to assign shares to participants in V. The combiner algorithm takes the shares of a 
subset B  C  p  of participants and returns the secret, if the set B  C  V  and \B\ > t ,  or 
it fails.
C: U  {Si}->
Pie a
The classic construction of a (t , n) secret sharing scheme is Shamir’s scheme [96], which 
uses Lagrange interpolation on polynomials over finite fields. It has S =  Si =  GF(q) 
and works as follows. To construct a (t, n ) threshold scheme (n  <  q) protecting k G JC, 
let 71 =  G F(q)t~1 and randomly choose n distinct non-zero values x i , . . . , x n G GF(q). 
V  is defined by
V (k, r i , . . . ,  rt- 1) =  . . . ,  f ( x n)),
where f (x i)  =  k +  r\X\ +  r2x? +  • • • +  rt-ix\~x. The values xi are made public (x{ 
is associated with Pi). The function C takes as input at least t valid shares and uses 
Lagrange interpolation formula to compute f ( x )  as
/w=z ffa) n
ie B
(x -  X3 ) 
(Xi -  X j )
where B  Ç { 1 , . . . ,  n } and \B\ =  t, hence reconstructing the secret k =  / (0 ) .
D efin ition  6.1 Let (V ,C ) be a (t ,n ) threshold scheme for  which the key space JC is 
a finite group with respect to the operation % ” . The scheme (V , C) is multiplicative 
over (JC, *) if for all sets B  =  {¿i, ¿2? * * •, it] of t distinct participants there exists a 
family /¿15jb, /¿2jb , • • •, /*4,b of functions from S^ , <S*2, • • •, Sit to JC and a public ordering 
i\,. . .  ,it of the elements of B  with the following property. For all key k G JC and shares 
Sii 5 • • • ? $it that have been distributed to B  by algorithm T1 on input k, we may express 
k in the form:
k — f i \ , B ) * fi2,B(Si2) * • * • * fit,B(Sit)-
It should be noted that multiplicative schemes only require a group structure on 
the set of keys 1C, which is different from homomorphic schemes [12]. However, when 
the functions ^ are homomorphic, then the secret sharing scheme is called linear. 
Shamir s scheme over the finite field Zq is a linear scheme, where fii}B(si£) is defined 
by
fhA^t)= f(xit) n - X,(xie -  Xj)
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One measure for efficiency of the secret sharing scheme can be through the notion 
o f share expansion.
Definition 6.2 Under the above notations, we define the share expansion of a secret 
share scheme as
p — max1 <i<n
Throughout this chapter, all logarithms are to the base 2, unless otherwise indi­
cated.
6.2.1 Blackburn-Burmester-Desmedt-Wild’s scheme
The most efficient construction o f multiplicative secret sharing schemes has been through 
an elegant recursive construction due to Blackburn, Burmester, Desmedt and Wild [20]. 
It uses a perfect hash family and multiple instances of a (t , m) scheme to build a new 
a (t , n) scheme, where n >  m. The original description of the scheme was without 
any reference to perfect hash families. Later Blackburn [19] gave a general description 
o f the scheme using perfect hash families. In the remainder of this section we briefly 
review BBDW  scheme as it will serve as a benchmark to measure performance of our 
scheme.
A (n, m, w)-perfect hash family is a set of functions F such that /  : { 1 , . . . ,  n }  — > 
{ 1 , . . . ,  m } for each /  G F, and for any X  C ^1 , . . . ,  such that |JA | — there exists 
at least a function f x  in F such that f x  is injection on X , i.e. the restriction of f x  
on X  is one-to-one. We will use the notation PiTF(7V; n, m, w) for a (n, m, w ) perfect 
hash family with |F| =  N . Let N (n ,m ,w )  denote the minimum value N  such that a 
P H F (N ;  n, m, w) exists. From [76], we know that for fixed m  and w, N (n ,m ,w )  is 
0 (lo g  n).
BBDW  construction uses a perfect hash family to combine multiple instances of 
an existing threshold scheme to obtain a new threshold scheme with larger number 
o f participants while retaining the same threshold, and with relatively small share 
expansion. Let (V 0, C0) be a (t, m) secret sharing scheme and and let F =  { A , . . . ,  f N}  
be a P H F(N \  n, m, t). BBDW  scheme works as follows.
1. To share a secret k G X , executes the dealer algorithm T)q independently N  times 
to produce c1, . . . ,  cN G Si x • • • x <Sm, where <S* is the share set of zth participant 
in the (£, m) scheme. For each j  G { 1 , . . . , X } ,  write =  (ci j ,  • • • ? cm,j), where 
Ckj G Sk for all 1 <  k <  m.
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2. Define a new (t, n) threshold scheme with n participants V  =  { P\, • • • ,P n } by 
constructing the share =  (d^i , . . . ,  d ^ ) ,  where dij — C f.^ j for all 1 <  i <  n 
and 1 <  j  <  N, and assigning to Pi.
We denote the new (t,n ) threshold scheme as (T>,C).
T h eorem  6.1 ([20, 19]) I f (T>o,Cq) *s a perfect (t,m ) threshold scheme with share 
expansion po, then (T>,C), constructed as above, is a perfect (;t ,n ) threshold scheme 
with share expansion of poN. Moreover, (V , C) is multiplicative provided (V q,Cq) is 
multiplicative.
It is known that P H F (N ; n, m, w) with N  =  O (logn) exists, which means that the 
share expansion in BBDW approach can reach O (logn). In practice, since the existence 
result on PHF that satisfies the bound N (n, m , w ) with equality is non-constructive, 
explicit constructions of P H F (N ; n ,m ,w ) with reasonable size N  is o f interest.
6.3 Our approach
We first give a formal definition of a strong cover-free family.
Definition 6.3 A strong cover-free family is a set system  (X , B) such that the follow­
ing properties are satisfied:
1. X  — { X\, . . . ,  x v}  called points;
2. B =  { B i , . . . ,  Bn} is a set of n subsets o f X , called blocks (Bi C  X ) ;
3. For any A  and any A C  { 1 , . . . ,  n } with |A| =  t and |A| =  t -  1, |ui€Aft| > 
\OjeAPj\-
We will call (X ,B ) a (v, n, t)-strong cover-free family (or (v, n, t) — S C F F  for  short).
The idea behind our new construction is to combine an existing threshold scheme 
and a SCFF to construct a new threshold scheme for large group of participants. The 
construction works as follows. 1
1. Assume (X , B) is a (v , n, i)-SCFF. Let £ be a integer such that minA | >
£ >  maxA | U^a Ai\ where A  runs through all t-subsets o f { 1 , . . . ,  n }  and A runs 
through all (t -  1)- subsets of { 1 , . . . ,  n }. Since (X , B) is a SCFF, such £ exists.
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2. Assume there is a (£,v) threshold scheme (V q,Cq). For a secret k G JC, the v 
shares of (V o, Co) are . . . ,  av.
3. Define a (t,n ) threshold scheme for n participants P i , . . . , P n by constructing 
n share S i , . . . ,  s n  as s* =  {aj | if and only if Xj 6  5 j }  and assigning s» to the 
participants Pi for all 1 <  i <  n.
We denote the resulting (t, n ) scheme as (V, C) and prove the following result.
T h eorem  6.2 I f  (X>o,Co) is perfect, then (T>,C) is perfect. Moreover, if (V q,Cq) is 
multiplicative, then so is (V ,C ).
P ro o f . (Sketch) Clearly, any t participants, . . . ,  Pit say, have |s*1 U• • • Us^| shares 
from the v share of the (£, v) threshold scheme (V q,Cq). From the choice of I, we know 
that t participants can reconstruct the secret by applying the combiner algorithm Co­
Next, any t — 1 participants have no extra information about k provided (Z>o,Co) is 
perfect. Indeed, without loss of generality, assume that P i , . . . ,  Pt~i want to recover 
the secret by using their shares Si U • • • U s*_i Ç  { a i , . . . ,  av}. Since |si U • • • U s*_i| <  £ 
and the underlying (t, v) scheme ( )  is perfect, the claim follows. Thirdly, the 
verification for the multiplicative property is straightforward.
Note that the share expansion p of (Z>, C) is determined by the share expansion pQ of 
(V o, Co) and the parameters of the (v, n, i)-SCFF (X , B). We have p <  maxi<j<n |P*|po- 
In particular, if (P q^Cq) is ideal, i.e. po =  1 and \Bi\ =  r for all 1 <  i <  n, then p — r.
6.3.1 An example
To illustrate the efficiency of our new approach, we compare our construction and 
the BBDW  construction through an example. As noted before BBDW scheme can 
reach logarithmic share expansion. As we will show in section 6.5.2 our construction 
can achieve the same result too. One of the advantages of our method is that unlike 
BBDW  construction that requires multiple instances of the old scheme for the same 
secret, which is difficult or impossible in some cryptographic settings like MTA-free 
[61], it only uses a single instance of the old secret sharing scheme. An­
other advantage of our approach is that the randomness coefficient of the new system 
is the same as the old system while in BBDW scheme it is N  times that of the old 
one. We note that this does not imply that the randomness coefficient in the latter is 
jV times the former simply because the old scheme in the two cases are different and 
in particular in BBDW  the old scheme has much smaller parameters. The following 
example, though contrived to some extent, explains these ideas.
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Example 6.1 Suppose we want to construct a multiplicative (2,70) secret sharing over 
G F (24) (as an Abelian group). Using B B D W  construction, we use a (N ; 70 ,2 ,2 ) perfect 
hash family and N  instances o f the multiplicative (2,2) ideal threshold schemes with 
the same secret. It is well known that (TV; 70,2,2) perfect hash family with optimal 
N  =  [log 70] =  7 does exist. So the share expansion o f the resulting (2,70) scheme is 
max*{log \Si\/log|/C|} =  7, and the dealers randomness is N  x log |/C| =  7 x 4 =  28 
bits.
Now we use our SCFF approach. Let X  =  {x\,X 2 , • • • , #s} o,nd B — {B  : \B\ =  
4 , B C X } .  Then (X , B) is a (8 ,70 ,2)-SCFF. Let the underlying secret sharing scheme 
be a (5,8) multiplicative ideal secret sharing scheme (for example using Shamir’s con­
struction). Then it yields a (2,70) multiplicative threshold scheme, in which the share 
expansion is 4 and the randomness requested is 4 x 4 =  16 bits.
6.4 Bounds
As noted earlier the efficiency of our new construction relies on the parameters of strong 
cover free family used in the construction. In this section we will derive some bounds 
on various parameters of SCFFs.
A trivial construction of SCFF is by letting B to be the collection o f singleton sets 
of X ,  in this case, n <  v. However, for our applications we will be only interested in 
SCFF with n >  v. The following theorem completely characterises the SCFF when 
t =  2.
Theorem 6.3 There exists a (v, n, 2) — S C F F  if and only if n <  ( ^ j ) .
Proof. Assume that (X , B) is a (v, n, 2) -  S C F F , then it is easy to see that there do 
not exist two distinct blocks Bu Bj such that B{ C Bj, i.e., (X , B) is a Sperner Family. 
It is well-known that there exists a Sperner family consisting o f n subsets o f a u-set 
only if n <  (|Jj) (see [28]). Conversely, we can take all [ f  J-subsets o f a u-set, it is easy 
to see that it results in a (v, n, 2)-SCFF with n =  proving the desired result. 
Next, we derive a lower bound on v for given n and t.
Theorem 6.4 In any (v , n, t) — S C F F , we have v >  (t — 1) l o g ^ .
P roo f. Assume that (X , B) is a (v, n, t ) -S C F F .  Let F =  {UieA^  : A  C { 1 , . . . ,  n } \ 
with |A| =  t — l,B i  6 B }. We observe that for any A  ^  A ' c  { l , . . . , n }  with 
|A| =  |A'| =  t - l ,  we have UieABi \JjeAtBj. Indeed, otherwise assume that there
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are A  and A ' with |A| =  |A'| =  t — 1 such that U^a #* =  U j^ B j.  Since A  ^  A ', we 
may assume that there is an element I  G A ', but I 0  A. It follows Ui€Aup}-E?i — CiekBi 
and hence |U*eAup}£*| =  |U»eA-S*|> which contradicts with the assumption that (X , B) 
is a (u,n, t) — S C F F . So we have |F| =  Similarly, it is easy to see that F is a
Sperner family, that is, for any F  ^  F' G F, we always have F  2  F '. It follows that 
|F| <  Since and <  2V, we obtain ( ¿ y ) i_1 <  2V, and so
v >  ( t -  l ) l o g ^ .
The above theorem can be restated as n <  (t — 1)2^ , which gives an upper bound 
on n for given v and t. The following theorem improves the upper bound on n when 
the SCFF has constant size of blocks.
Theorem 6.5 Let (X ,B ) be a (v,n , t) — S C F F  such that we have, for all Bi G B 
\Bi\ =  r. Then n <  Q / ( j l } ) ,  where I — \r/t — 1].
Proof. Assume that (X , B) is a (v, n, i)-SCFF. Let A  be a subset of { 1 , . . . ,  n } such 
that | A| =  t — 1, and let i ^ A. Then we have |A U  {z}| =  t, and so | U  ^Aup} Bj\ >
| UjgA Bj\. It follows that Bi % that is, the union of any t — 1 blocks in B can
not cover any remaining one in B (such a set system is called (v ,n ,t  — 1)-cover free 
family [47]). By Proposition 2.1 of [47], the result follows immediately.
We can show that in any non-trivial SCFF (X , B), that is, |X| <  \B\, the parameter 
t can not be too large relative to n. Indeed, assume that (X , B) is a (v, n, t) — S C F F . 
From the proof of Theorem 6.5 we know that (X , B) is a (v, n, t -  l)-cover-free family. 
By Proposition 3.4 of [47], we have n >  2 A  an(i the desired result follows.
Theorem 6.6 In a (v, n, t) -  S C F F , where v < n, we have t <  \/2n.
6.5 Constructions
The following lemma is essential for our later constructions. 
L em m a 6.7 Let (X , B) be a set system such that
1. \Bi\ =  r, f o r i  G { l , . . . n } ;
2. \Bif) Bj\ <  pi, for  i ^  j  G { 1 , . .  • ,n} .
Then (X ,B ) is a (v ,n ,t ) SCFF provided Q  <r/ fi.
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Proof. Let A  and A be two subset of { 1 , . . . ,  n }  such that |A| =  t and |A| =  t — 1.
We have | Ui6A Bt\ >  -  £  \B{ D B,\ >  tr -  ( ‘ ) / i  =  (t -  l ) r  +  (r -  Q )/i) >
ie  a  i, je  a
(i -  l )r  =  J2\Bi\ ^  I uisA B,\.
j e  A
6.5.1 Constructions from combinatorial designs
In this subsection, we will give some constructions of SCFF from certain combinatorial 
designs, including //-designs, packing designs and orthogonal array. Similar construc­
tions for tractability scheme and frameproof codes can be found in [111].
As before, we will use (X , B) to denote a set system in which X  is a finite set and 
B is a family of subsets of X . The elements of X  and B are called points and blocks, 
respectively. A p — (v,r, A) design is a set system (X ,B ), where \X\ =  v, \B\ =  r for 
every B  E B, and for every //-subset of X  occurs in exactly A blocks in B. We will 
be only interested in // — (v , r, 1) design. It is well known that in a // — (v , r, 1) design 
the number of blocks n is exactly Assume there exists a p — (v,r, 1) design
(X ,B ). Then for each pair B i,B j e  B , we have \BiC\Bj\ <  p — 1. From Lemma 6.7 
the following theorem is immediate.
Theorem 6.8 If there exists a p — (v,r, 1) design, then there exists a (v , (^) / (^)>0~ 
SCFF for any r satisfying Q  <
There are many results on existence and constructions o f p — (v, r, 1) design for 
r =  2,3. On the other hand, no p — (v, r, 1) design with v >  r >  p  is known to exist for 
P >  6. Furthermore, it is known that for 3 <  r <  5, a 2 -  (v, r, 1) design exists if and 
only if v =  1, or r mod (r2 - r ) .  To apply Theorem 6.8, it is required r >  4 and so that
(2) < r /(^  ~  l)? where p =  2. Since 2 -  (v, 4,1) design exists for any v =  1,4 mod 12, 
Theorem 6.8 yields the following result.
Theorem 6.9 There exists (v, 3) -  S C F F  for  all v =  1,4 mod 12.
A p -  (v, r, A) packing design is a set system (X ,B ), where \X\ =  v, \B\ =  r for 
every B e B, and every //-subset of X  occurs in at most A blocks in B. Similar to 
Theorem 6.8, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 6.10 If there exists a p — (v,r, 1) packing design having n blocks, then there 
exists a (v, n, t) -  S C F F  if Q) <
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As we noted previously, no p, — (v,r, 1) designs are known to exist i f v > r > ^ > 6 .  
However, for any p, there are infinite classes of packing designs with a “large” number 
of blocks (i.e. close to Q / ( ^ ) ) -  Such packing designs can also be constructed from 
orthogonal array. Recall that an orthogonal army O A (p , r, s) is a r x s* array, with 
entries from a set of s >  2 symbols, such that in any p rows, every p x  1 column vector 
appears exactly once. In [111], Stinson and Wei showed that if there is an O A (p ,r, s), 
then there is a p — (rs, r, 1) packing design that contains s** blocks. It is well known 
that for any prime power q with ¡jl <  q, there exists an O A(p, q +  l,q ). It follows that 
there exists a p  — (q2 +  q, q 4-1,1) packing design (A , B). From Theorem 6.10, we have 
the following theorem.
Theorem 6.11 For any prime power q and any integer p <  q, there exist (q2 +  
</, ~ S C F F  for  any t satisfying Q ) <
6.5.2 Constructions from universal hashing families
The concept of universal hashing family was invented by Carter and Wegman [29] and 
has found numerous applications in computer science [108].
Let e >  0. A multiset H  of A  function from a n-set A  to a m-set Y  is called 
e-almost universal (e — AU  for short) if for any two distinct elements x i ,x 2 G A , there 
exists at most eN  functions h e  H  such that h(x i) =  h(x2). Without loss of generality 
we will assume that n >  m. We call H  an e -  AU  (A ; n, m) hashing family. The 
following shows that SCFF can be constructed from AU  hashing families.
Theorem 6.12 If there exists an e -  AU(N \n,m ) hashing family, then there exists a 
(A m , n ,t )-SCFF provided Q) <  1/e.
Proof. Assume that H  is an e -  A U (N ;n ,m ) hashing family from S to T. We 
construct a set system (A , B) as follows. Set X  =  H  x T  =  {(fi, t) : h e H , t e T }  and 
B =  {B s : s e  S }, where for each s e  S we define B s =  {(fi,fi(s)) : h e  H }. Then 
it is easy to see that |A| =  A m , \B\ =  n and \BS\ =  A  for each s € S. For each pair 
B s, B s> e B , we have,
l ^ n ^ l  =  |{(fi, h(s)) : h e H } n  {(fi, fi(s')) : h e H } \
=  I {fi : h(s) -  fi(s'), fi e  H}\
<  eN
From Lemma 6.7, we know that (A ,B ) is an (Am , n, t) SCFF if (2) <  =  e’ anc^
the desired result follows.
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e — AU  are strictly related to error-correcting codes (see [17]). Let Y  be an alphabet 
of q symbols. An (N, M ,D ,q ) code is a set C o iM  vectors in Y N such that the Hamming 
distance between any two distinct vectors in C is at least D. The code is linear if q is 
a prime power, Y  =  G F (q ), and C is a subspace of G F (q )N. Then we will denote it by 
an [N, ra, D, q\ code, where m  =  logg M  is the dimension o f the code.
Let C be a (IV, M, D, q) code, we can define a family o f functions H  =  {h u . . . ,  hN}  
from M  to Y,
(M v ) , • • • > hN(v)) =  (ui, . . . , v N)
for any v =  (v i , . . . ,  vn) G M .
The following equivalence is due to Bierbrauer, Johansson, Kabatianskii and Smeets 
[17], we took it from Stinson [108]
T h eorem  6.13 ([108, 17]) 1} there exists an (N, M, D ,q ) code, then there exists a 
(1 — ^ ) — A U (N ; M, q) hash family. Conversely, if there exists an e — A U (N ;n ,m ) 
hash family, then there exists an (N , n, N(1 — e), m) code.
If we apply the above theorem to Justesen codes (Theorem 9.2.4 [118]), we obtain 
a (v, n, i)-SCFF (X , B) with |£?*| =  O (logn), for all Bi G B , and the share expansion of 
the new scheme in our construction is O (logn). Blackburn et al [20] showed a similar 
result by using perfect hash families.
Another application of Theorem 6.13 is to use Reed-Solomon codes. An extended 
Reed-Solomon code is a linear code having parameters [q,t,q — t+ l ,q ] ,  where t <  q and 
q is a prime power. Applying Theorem 6.12 and 6.13 we have the following theorem.
T h eorem  6.14 Let q be a prime power and 1 <   ̂<  q- There exists a (q2, qe, t) SCFF, 
where t <  +  1.
P roo f. Applying the extended Reed-Solomon codes in Theorem 6.13, we know 
that there is a — AU(q , q*, q) hashing family. The result follows immediately from
Theorem 6.12.
Using the recursive construction, Stinson (Theorem 6.1 [105]) proved that there 
exists an i/q — AU{(f\ q2 , q) hashing family. This in conjunction with with Theorem 
6.12 gives us an infinite class of SCFFs.
T h eorem  6.15 Let q be a prime power and let i >  1 be an integer. Let t <  yJW +  1. 
Then there exists a (qi+1,q2\ t) SCFF.
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6.5.3 Construction based on exponential sums
In [59] Helleseth and Johansson used exponential sums over finite fields to construct 
strongly universal hashing families and authentication codes. Motivated by the uni­
versal construction in the previous subsection we show that exponential sums can be 
used to construct SCFF with good parameters.
Let G F(q) be a finite field with characteristic p, and let T rqm/q(a) be the trace 
function from G F (qm) to G F(q) defined by
TTqmjq{pi) =  OL +  OL1 +  • • • +  Oiq .
L em m a 6.16 ([59]) Let f ( x )  =  o>iXl € G F(qm)[x] be a polynomial of degree D  
that is not expressible in the form f ( x )  =  g (x )p—g (x )+ 0  for any g(x) G G F(qm)[x], 0 G 
G F {qm). Let
Na( f )  =  \{x e  G F(qm) : T rqm/q(f (x ) )  =  a}|.
Then Na( f )  <  qm~l +  (D  — 1 )y/q™ for any a  G GF(q).
Let D  <  y/qm, we define a set of polynomials with degree less than or equal to 
D by,
F d =  { f i x )  : f { x )  =  aiX +  a2x 2 H-------h aDx D G G F(qm)[x\, a{ =  0, whenever p\i}.
Then, F D is clearly a (D  — [D/pJ)-dimensional vector space over G F(qm), and so we 
have IF^I =  qm(D- l D/p̂ \ Moreover, it is easy to see that for each / ( x) G F D, f ( x )  can 
not be expressed in the form f ( x )  =  g (x )p -  g(x) +  0, and Lemma 6.16 can be applied. 
That is, for each f ( x )  G Fp  and a  G G F(q), we have Na(f )  <  qm~l +  (D  — l)y/4™• 
For each ß  G G F(qm), we associate a function gß from F D to G F(q) defined by 
gßi f )  =  T rqm/qif iß ) ) .
Let Q =  {gß : ß  G G F (qm)} , X  =  0  x GF(q) and B =  {B f J  G F D}, where 
B f  =  {ig ß ,9 ß (f))  • ß  £ G F(qm)}. We will show that such set systems (X , B) are 
SCFF with appropriate parameters.
L em m a 6.17 \Bj D Bp\ <  qm 1 +  ( D  — l)y/4™, for any f  ^  f  G Fß.
Proof.
\Bf n B f ’ \ =  lifts : 9ßU) =  9ß(f')}\
=  \{ß : T rgm/q(f (ß ) )  =  Trqm/q(f'(ß ))}\
=  \{ß : T r y . / , ( /  -  f ') (ß )  =  0, ß  € G F (qm)}\
<  N o ( f - f ' )
<  q™-1 +  (D  -  l)y/<r
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Combining Lemma 6.17 and Lemma 6.7, we have the following result.
T h eorem  6.18 (X ,B ) is a -  S C F F  provided
Q < Qm/ ( r - 1 +  ( D -  1 )V ^ ) .
The above theorem results in an infinite class of SCFFs with good parameters. For 
example, taking D  =  qml2~l +  1 for any even m, then for any t satisfying Q ) <  q/2, 
applying the above theorem gives a
(^m, qm^rn/2~1 ~L?m/2-1 Ip\), [y/2qm^\) -  S C F F
for all even m. A simple approximation yields that there is an infinite class o f (v, n, t) — 
S C F F s  in which the parameters satisfy logn =  Cy/v logu, where C  is a fixed constant. 
We have (logn)2 =  C 2vi}ogv)2 >  c2u, and so there exists an infinite class of (v, n, t) — 
S C F F  in which v is 0 (( lo g n )2).
6.6 Evaluation
In the following we translate some of the results in the previous section into construc­
tions of new threshold schemes from old ones. Unlike BBDW scheme in which threshold 
value in the old and the new system are the same, in our approach the threshold value 
may change. Given a (i>, n, t) — S C F F  it is straightforward to see that the new scheme 
is a (t, n) threshold scheme. However the old scheme is a (£, v) threshold scheme where 
£ =  minA \ UieA Aj| where A  runs through all ¿-subsets of { 1 , . . . ,  n}. The value o f £ 
must be calculated for each case separately and so in the following we only give the 
parameters of the new scheme.
1. For any integer v =  1,4 mod 12, a (( ,v )  scheme results in a (3 ,1~ i i ) scheme 
(Theorem 6.9).
2. For any prime power q and any integer /x <  q, a (£, q2 +  q) scheme results in (t, ^ )  
scheme provided Q) <  (Theorem 6.11).
3. For any prime power q and integer i >  1, a (£,v) scheme results in a (t,q 2i) 
scheme provided t <  y p f  +  1 (Theorem 6.15).
4. For any prime power q and even m, a (b,qm) scheme results in a (t ,q cmqm/2) 
scheme provided q >  2 ^ ,  where c is some fixed constant (Theorem 6.18).
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For example using q =  81, ¡jl =  3 and the result in 2 we can construct a (t, 813) 
scheme for t <  9. Using the same value of q and i — 2 together with the result in 3 we 
obtain a (t, 814) scheme for t <  10. In the former case the old scheme is a (i, 812 +  81) 
threshold scheme and in the latter case it is a {£, 813) scheme. However finding £ re­
quires careful investigation.
It is tempting to look for a SCFF with i  — v. This will imply that we can construct 
a (t,n ) scheme from a (v ,v ) scheme and as the latter kind of scheme can always be 
efficiently constructed in multiplicative case, construction of multiplicative (t, n) will 
reduce to the construction of appropriate SCFF. However the following theorem shows 
that this is not possible.
Suppose we have a (v ,n ,t )~SCFF with \X\ =  v and \B\ =  n. It is easy to see that 
the addressed problem of constructing a (£, n) scheme from a (v, v) scheme is equivalent 
to the following condition
B h U . . .  U B it =  X  and Bh U . . .  U Bjt_x ^  X . (6.1)
T h eorem  6.19 Let (X , B) be a (v, n, t)-SCFF. If the condition (6.1) holds, then v <  n.
P ro o f . Since (X ,B )  is a (v ,n ,t)~SCFF, from Theorem 6.6, we have t <  y/2n. Now 
if the condition (6.1) holds, then for each j  £ A, Bj D X  \ ^  0. It follows that
FijerBj ¡2 X  \ U*6a £», where T — { 1 , . . . ,  n } \ A . In other words, Cij^Bj % U^a #*• 
Now we consider the set systems (X , B'), where B' =  {B r : B' =  X  \B , B  £ B }. Then 
we have Pî a ^  2  CjerBj. It follows that for any T C { 1 , . . . ,  n } with |T| =  n -  t +  1 
and i £  T we have B[ g  UjerB j. That is, {X ,B ') is a (n -  t +  l)-cover-free family. 
From Proposition 3.4 in [47], we have (n_2+1) <  n-> this contradicts with t <  y/2n as 
we observed already.
This shows that to construct a multiplicative (t, n) scheme using SCFF, we need a 
(P, v) multiplicative with I ^  v. It is interesting to note that in BBDW construction, by 
using a minimal perfect hash family P H F (N , n, t, t) one can construct a (t, n) scheme 
from a (t, t) scheme.
6.7 Concluding Remarks
We proposed a new approach to constructing a new (t, n) threshold scheme from an old 
v ) scheme. The approach can achieve similar efficiency as BBDW approach in terms 
of share expansion, but in practice is not as easy to use. The very attractive feature of
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BBDW  is that the old scheme can be a (t, t) scheme for which an efficient construction 
for all values of t exists. Our approach starting with the same old scheme will result 
in v >  n. However our approach is the only possible approach in environments such as 
MTA-free environment, in which multiple instances o f the old scheme with the same 
secret cannot be guaranteed. With respect to the second efficiency parameter o f a 
threshold scheme, that is randomness coefficient, our approach is likely to be more 
efficient than BBDW scheme. Although making a definite statement requires further 
research and is an open problem. Overall the two approaches are complementary and 
in conjunction with each other can produce threshold schemes with a wide range of 
parameters.
SCFFs, although strictly defined and used in the context of the construction o f new 
threshold schemes from old ones, are of interest in their own rights. Although a (u, n, t)- 
SCFF in general cannot be shown to be a (v, n, t — z)-SCFF, but all the constructions 
given in the present chapter have this property. Construction o f SCFF families for 
which £ =  min& \ U^a A|, where A  runs through all (t — l)-subsets of { 1 , . . . ,  n }, can 
be easily calculated is an open problem of high interest in our approach.
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